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The United States has employed a wide range of foreign policy tools to try to stop 
North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, including two cooperative agreements that 
ultimately failed to produce the desired outcome. The breakdown of the 1994 Agreed 
Framework and the Six Party Talks process in the 2000s has led many to conclude that 
North Korea’s nuclear weapons program cannot be constrained through cooperation. 
According to this view, Pyongyang violated its previous commitments once it received 
economic and political benefits and it will do so again in any future negotiations. The 
underlying assumption is that Washington was fully implementing its own commitments 
until Pyongyang broke the deal. Is this true, or did U.S. domestic politics complicate the 
implementation of the agreements? 
This dissertation explores this question through a four-part case study using three 
analytical lenses: a rational actor model, an institutional interests model, and an 
individual mindset model. It finds that the United States retreated from full cooperation 
with North Korea not just because of Pyongyang’s actions, but also due to domestic 
  
political considerations. Washington reduced its level of cooperation when tolerance for 
concessions weakened in the domestic system, sometimes because of institutional 
interests and sometimes due to political maneuvers by individuals who favored stronger 
coercive measures and more concessions from North Korea. 
The study shows that domestic politics impacts not only the negotiation and 
ratification of international cooperation agreements, but also their implementation. The 
findings also suggest it is incorrect to assume that past engagement efforts did not 
succeed solely due to North Korean actions. Whether a more fully implemented 
engagement policy would have led to North Korea’s denuclearization is beyond the scope 
of this study, but it indicates U.S. policy was not applied consistently to North Korea. 
Any future engagement strategy should aim at a more consistent approach for it to 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
There was opposition to the (Agreed Framework) in the 
United States, which focused in the United States Senate. 
That made it very difficult for the administration to do the 
things it wanted to do. The president decided that the 
political price of (working toward a normal relationship 
with North Korea was) too high. … We did not try to build 
a relationship with North Korea. It’s certainly arguable 
whether we would have succeeded, that is, whether North 
Korea would have reciprocated. My judgment is (it) would 
have.1  
- Former Defense Secretary William Perry 
 
 
The intelligence community (IC) was coming to the 
conclusion that the North was actively attempting to 
acquire a production-scale capacity for uranium 
enrichment. … This was the hammer I had been looking for 
to shatter the Agreed Framework.2 







 The United States has employed a wide range of foreign policy tools to try to stop 
North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. While many have been coercive in nature, the 
United States has also tried to denuclearize the country through two cooperative 
agreements.3 In those accords, Washington, together with other regional powers, 
                                                 
1 William Perry, interview with author, June 13, 2017. 
 
2 John R. Bolton, Surrender Is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations and 
Abroad (New York: Threshold Editions, 2008), 105-106. 
 
3 While the 1994 Agreed Framework was a single document, the Six Party Talks process in the 
2000s produced a 2005 joint statement of principles agreed to by the six countries and two 
implementation agreements in 2007. Despite the number of documents, I refer to the Six Party 
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promised to provide Pyongyang with political and economic benefits in exchange for 
North Korea’s abandonment of its nuclear weapons program. Both ultimately failed to 
produce the intended outcome, and North Korea continues to improve and increase its 
nuclear arsenal today. 
 The failure of the 1994 Agreed Framework and the Six Party Talks process in the 
2000s has led many to conclude that threats from North Korea’s nuclear program cannot 
be addressed through cooperation. According to this view, North Korea violated its 
commitments once it received economic and political benefits promised to the country, 
making it impossible to obtain the outcome desired by those who sought to constrain or 
eliminate North Korea’s nuclear programs. 
 The underlying assumption of this interpretation is that the United States was 
smoothly implementing its own commitments under the agreements. This view assumes 
that when Washington stepped back from full cooperation, it was only reacting to 
Pyongyang’s violations of the agreement, often characterized as willful evasion and 
deceit. But is this the only reason why the United States did not fully implement the 
cooperative commitments it had made to North Korea? 
 Both agreements involved other countries. The Agreed Framework was signed by 
the United States and North Korea in 1994 but required the cooperation of a dozen other 
countries in the implementation phase. The Six Party Talks - involving China, Japan, the 
two Koreas, Russia and the United States – produced a touchstone document in 2005, 
which was followed by implementation agreements reached in February and October 
2007. 
                                                 
Talks documents as a single group of agreements stemming from the 2005 joint statement in this 
dissertation. 
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 Both the Agreed Framework and the Six Party Talks were controversial in the 
United States.4 Some of the sharp differences in the U.S. government were visible at the 
time, through media reports and Congressional testimonies. The contentious policy 
debate and its impact on the policy process have been subsequently described by 
policymakers who participated in the process as well as journalists. Different aspects of 
the two efforts have been analyzed by academics.5   
 The focus of analyses thus far has mainly been on interaction with North Korea 
during crises, the negotiation stage of the two agreements, or the impact of policy on 
North Korea.6 Scholars have asked, for example, why the United States, with all its 
power, did not prevail in the Six Party Talks negotiations.7 Others have concentrated their 
                                                 
4 The two comments in the opening of this chapter is symbolic of the disagreements over the 
Agreed Framework. For such differences in the Six Party Talks, see, for example, contrasting op-
eds in the Wall Street Journal by two key players Condoleezza Rice, “Diplomacy is Working in 
North Korea,” Wall Street Journal, June 26, 2008, 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB121443815539505367 and John R. Bolton, “The Tragic End of 
Bush’s North Korea Policy,” Wall Street Journal, June 30, 2008, 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB121478274355214441. 
 
5 Example of policymakers’ works describing the Agreed Framework include Joel S. Wit, Daniel 
B. Poneman, and Robert L. Gallucci, Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis 
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), Charles L. Pritchard, Failed Diplomacy: 
The Tragic Story of How North Korea Got the Bomb (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution 
Press, 2007), Victor Cha, The Impossible State: North Korea, Past and Future (New York: 
Harper Collins Publishers, 2012), 281-305. Journalists’ works documenting the Six Party Talks 
process are Mike Chinoy, Meltdown: The Inside Story of the North Koreans Nuclear Crisis. (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 2008) and Funabashi, Yoichi. The Peninsula Question: A Chronicle of 
The Second North Korean Nuclear Crisis. (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2007). 
Analytical works by academics that involve the Six Party Talks include Stephan Haggard and 
Marcus Noland. Hard Target: Sanctions, Inducements, and the Case of North Korea. (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 2017) and Leszek Buszynski, Negotiating with North Korea: The 
Six Party Talks and the Nuclear Issue. (Milton Park, England: Routledge, 2013). 
 
6 Chinoy’s Meltdown gives a descriptive account of the internal battles within the George W. 
Bush administration in the agenda-setting and negotiation stages of the Six Party Talks as well as 
the implementation phase until the spring of 2008. The last round of the talks was held in the 
winter of 2008 and work to implement the agreement continued until the spring of 2009. 
 
7 Buszynski, Negotiating with North Korea, 2013. 
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analyses on whether the positive and negative inducements used on North Korea were 
effective.8  
 But the implementation phase was as crucial as the earlier stages for countries to 
achieve their agreed goal. How did the sharp divisions in the United States impact the 
implementation of the agreements? Did government officials and Congressional members 
opposed to the agreements try to prevent their implementation? If so, how? Did 
policymakers and politicians try to shield the agreements from their opponents? If so, did 
that interfere with smooth implementation? These questions have not been explored in 
detail before. 
 This research studies the impact of U.S. domestic politics on the implementation 
of the two agreements, but it does not assume that the blame for their ultimate failure 
rests solely with the United States. North Korea and the actions of other countries also 
mattered to produce the final outcome. Focusing only on the United States, though, 
allows the interaction between domestic politics and the implementation of the two 
agreements to be studied in detail. By doing so, this research seeks to better understand 
the domestic political factors that contribute to the successful (or unsuccessful) 
implementation of security cooperation among countries more generally. 
 
1.2 Research question 
 
 This dissertation uses the Agreed Framework and Six Party Talks agreements as a 
two-part case study to explore when, why and how U.S. domestic politics impacted the 
implementation of the terms of the accords. 
                                                 
 
8 Haggard and Noland, Hard Target, 2017. 
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 More specifically, the research asks the following three questions.  
1) When did domestic political considerations cause the United States to step 
away from full implementation of the terms of an agreement? 
2) When this took place, was it due primarily to interests that can be explained 
on the institutional level, or could it be better attributed to the mindsets of 
individuals?  
3) What was the mechanism through which domestic politics prevented the full 
implementation of the terms of the agreement? For example, did a key 
policymaker change his or her mind about the agreement, or did a group 
supportive of the agreement accommodate the viewpoint of the opponents to 




 The dissertation’s dependent variable is the U.S. implementation of obligations 
under the Agreed Framework and the Six Party Talks. In other words, it is the extent to 
which Washington carried out what was written in the agreement or was explicitly agreed 
to in international negotiations. This is not a binary variable that consists of 
implementation of or deviation from an agreement’s terms. Rather, it can differ in 
degrees, from full implementation to partial cooperation to complete failure in carrying 
out obligations. 
 The independent variable is the U.S. policy process and broader domestic politics. 
That consists of interests at the institutional level, whose influence can be determined by 
domestic structures that gives some agencies more power than others. It also includes 
 6 





 The benefit of conducting in-depth research using the case study method is that 
the causal mechanisms can be explored in detail.9 A microscopic look into the 
relationships among the variables that affected U.S. implementation of obligations under 
the Agreed Framework and the Six Party Talks provides an explanation of greater 
richness compared to a study conducted from an elevated level that obscures the details 
of a case.10 The in-depth analysis is particularly suited for this research as it breaks down 
the components to the individual level, including the impact of people’s mindsets on the 
policy outcome. 
The downside of using a case study approach is that due to its specificity, it may 
have weaker explanatory power for other cases that differ in context.11 The two 
denuclearization agreements with North Korea were particularly contentious in the 
United States and are thus an extreme example of how domestic politics may interfere 
with the implementation of cooperative agreements. Such extreme examples, however, 
can still be instructive for other cases. This is because they often reveal more information 
as the basic mechanism in such cases is starker than in typical cases.12 This allows for a 
                                                 
9 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005.), 21.  
 




12 Bent Flyvbjerg, “Five Misunderstandings about Case-Study Research,” Qualitative Inquiry 12, 
no. 2 (2006): 229-230. 
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close examination of deeper causes at work, and similar dynamics can present themselves 
in milder forms.  
This dissertation uses both primary and secondary data. They include archival 
research including declassified memoranda on U.S. governmental meetings and policy 
papers as well as transcripts of interviews, speeches, press conferences and Congressional 
hearings. They also include legislation, government publications, scholarly journals, 
policy papers by think tanks, news reports and books written by those who were involved 
in the policy process as well as scholars and journalists who researched the topic. 
It also relies on information gained through in-person and phone interviews, 
conversations and e-mail correspondence with 25 policymakers and experts chosen 
specifically for this research and many other interactions with practitioners and observers 
of relations between the United States and North Korea. Those interviewed include U.S. 
negotiators with North Korea and other government officials who were involved in U.S. 
policy coordination meetings as well as those tasked with the technical implementation of 
the terms of the agreement. To learn more about policymakers’ mindsets, the questions 
asked included their view on the utility of the agreements and the engagement approach 
to North Korea. 
 The research uses process-tracing to examine causal mechanisms. This method 
seeks to identify the causal chain by tracing the process that may have led to an outcome, 
forcing the researcher to think about the various pathways through which the outcome 
could have occurred.13 
                                                 
 
13 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development, 206-207. 
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 The research design focuses on two types of subcases drawn from both the 
Agreed Framework and the Six Party Talks. The first type of subcase is when the United 
States did not fully adhere to either the terms of a written agreement or explicitly stated 
obligations or reduced its level of possible cooperation with North Korea without the 
presence of a clear violation on the part of Pyongyang. The other type of subcase is when 
both sides stepped away from full cooperation. The first type of subcase is chosen as the 
impact of domestic politics was seen to be strong, while in the second type, North Korean 
actions had a fair chance of being the sole explanation of U.S. actions. By taking this 
approach, the impact of domestic politics can be observed in the two different types of 
conditions. 
 Deciding whether to declare an action by another state to be a violation of an 
agreement is itself a political process. In this research, North Korean actions that were 
defined by the United States as violations are treated as such. How the actions were 
defined as violations, however, will be examined in detail in the case study chapters 
because that is a way in which domestic politics can affect U.S. implementation. 
 Three analytic models are used to examine the four subcases. The models look at 





                                                 
14 The use of three levels of analysis as complementary frameworks follows the analytical 
framework used in Fredrick Mayer, Interpreting NAFTA: The Science and Art of Political 
Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998). 
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Model 1: The unitary rational actor model  
 This model treats the state as a unitary rational actor that responds to external 
changes.15 A state’s actions may change in reaction to another state’s activity, but 
domestic factors are assumed to be stable. This model is likely to provide the most 
compelling explanation if U.S. decisions were made in reaction to North Korean actions 
and not due to any domestic political factor. 
 
Model 2: The institutional interest model 
 This model introduces interests, or utility-maximizing behavior, of domestic 
institutions into the analysis. The distribution of gains and losses within the domestic 
system is used to explain a phenomenon.16 Because this study involves security matters, 
the institutional gains may not be as clear cut as those in economic cases, where profits 
can be calculated in monetary or other material terms. But the focus here is whether the 
actions of institutions were intended to maximize their benefits within the domestic 
system. Rather than treating the executive branch and the legislature as unitary entities, 
this study looks into groups within them. For example, the White House, the Department 
of State and Department of Defense are treated as separate units in this analysis. This 
model would provide the most compelling analysis if there were no significant internal 
                                                 
15 The model is based on the rational actor model described in Graham T. Allison and Philip 
Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis Second edition (New York: 
Longman, 1999), 23-25. 
 
16 This model is based on the “two-level game” framework established by Robert Putnam and 
explored further by others such as Helen Milner. For example, Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy 




divisions within the separate government units, and competition took place at the 
institutional level. 
 
Model 3: The individual mindsets model 
 In addition to gains and losses of groups included in Model 2, this model analyses 
the preferences of individual policymakers, with particular emphasis on their mindsets, or 
fundamental assumptions about the outside world.17 
Two types of mindsets are used as an analytical tool to interpret the outcomes of 
the subcases. “Cooperators” are differentiated from “Hardliners,” not only by whether 
they prefer a cooperative or coercive method to achieve their goal, but also by the level of 
demand they make on the target country. 
Those who prefer the cooperative approach are prepared to adjust their behavior 
in order to achieve a gain.18 They are open to making concessions in exchange for the 
other side doing the same. Those who favor the coercive approach, on the other hand, 
prefer to apply pressure on an actor to persuade it to adjust its policies. They want to 
threaten or impose economic costs or pain to force a target country to do something it 
does not want to do. The implied threat is that the cost will be increased if the actor does 
                                                 
17 For a discussion on how policymakers interpret the world using assumptions and worldviews, 
see, for example, Jack S. Levy, “Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual 
Minefield,” International Organization 48, no. 02 (1994). 
 
18 The definition of cooperative mindset is adapted from the concept of cooperation in Helen 
Milner, Interests, Institutions and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 7. 
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not concede.19 They oppose making concessions as a tool for changing the other side’s 
behavior. 
The level of demands also matters for the two types. Cooperators believe that 
coexistence with the target country is possible, as long as what they consider core 
demands as being satisfied. In the North Korean case, this means that Cooperators are 
prepared to live with the authoritarian North Korean regime, as long as it takes steps that 
mitigates or eliminates security problems for the United States and its allies. Hardliners, 
meanwhile, have a more ambitious goal, such as the target country’s total capitulation or 
regime change. This may be because they find the North Korean regime distasteful or 
because they believe that lasting denuclearization of North Korea will only be achieved 
through a change in both the leadership and/or the form of the North Korean 
government.20 Generally, Hardliners are more suspicious about the target country and see 
the world as a zero-sum game in which the target country’s gain is the home country’s 
loss. 
 In reality, people are not clearly divided into these two ideal types. Their positions 
may lie somewhere on the continuum of the two. It is also possible that some people 
agree on what type of method to be used – cooperative or coercive – but have different 
                                                 
19 Robert J. Art and Kelly M. Greenhill, “Coercion: An Analytical Overview,” in Coercion: The 
Power to Hurt in International Politics, ed. Kelly M. Greenhill and Peter Krause, (Oxford, 
England: Oxford University Press, 2018), 4-5. An example of another definition of coercion is 
“using threats of force and limited actual force to manipulate adversary decision making,” by 
Daniel Byman and Matthew C. Waxman, The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy 
and the Limits of Military Might (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 18. 
 
20 While the opposite of coercion can be termed as engagement, particularly when discussing 
approaches to take in order to make a country do what you want it to do, I use cooperation here 
since this is a study on the implementation of cooperative agreements, meaning that engagement 
has already taken place. 
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level of demands in mind for North Korea. Others may not care which method is used as 
long as it eventually leads to regime change in North Korea. 
 Policymakers can also change their minds, not only about the level of demands 
made to Pyongyang, but also about whether to take a coercive or cooperative measure to 
achieve that goal. Those who are less committed to an idea are more likely to move away 
from their previous position when faced with new information.21 
 Despite the variations, the two ideal types – the Cooperators and the Hardliners – 
are useful for highlighting the key points of contention in the domestic system and will be 
used as an analytical device to understand U.S. actions.22 
  
 As Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky have said, policy implementation is 
evolution. “At each point we must cope with new circumstances that allow us to actualize 
different potentials in whatever policy ideas we are implementing. When we act to 
implement a policy, we change it.”23 What appears to be a simple task of policy 
implementation often turns out to be a complicated task. 
 Implementation of international agreements can be particularly challenging. 
While such agreements define the parameters of a country’s commitments, they can also 
                                                 
21 Levy, “Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield,” 302. 
 
22 Ideal types of worldviews are used for analysis in Nancy Gallagher, The Politics of Verification 
(Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 5-12. 
 
23 Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky, Implementation: How Great Expectations in 
Washington Are Dashed in Oakland; Or, Why It’s Amazing That Federal Programs Work at All, 
This Being a Saga of the Economic Development Administration as Told by Two Sympathetic 
Observers Who seek to Build Morals on a Foundation of Ruined Hopes (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1984), 177. 
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avoid specifics when they are deemed potentially controversial domestically.24 In other 
words, they are sometimes purposefully written ambiguously, making it difficult to 
measure a country’s actions against them. This can be even more problematic when 
unforeseen contingencies arise. Mindful of this point, this study pays particular attention 
to differing interpretations of written documents. 
 In both the Agreed Framework and the Six Party Talks process, implementation 
of some commitments and the negotiation of others were often carried out in parallel. 
This is because the United States and North Korea — and at times other countries that 
were involved — agreed on the basic plan first and hammered out the details later.  
 Vaguely written terms also leave room for interpretation, which can be interpreted 
in a way that serves the purpose of what policymakers perceive to be appropriate. This 
can be used against the other party in minimizing cooperation. But it can also save the 
collapse of an overall agreement by taking the harshest possible interpretation of the 
terms possible to satisfy domestic critics, while not abandoning the cooperative 
framework altogether. 
 Other factors that can impact the implementation process includes logistical 
problems unforeseen by policymakers in the negotiation stage. Logistics did indeed 
complicate the Agreed Framework and Six Party Talks processes. For example, multiple 
protocols had to be negotiated with North Korea to set the terms of work on its territory. 
This delayed the construction of proliferation-resistant light water reactors that were 
promised to North Korea in the Agreed Framework in exchange for the country’s 
                                                 
24 Charles Lipson, “Why are Some International Agreements Informal?” International 
Organization, No. 4 (Autumn 1991): 498. 
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indigenous graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities.25 The removal of fuel rods 
from the graphite-moderated reactor agreed to under the Six Party Talks took longer than 
the agreed deadline due to concerns that it would expose North Korean workers to 
unacceptable levels of radiation.26  
 At times, problems stemming from the multilateral nature of the processes 
delayed implementation. The Agreed Framework was negotiated by the United States and 
North Korea, but implementation involved South Korea and Japan, along with European 
countries and others. The Six Party Talks negotiations, meanwhile, involved China, 
Japan, the two Koreas, Russia and the United States. Coordination among these countries 
was not always smooth, and sometimes held up progress. 
 This dissertation sifts through such factors and analyzes when domestic political 
variables explain the differences in U.S. behavior, as well as which factors were at work, 
and how they affected implementation.   
By shedding light on how U.S. domestic politics impacted implementation of 
nuclear agreements between the United States and North Korea, this research aims to be 
useful for the implementation of cooperative security agreements in general. Without a 
better understanding of this aspect of international cooperation, a country may incorrectly 
attribute a failure of implementation of an accord solely to the other party and 
overcompensate in response, further worsening the situation. Moreover, when dealing 
with another country, the only portion of activity that is under one’s direct control is 
                                                 
25 Charles Kartman, Robert Carlin and Joel Wit, A History of KEDO 1994-2006, June 2012, 
Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, June 2012, 
https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/publications/a_history_of_kedo_19942006, 32-45. 
 
26 Interview with U.S. government official involved in the process on December 7, 2017. 
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one’s own actions. It therefore makes sense to adjust your own behavior to make an 
agreement work, rather than trying to get the other party to adjust its behavior. 
 
1.5 Current understanding 
 
 The literature on the relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy 
evolved from the study of bureaucratic politics. In the 1971 Essence of Decision, Graham 
Allison showed that treating a state as a unitary rational actor was not enough to explain 
the Cuban Missile Crisis. He demonstrated that a fuller understanding can be achieved by 
bringing bureaucratic politics and organizational interests into the analysis.27 
Since then, scholars have analyzed the domestic institutional design of foreign 
policy-making28 as well as the reciprocal influences between international and domestic 
politics29 to better comprehend the relationship between domestic politics and foreign 
policy.  
 These analyses have focused on the internal structures of the state. When 
individuals are mentioned, it is usually in the context of their share of power in the 
domestic system that allows them to realize their policy preferences.  Moreover, analyses 
in this field typically center on the interests of groups or individuals in the system. 
                                                 
27 While Graham Allison first published his book analyzing bureaucratic politics in 1971, 
references here will be from the second edition by Allison and Zelikow. Essence of Decision. 
 
28 For example, I.M. Destler, Presidents Bureaucrats and Foreign Policy 2nd ed. (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1974) and Morton H. Halperin, Priscilla. Clapp, and Arnold. Kanter, 
Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1974). 
 
29 The most influential work is Robert Putnam’s “two-level game” metaphor.  Robert D. Putnam, 
“Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games.” International Organization 
42, no. 3 (1988): 427–60. 
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Mindsets that determine those interests have not been given much attention, even if some 
works have pointed to their importance.30 Idea-driven approaches to policy decision 
making have been more common in works that have foundations in psychology31 or 
foreign policy learning. 32 While some studies used social beliefs33and other conceptual 
frameworks34 to understand how policy decisions are made, the impact of mindsets on 
policy decisions remains an understudied field.  
Another gap in knowledge concerns how domestic politics impact the 
implementation of international agreements. Literature on this topic in the international 
arena mainly consists of studies of peace agreements between warring factions in civil 
conflicts.35 Other studies of politics during the implementation phase have focused on the 
domestic policy front, which showed that policies are transformed during the 
implementation process.36 
                                                 
30 For example, Robert J. Art, “Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique.” 
Policy Sciences: Integrating Knowledge and Practice to Advance Human Dignity 4, no. 4 (1973): 
467–90. 
 
31 For example, John Steinbruner, Cybernetic Theory of Decision: New Dimensions of Political 
Analysis (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974). 
 
32 Jack S. Levy gives an overview of this field in Jack S. Levy, “Learning and Foreign Policy: 
Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield.” International Organization 48, no. 2 (1994): 279. 
 
33 Judith Goldstein, Robert O. Keohane, ed. Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and 
Political Change (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993). 
 
34 Gallagher, The Politics of Verification, 1999. 
 
35 For example, Stephen John Stedman, “Implementing Peace Agreements in Civil Wars: Lessons 




36 A classic work is Pressman and Wildavsky, Implementation. 
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Some scholars have studied specific aspects of the implementation process for 
international agreements. Allison and Philip Zelikow showed how it is affected by 
organizational characters and routines.37 Morton Halperin, Priscilla Clapp and Arnold 
Kanter, argued that the differing preferences and tactics of domestic groups can 
complicate the process. They discuss how presidential decisions can vary in specificity, 
and that lower-level officials may not faithfully implement them because they are unsure 
what they are being asked to do, unable to carry out what they believe they have been 
ordered to do or because they refuse to do what they are told. They can resist, for 
example, by delaying actions or obeying the letter but not the spirit of the order.38 
This dissertation builds on such works and explores when and how domestic 




 The central claim of this dissertation is that domestic politics impacts not only the 
negotiation and ratification of international security agreements but also their 
implementation. The pulling and hauling of domestic politics continues and affects the 
implementation phase. As the analysis of the four subcases in the following chapters will 
show, the United States moved away from full implementation of the terms of its 
agreements with North Korea not just because of Pyongyang’s actions, but also due to 
domestic political considerations. Even in the two subcases where North Korea and the 
                                                 
37 Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision, 176-177. 
 
38 Morton H. Halperin, Priscilla. Clapp, and Arnold. Kanter, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign 
Policy, (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1974), 243-272. 
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United States both stepped away from cooperation, U.S. behavior cannot be fully 
explained by the realist model alone. 
 U.S. domestic politics affected the implementation of nuclear agreements with 
North Korea in two ways. One was in determining the outer limits of what was possible 
to implement. This finding confirms the view of many works on bureaucratic politics 
which argue that domestic politics can constrain international cooperation. But domestic 
politics also played a more proactive role, such as when domestic political considerations 
partly prompted U.S. officials to pursue a more coercive strategy in implementing the 
country’s agreement with North Korea, while not breaking the accord entirely.39 
 When a split in opinion existed mainly among institutions, institutional interests 
were sufficient to explain U.S. government actions. But more often, institutional interests 
provided only a partial explanation of the outcomes in the sub-cases. A fuller 
understanding of when and how domestic politics impacted the implementation process 
could only be achieved through an analysis at the individual level including their 
mindsets. 
 The important question is whether there were key actors who strongly preferred 
coercive approaches rather than cooperative ones in dealing with North Korea, and the 
extent of concessions they demanded from the country. When Hardliners were 
                                                 
39 The need to look at domestic politics for explanations for a country’s strategy on the 
international level has been mentioned by Helen Milner. She says the reasons for analyzing 
domestic politics when studying international cooperation are important because 1) it reveals how 
preferences are aggregated 2) it helps explain the strategies adopted to attain goals and 3) without 
ratification in the domestic arena, implementation will not take place in “International Theories of 





influential, there was less tolerance for concessions to North Korea in the domestic 
system. To ease the concerns of at least some Hardliners, the Cooperators, who preferred 
the cooperative approach and who found the level of demands in the agreements 
satisfactory, nevertheless scaled back cooperation with North Korea, increased the scale 




This dissertation makes two contributions to the literature in the fields of 
international security cooperation and policy implementation. 
First, it adds to the understanding of the impact of domestic politics on the 
implementation of international security agreements, an understudied area. The research 
shows how some of the dynamics seen in the negotiation stage continue in the 
implementation phase of international agreements. 
Secondly, it shows the utility of using individual-level mindsets to study the 
interaction between domestic politics and international security agreements. While there 
is a body of work on the relationships between domestic politics and foreign policy, most 
of the literature focuses on the interests of institutions or individuals. Few researchers 
study the impact of mindsets that shape those interests. 
 This dissertation also makes a practical contribution. If domestic impediments 
prevented the United States from fulfilling the terms of the agreements, then the 
assumption that engagement did not work solely due to North Korean actions is incorrect. 
Whether a more fully implemented engagement policy would have led to North Korea’s 
denuclearization is beyond the scope of this study. But if domestic politics interfered with 
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U.S. implementation of the agreements, it raises the possibility that the policy of 
engagement may not have been applied consistently to North Korea. If so, any 
assessment of policy should include the possibility that cooperative arrangements have 
failed not just because of North Korean actions, but because of inducements that were not 
extended fully, or in a timely manner.  
 There are also implications for the credibility of the United States. If the United 
States does not keep its word or is seen as not keeping its word, North Koreans will have 
less reason to believe that Washington’s future promises will be credible. This could 
make future engagement efforts more difficult. If the United States is seen as being less 
than reliable in keeping its word, it could also create problems in its negotiations with 
other countries. 
 
1.8 Organization of this dissertation 
 
 The dissertation consists of eight chapters. 
 Chapter two provides an overall framework of the topic through a brief review of 
the relevant literature from the fields of cooperative security, the relationship between 
foreign policy and domestic politics as well as policy implementation. 
 Chapter three provides the background of the Agreed Framework and the Six 
Party Talks as well as North Korea’s nuclear development efforts. This is intended to put 
overall U.S.-North Korea relations into context. 
 Chapter four evaluates the first type of subcase regarding the Agreed Framework 
of 1994 to assess the impact of U.S. domestic politics on its actions. The question asked 
is: Why did the United States hold back from more generous cooperation when it lifted 
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sanctions against North Korea? This was the case in which when no clear violations were 
observed on the North Korean side. It finds that in this case, institutional interests provide 
a key explanation. The executive branch, which wanted to make the agreement work, 
adapted an approach that would be acceptable for Congress, which was generally 
opposed to or highly skeptical about the Agreed Framework. 
 Chapter five analyzes the second type of subcase regarding the Agreed 
Framework, in which both the United States and North Korea deviated from the 
agreement. The questions asked are: Why did the United States treat the intelligence 
community’s 2002 assessment that North Korea was procuring material and equipment 
for an industrial-scale uranium enrichment program as a violation of the Agreed 
Framework when the accord did not explicitly prohibit this program? Why did the United 
States respond by stopping the shipment of heavy fuel oil? The study finds that an 
analysis involving individual mindsets best explains how this happened. The 
interpretation of the Hardliners that North Korea’s uranium enrichment was a violation of 
the deal and should be punished became policy as they successfully promoted this view 
while the Cooperators harbored varying levels of doubt about the Agreed Framework and 
some were preoccupied with other foreign policy issues. 
 Chapter six studies a subcase in the Six Party Talks process, in which the United 
States did not adhere to the terms of originally stated obligations despite no clear 
deviations on the North Korean side. The question asked is: Why did the United States 
advance the schedule for the establishment of a verification protocol for North Korea’s 
nuclear activity and expand its scope in 2008? It finds that the Cooperators faced pressure 
from opponents to produce results to justify the diplomatic path. When North Korea 
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refused to explain its uranium enrichment activity, they incorporated some coercive 
tactics promoted by their opponents, while trying to prevent the complete destruction of 
the cooperative framework. 
 Chapter seven analyzes a subcase in the Six Party Talks process involving 
violations on both sides. The question asked is: Why did the United States decide in 2008 
to end the provision of economic benefits to North Korea under the Six Party Talks due 
to a disagreement over sampling? An analysis that uses individual mindsets shows that, 
faced with North Korean intransigence and domestic pressure, the Cooperators 
incorporated the views of the Hardliners. 
































 This dissertation aims to reveal the mechanisms through which domestic politics 
impacts implementation of international security cooperation, while focusing primarily 
on how the United States dealt with its obligations under the two denuclearization 
agreements with North Korea. To do so, it synthesizes and builds on existing research in 
a broad array of fields ranging from bureaucratic politics to policy implementation. 
 This chapter gives an overview of the literature this research draws on. It first 
defines the concept of cooperation to put the two denuclearization agreements in context, 
followed by a discussion on the concept of coercion which will be used in the study. It 
then discusses relevant literature on the relationship between domestic politics and 
foreign policy, beginning with the evolution of bureaucratic politics, followed by theories 
that focus on the design of domestic political institutions to explain a country’s foreign 
policy behavior. This is followed by the “two-level game” model that links the 
international and domestic political arena by describing a framework in which negotiators 
bargain at both levels to obtain an agreement. It then discusses the assumption in many of 
the models that material interests and policy preferences drive the behavior of actors in 
the foreign policy process, followed by theories that deal with ideas as explanations of 
decision-making in diplomacy. It then moves to analyses of the implementation phase of 
policy decisions. It concludes with a discussion about how this research synthesizes the 




2.2 Defining cooperation and coercion 
 
 In the broadest sense, this dissertation concerns the interaction between domestic 
politics and international cooperation. Following a number of scholars who have relied 
on Robert Keohane’s definition, cooperation is defined here as an adjustment of the 
behavior of actors to the actual or anticipated preferences of others through a process of 
policy coordination.40 
Policy coordination is a process of negotiation, through which individuals or 
organizations are brought into conformity with one another.41 Cooperating states modify 
their behavior to decrease the negative impact it will have on other parties in exchange 
for the other side doing the same, although the balance of benefits between the parties 
may vary. 
Cooperation does not always have to be explicit. As Robert Axelrod shows in The 
Evolution of Cooperation, cooperation can take place without such bargaining and formal 
agreements. Games such as the Prisoners’ Dilemma show that cooperation can evolve 
through reciprocity and prove to be stable.42 
 The two agreements that are the focus of this study, however, fall in the category 
of explicit cooperation. North Korea twice agreed to halt its indigenous nuclear program 
and eventually abandon it, and the United States agreed to end sanctions and improve 
                                                 
40 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political 
Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 51-52. 
 
41 Ibid., 51. 
 




relations with North Korea in return.43 From Washington’s perspective, it made policy 
accommodations to achieve its foreign policy goal of North Korea’s denuclearization. 
The implementation of the agreements thus equals the implementation of international 
cooperation. 
 The United States could have taken the other road of coercion to try to achieve its 
goal of denuclearizing North Korea. Unlike cooperation, coercion applies pressure on an 
actor to persuade it to adjust its policies. It imposes or threatens cost or pain to a target 
country to get it do something it does not want to do. The implication is that the cost will 
increase if the actor does not concede. Coercion often involves the use of military action 
or military threat, although it can involve other instruments of persuasion such as 
economic sanctions and international isolation. It can include the use of positive 
inducements, although it is never carried out through such incentives alone.44 
 A key difference between cooperation and coercion is the existence of 
accommodation. While cooperation necessarily includes concessions by one country in 
exchange for the same from another country, that is usually not a part of the coercion 
process. The question of whether to accommodate the other state at some level to make it 
do what one wants it to do is a key concept used in this study. 
Both cooperation and coercion are means to obtain a foreign policy goal. What is 
the goal to be pursued? Literature on coercion has explored various aspects of 
                                                 
43 “Agreed Framework Between the United States of America and the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea,” Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), accessed 
May 7, 2018, http://www.kedo.org/pdfs/AgreedFramework.pdf, and “Joint Statement of the 
Fourth Round of the Six Party Talks Beijing 19 September 2005,” State Department, accessed 
May 7, 2018, https://www.state.gov/p/eap/regional/c15455.htm. 
  
44 Art and Greenhill, “Coercion: An Analytical Overview,” 4-5. 
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concessions that a state requests of another, including what type and magnitude of 
demands are associated with success45 as well as what happens when extreme demands, 
such as regime change, are made.46 This study uses the magnitude of demands, in 
combination of the idea of cooperation and coercion, to understand policymakers’ 
mindsets that determine policy. 
 
2.3 Bureaucratic politics 
 
 This study looks at domestic politics, rather than relying solely on international-
level explanations, to understand a country’s foreign policy actions in the diplomatic 
arena. This is because while international-level analysis that treats domestic factors as 
stable provides some explanation of how the United States implemented the Agreed 
Framework and the deals stemming from the Six Party Process, analysis on that level 
leaves some unanswered questions. 
   Graham Allison’s seminal 1971 Essence of Decision showed that treating a state 
as a rational unitary actor was insufficient to explain all aspects of the Cuban Missile 
Crisis. He developed two alternative conceptual models, the Organizational Behavior 
Model and the Governmental Politics Model, to better explain actions by the United 
States during the crisis.47 
                                                 
45 Art and Greenhill, “Coercion,” 22-25. 
 
46 Alexander B. Downes, ”Step Aside or Face the Consequences,” in Coercion: The Power to 
Hurt, ed. Greenhill and Krause (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018) 93-114. 
 
47 Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision, 5. 
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 Of particular interest to this dissertation is the Governmental Politics model. This 
model interprets government behavior as resulting from decisions made not by a single 
actor but multiple actors engaged in “the pulling and hauling that is politics.” In this 
model, players “focus not on a single strategic issue but on many diverse intranational 
problems as well,” and “act in terms of no consistent set of strategic objectives but rather 
according to various conceptions of national, organizational and personal goals.”48 
 
2.4 Domestic politics and institutional design 
 
 There is a long-held belief in the United States that foreign policy actions should 
be and are in fact bipartisan, as can be inferred from the famous statement, “politics stops 
at the water’s edge.”49  But as any government official can attest, foreign policy in reality 
can be just as contentious as domestic political issues.50 
From the 1960s and 1970s, studies have analyzed how domestic politics impacts 
diplomacy, with a focus on the institutional design of the government, particularly the 
                                                 
48 Ibid., 255. Noteworthy critics of Allison’s work are Stephen Krasner, who contends that 
Allison underestimates the president’s power in Stephen D Krasner, “Are Bureaucracies 
Important? (Or Allison Wonderland),” Foreign Policy, No. 7 (Summer 1972), and Jonathan 
Bendor and Thomas Hammond, who challenge the internal logic used in Allison’s models in 
Bendor and Hammond, “Rethinking Allison’s Models.” The American Political Science Review 
86, no. 2 (1992): 301–22.  
 
49 The statement was made in 1947 by Senator Arthur Vandenberg. See Robert J. Lieber, “Politics 




50 Helen Milner and Dustin Tingley point out the deep link between domestic politics and foreign 
policy in Milner and Tingley, Sailing the Water’s Edge: The Domestic Politics of American 
Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015). 
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office of the president. In many of these studies, domestic politics acts as a constraint on 
coherent foreign policy. 
Morton Halperin described the complexity of the process, using President 
Johnson’s decision on the antiballistic missile system (ABM) as an example.51 In 
Halperin’s model, the president does not offer specific instructions but maintains 
ambiguity and allows the bureaucracy and Congress to engage in a tug-of-war, which, in 
the case of the ABM, prevented a single actor from dominating the process. 
Richard Neustadt’s analysis that presidential power is “the power to persuade” 
and that power is “the power to bargain”52 also describes the need for give-and-take 
within the domestic system: the president may not always get what he desires. 
The gap between what presidents intend as policy and what the bureaucracy does 
in reality is also the subject of I.M. Destler’s analysis. He explores the question of how 
governments can be organized for “purposive and coherent” foreign policy.53 
 Literature in this field looked for domestic political variables to explain how a 
country’s foreign policy is formed and carried out. It shows that the internal 
characteristics of a country have a significant impact on what it does in the diplomatic 
realm. This dissertation builds on these insights, particularly regarding the nature of the 
                                                 
51 Morton H. Halperin, Priscilla. Clapp, and Arnold Kanter, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign 
Policy (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1974). 
 
52 Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of 
Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan (New York: Free Press, 1991), 32. 
 
53 I.M. Destler, Presidents Bureaucrats and Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1974), 4. 
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power of the president’s office as well as how key advisors try to influence the 
president’s decisions. 
 
2.5 Interaction between the international and domestic levels 
 
While foreign policy actions have been analyzed on the international and 
domestic levels from various angles, the interaction between them remained largely 
unexplored until Robert Putnam provided a link through his “two-level game” framework 
of analysis.54 
 Putnam’s model assumes that executive branch leaders typically try to manipulate 
domestic and international politics simultaneously to achieve a foreign policy goal. 
Diplomatic moves are constrained by both the limit of acceptance by the other party, as 
well as what the domestic constituencies are willing to accept. The executive engages in a 
“Janus-faced” or “double-edged” diplomacy, in which the statesman tries to gain a 
bargaining advantage on the international stage while winning the support of the 
domestic audience.55 
 Putnam’s model emphasizes the role of the executive who simultaneously 
calculates the constraints as well as opportunities on the domestic and international levels 
to determine the outcome of bargaining.56 
                                                 
54 Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games.” 
International Organization 42, no. 3 (1988): 427–60. 
 
55 Peter B. Evans, Harold Karan. Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam, Double-Edged Diplomacy 
International Bargaining and Domestic (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 15. 
 
56 Ibid., 17.  
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 Many studies have refined the “two-level game” framework since Putnam 
introduced it in 1988. For example, Helen Milner takes a closer look at the domestic 
elements that determine decision making in her book Interests, Institutions, and 
Information.57 In this model, Milner examines four players in a two-level game, namely 
the home country’s executive, the foreign counterpart, the home country’s legislature and 
interest groups. The actors all try to achieve an outcome that is as close as possible to 
their “ideal point” of preferred policy.58 While the foreign government is treated as a 
unitary actor, the other three players represent different groups within the home country 
trying to maximize their utility. 
 This study uses the core insights gained through the two-level game framework, 
which is that the key executives need to obtain approval both on the international and 
domestic level to make an agreement work. Of particular interest to this study is the 
necessity for the officials to obtain the approval from key actors in the domestic system 
since policy agreements usually cannot be implemented without their consent. 
 
2.6 Focus on interests 
 
 The theories and models mentioned above assume that material interests drive the 
preferences and choices of actors in the domestic or international system.  
 In her analysis, Milner separates the concepts of interests and preferences. In her 
definition, interests are the actors’ “fundamental goals, which change little.”59 The 
                                                 
57 Helen V. Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International 
Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 67-70. 
 
58 Ibid., 71. 
 
59 Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information, 15. 
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interests of economic actors are maximizing income, while the interests of actors in the 
political field are usually winning elections and retaining office.60 
Preferences, meanwhile, refer to the specific policy choices that actors believe 
will be useful in pursuing their interests. While actors in the domestic system may share 
the same interest, their preferences in policy may vary due to such factors as what their 
constituencies demand from them.61  
Through a study of cases involving international economic cooperation, Milner 
concludes that cooperation on the international level is determined more by the domestic 
distribution of gains — in other words, who in the domestic arena gains from the 
cooperation — than any fear that other countries may cheat or take advantage of the 
home country.62 
Another important finding in Milner’s study is that while domestic politics in 
general makes cooperation difficult on the international stage, the division between the 
executive and legislative branches of the government made it even more difficult for 
negotiations to succeed.63 
Milner’s theory is developed further in a later book written together with Dustin 
Tingley, Sailing the Water’s Edge, that includes not only interests but also the elements 
of ideas as determinants of foreign policy. 
                                                 




62 Ibid., 234. 
 
63 Ibid., 235. 
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In this analysis, the two scholars introduce ideology as a motivation for the 
actions of domestic actors. They define ideology as a “set of beliefs held by an individual 
about politics and foreign affairs that is consistent internally, contrasts with others 
individuals’ beliefs, is relatively stable through time and is non-expedient – that is, does 
not reflect their immediate, short-term material interests.”64 Ideology matters because that 
impacts how citizens evaluate leaders and vote in the next legislative or presidential 
election.65 In this work, ideology is still a factor that contributes to the ultimate motivator, 
which is interest. 
A notable characteristic of these works is that they treat separate branches of the 
government as unitary actors. Milner offers three justifications for that in Interests, 
Institutions and Information. She says that given the power of the prime minister or 
president, the leader can be assumed to be the executive in some cases. In others, a 
cabinet minister in charge of a particular issue can be considered to be the executive, as 
the minister is likely the most important decision maker in a specific policy question. In 
still other cases, the cabinet minister who holds the swing vote in a policy decision can be 
regarded as the executive. All of these cases lead to a single outcome and therefore, she 
says, the assumption of the single entity is justified. 
 Treating the executive and legislature as single units, however, limits our 
understanding of how a decision is made. Similar to the debate over treating a state as a 
unitary rational actor, treating a branch of the government as a single actor does not 
                                                 
64  Milner and Tingley, Sailing the Water’s Edge, 57. 
 
65 Unlike Interests, Institutions and Information, whose case studies concerned economic 
cooperation, Sailing the Water’s Edge explores non-economic aspects of foreign policy, 
analyzing policy instruments such as immigration, geopolitical aid and military deployments. 
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explain why its action at times seems irrational. For this reason, this study will look at the 
individual level to seek an explanation of events. 
 
2.7 Focus on ideas 
 
 Some scholars who study bureaucratic organizations have discussed the 
importance of ideas and mindsets impacting foreign policy behavior. 
 In his Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs originally 
published in 1971, Roger Hilsman develops a “political process model”66 that treats states 
as an organization consisting of individuals with different degrees of power. He 
acknowledges that the “policy convictions” of individuals play a role in policy 
decisions,67 but does not go into detail about how they do so. 
 Critiques of the bureaucratic politics model have emphasized the role of ideas. 
Robert Art contends that the fundamental assumptions of individuals, which he refers to 
as mindsets, may have more to do with foreign policy decisions than motivations 
stemming from their position in government.68 This means that different individuals 
occupying the same senior position may not necessarily reach the same conclusion due to 
different fundamental assumptions, which he calls mindsets. He argues that the 
                                                 
66 Roger Hilsman, Laura Gaughran, and Patricia A. Weitsman, The Politics of Policy Making in 
Defense and Foreign Affairs: Conceptual Models and Bureaucratic Politics 3rd ed. (Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1993), 85-89. 
 
67 Ibid., 70-71. 
 
68 Robert J. Art, “Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique,” Policy 




president’s preferences, the mindsets of top policy makers and domestic political 
pressures explain a government’s decision making rather than bureaucratic politics. 
 Edward Rhodes also says that an “idea-driven” explanation of state behavior has 
more explanatory power than the “pulling and hauling” of bureaucracy.69 He 
demonstrates the effect that widely held social beliefs have on decision making through a 
case study of the development of U.S. Navy force posture. He does not, however, 
develop a generalizable model that explains state behavior through ideas. 
In order to explain the decision-making process of policy makers, scholars have 
used cognitive psychology and other disciplines to offer theories on how the human mind 
simplifies complex inputs to make decisions. 
John Steinbruner showed that the assumption of rationality cannot explain all 
decision-making phenomena, and introduced the cybernetic cognitive paradigm.70  In the 
cybernetic paradigm, decision makers control uncertainty by “focusing the decision 
process on a few incoming variables while eliminating entirely any serious calculation of 
probable outcomes.”71 This is supplemented further with the principles of cognitive 
theory, which explains how the problem is formulated in the mind so that the cybernetic 
mechanism can operate. 
 Steinbruner uses the actions of a tennis player as an example of how the 
cybernetic paradigm works. The tennis player does not mathematically calculate the 
                                                 
69 Edward Rhodes, “Do Bureaucratic Politics Matter?: Some Disconfirming Findings from the 
Case of the U.S. Navy,” World Politics 47, no. 1 (1994): 1–41. 
 
70 John D. Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision: New Dimensions of Political Analysis 
2nd ed. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002). 
 
71 Ibid., 66. 
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trajectory of the ball and carefully examine the alternatives each time he hits it. Rather, 
the tennis player uses information kept in feedback loops to make those decisions.72 
 Robert Jervis also studied how the human mind works to understand foreign 
policy behavior. In Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics, Jervis 
explores how policymakers form images of the other side based on their personal 
experience, pre-existing beliefs and a need for cognitive consistency. These images 
impact decision making. He identifies common misperceptions that impact foreign policy 
decisions, ranging from the tendency to see the others as more organized and centralized 
in their behavior to overestimating one’s importance in the policies of other parties.73 
 Other scholars have researched conceptual frameworks that policymakers use to 
manage inputs and make decisions. 
 Arguing that both ideas and interests impact behavior, Judith Goldstein and 
Robert Keohane looked at three types of ideas based on social beliefs.74 The first is the 
worldview, which defines the possibilities for action. This includes, for example, 
religious beliefs and the widely shared concept of national sovereignty that took hold 
after the 1648 Peace of Westphalia. The second is principled beliefs, which determine 
what we consider right or wrong. Finally, they discuss causal beliefs, which determine 
strategies for achieving goals. This includes, for example, scientific knowledge that 
guides people when trying to cure a disease. 
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 Nancy Gallagher uses three types of conceptual frameworks that policymakers 
use to process information and make decisions in her analysis of arms control 
verification. The Unilateralists see international relations as a zero-sum game, while 
Cautious Cooperators think that cooperation is possible when they can improve their 
situation by coordinating their behavior. Arms Control Advocates, meanwhile, believe 
that states and individuals have more shared interests than are identified in the other two 
conceptual frameworks, and thus they are enthusiastic proponents for arms control and 
disarmament accords.75 
 Still others have explored how policy changes as a result of a learning process by 
policymakers. Philip Tetlock, for example, argues that foreign policy belief systems are 
hierarchically organized.76 The highest level consists of strategic policy beliefs, followed 
by preferences at the intermediate level and tactical beliefs at the base. He argues that 
most learning takes place at the tactical level, as policymakers normally do not have the 
time to question fundamental beliefs but are willing to make tactical-level adjustments.77 
 This study builds primarily on works that use conceptual frameworks that help 
policymakers deal with decision making by assisting in the processing of complex ideas 
and information amid uncertainty. It calls such conceptual frameworks mindsets, 
although it can be described in other ways, meaning fundamental assumptions that people 
have of the world, including worldviews and personal convictions. 
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 Many foreign policy analyses use case studies that involve the stages of policy 
formation, negotiation and ratification, but the implementation phase is rarely mentioned.  
 In the two-level game framework of Putnam, the focus is on the negotiation and 
ratification stages of negotiations. That is the same for the case studies in Milner’s 
Interests, Institutions and Information, which builds on Putnam’s model. Steven Miller 
divides the two main phases of arms control policymaking into the policy formulation 
phase, where internal bargaining is carried out to form proposals, and the ratification 
phase, where the U.S. Senate, rather than the president, is the decisive player in the 
game.78 Frederick Mayer’s political analysis on the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), which uses the domestic politics of the countries involved in 
NAFTA as one of the analytic lenses to understand how the treaty was negotiated and 
ratified, but does not go beyond the stage when a vote takes place in Congress.79 
 Existing works on policy implementation either focus on domestic issues or 
analyze institutional structures.80 
 On the domestic policy front, Pressman and Wildavsky showed the complexities 
involved in a federal agency’s job-creating project in Oakland, California. Pressman and 
Wildavsky argue that what initially appears to be a simple task of carrying out a funded 
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project could actually be a complicated one involving numerous actors with different 
perspectives and various decision points.81 In another study on domestic policy 
implementation, John Kingdon shows that agenda setting, decision-making and 
implementation do not necessarily proceed in a neat order.82 
 A relatively few scholars have addressed foreign policy implementation. In their 
Essence of Decision, Allison and Zelikow show that the implementation of foreign policy 
is affected by the predispositions of organizations and previously established routines.83 
Halperin, Clapp and Kanter argue that differing preferences and tactics of domestic 
groups complicate implementation. 
 
2.9 Framework for analysis 
 
 Gaining insights from the bureaucratic politics literature, this dissertation looks 
inside the U.S. government to analyze the U.S. implementation of the Agreed Framework 
and the Six Party Talks deals. As this group of work has shown, relying on a single level 
to analyze important world events is not enough. While the unitary rational actor model is 
used to look for explanations on the international level, the other two models are used to 
understand events at the institutional and individual levels of domestic politics. 
 This study also pays attention to how the international and domestic politics 
interact. For this aspect, it relies on Putnam’s “two-level game” framework. Policymakers 
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know that unless key domestic actors approve, international agreements cannot be 
ratified, and consequently conduct themselves so that they can achieve a satisfactory 
outcome on both fronts. The logical extension of that insight is that international 
agreements cannot be implemented without such domestic approval. 
 To analyze what consists of domestic approval, this study looks at individuals in 
the system, rather than stopping at the institutional level. The most important actors in 
this particular case are the president and his key advisors. 
 While many studies look to interests as the motivator for its actors, this 
dissertation pays special attention on what it calls mindsets, meaning conceptual 
frameworks or fundamental assumptions that actors use to make sense of world politics. 
Whether key actors in the U.S. domestic system preferred cooperative or coercive 
measures in dealing with North Korea and the amount of concessions they wanted from 
North Korea are the key factors that determined whether they were Cooperators or 
Hardliners, the two ideal types used for analysis. 
 In addition, the concept of learning — particularly tactical learning that does not 
impact the strategic objective — is used to help explain how key policymakers changed 
their minds and affected the approval process in the domestic system. 
 The implementation stage of policy and agreements receive little attention. But as 
the literature on policy implementation in the domestic arena shows, implementation is 
not just about putting what is written on paper into action. It is a complicated process that 
requires overcoming logistical problems and bureaucratic hurdles that may have been 
unexpected in the beginning, as well as dealing with politics. 
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 In short, this dissertation looks at the understudied area of implementation of 
international agreements, using not only interests but also ideas as motivators, while 
breaking down the unit of analysis to the level of individuals rather than focusing just on 






































Chapter 3 Understanding the Context – Background 
 
 
3.1 North Korea’s nuclear efforts 
 
 North Korea’s nuclear efforts began with the training of its first generation of 
scientists, who studied in Japan in the 1930s and moved back to the country in the 1940s. 
The country made its own investments in nuclear science education in the 1950s, but also 
turned to outside help.84 It signed an agreement with the Soviet Union in 1959 and 
received assistance on basic nuclear technology.85 
 At least initially, North Korea appears to have been interested in nuclear 
technology for civilian use. There continue to be claims originating from South Korean 
sources that Kim Il Sung, the North Korean founder, sought a nuclear weapons program 
as early as 1950. But according to Jonathan Pollack, there is no documentary evidence to 
back this claim.86 
The 1959 North Korea-Soviet Union agreement included plans for the 
construction of nuclear facilities in Yongbyon, about 90 kilometers north of Pyongyang. 
The first facilities to be built at the Yongbyon nuclear research center included a small 
Soviet-designed reactor for basic nuclear research and a radiochemical laboratory for 
extracting isotopes. This reactor reached criticality in 1965, while the radiochemical 
laboratory became operational in 1977.87 These facilities were placed under International 
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Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards in 1977, when North Korea concluded an 
“INFCIRC/66” agreement with the IAEA.88 This type of safeguards agreement covers 
specific nuclear facilities, materials and equipment for inspection.89  
Apart from the benefits of energy generation, there are signs that Kim Il Sung saw 
nuclear power as a key element that would elevate the country to industrial power status. 
It may also have acted in response to the fact that its rival South Korea, which joined the 
IAEA in 1957, saw its first research reactor go critical in 1962.90 
As the construction of the Yongbyon facilities was being carried out in the 1960s, 
signs that North Korea might also have been thinking of acquiring nuclear weapons 
began to emerge. While Pyongyang publicly stated that its goal was the peaceful use of 
nuclear energy, it privately began dropping hints about a desire to acquire weapons. For 
example, in August 1963, the East German ambassador to Pyongyang told his Soviet 
counterpart that North Koreans were asking East German sources about nuclear weapons 
technology.91 
There is no documentary evidence that pinpoints when Kim Il Sung decided to 
pursue nuclear weapons in addition to the civilian program, or why he chose that path.92 
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However, the country’s experience in the 1950-1953 Korean War and later developments 
in the international environment provide some clues to understanding what may have 
motivated the decision. North Korea suffered much destruction as a result of U.S. air and 
ground attacks during the Korean War, and American actions suggested that it might be 
willing to use nuclear weapons against the country. U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower 
believed that threats conveyed through aircraft and nuclear warhead movements helped 
bring about a truce.93 But not everyone thinks that U.S. nuclear signaling led to the 
signing of the armistice in 1953. McGeorge Bundy, who looked into the events at the 
time, believes that other factors, including the death of Stalin and heavy losses on the 
communist side, were the primary reasons for North Korea and its allies to end the 
conflict.94 But American nuclear signaling, including its deployment of tactical nuclear 
weapons to the Korean Peninsula in the late 1950s, could well have heightened North 
Korea’s sense of vulnerability.95 
 The 1980s saw a new phase in North Korea’s nuclear development. North Korea 
tried to obtain more civilian nuclear assistance from the Soviet Union, but Moscow was 
at times unenthusiastic about extending this due to Pyongyang’s failure to repay its 
debts.96 How much that contributed to North Korea’s decision to strike off on its own 
remains unknown. But it is clear the country embarked on an indigenous program at the 
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Yongbyon nuclear complex, which centered on three gas-cooled graphite moderated 
reactors. These included a small 5 megawatt (MW) research reactor in Yongbyon, a 
larger 50 MW prototype reactor, also in Yongbyon, and a full-scale 200 MW reactor in 
nearby Taechon.97 Ri Hong Sop, director of the Yongbyon nuclear complex, told a 
delegation of Stanford University academics in one of their seven visits from 2004 that 
the 5MW reactor became operational in 1986.98 The 5MW reactor was the prototype for 
the two larger reactors.99 
 
3.2 The first crisis 
 
 The United States became increasingly suspicious of the nature of North Korea’s 
nuclear program. While North Korea maintained that the 5MW nuclear reactor was 
intended for civilian energy research purposes, satellite photographs did not show power 
lines or other infrastructure that would be needed for power generation.100 
 North Korea signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985 due to 
pressure from the Soviet Union, which held up its approval of a project to build four light 
water reactors in North Korea if Pyongyang did not join the international treaty.101 North 
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Korea had 18 months to sign a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA 
under the NPT, but the IAEA discovered it had sent the wrong document shortly before 
the deadline, and granted North Korea another 18 months.102 That deadline in 1988 also 
passed without North Korea taking action, and Pyongyang did not sign a comprehensive 
safeguards agreement that would allow general inspections until 1992. (North Korea 
agreed to IAEA monitoring of the Soviet-provided facilities in 1977 based on the facility-
specific INFCIRC/66 agreement but had not allowed monitoring of new buildings.)  
 Meanwhile, U.S. President George W. Bush announced in 1991 the removal of all 
U.S. ground-based and sea-based tactical nuclear weapons worldwide, as the Soviet 
Union began its rapid dissolution. This included nuclear artillery from South Korea. Bush 
also decided to pull the remaining 60 nuclear warheads out of the country, marking the 
end of the deployment of the warheads there that at its peak was believed to total 763.103 
When North Korea finally allowed IAEA inspections, inspectors found a 
discrepancy. While North Korea said that it had reprocessed about three ounces of 
plutonium in 1989, the inspections and nuclear forensics revealed that it had reprocessed 
plutonium on at least three occasions, in 1989, 1990 and 1991. Due to concerns about 
North Korea accumulating nuclear materials for weapons use, the IAEA in February 
1993 called for special inspections of North Korean sites that would better inform 
outsiders about their nuclear activities. North Korea refused, and announced that it was 
withdrawing from the NPT, which prohibited it from developing nuclear weapons. This 
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marked the start of tensions involving the United States, the IAEA and regional 
powers.104 
 U.S. officials regarded the prospect of North Korea extracting enough plutonium 
from its nuclear complex to make five to six nuclear bombs “an unacceptable risk” and 
considered carrying out a conventional military attack on key components of the 
Yongbyon nuclear complex.105 U.S. officials believed the benefit of a surgical military 
action  — called the “Osirak option” after a 1981 Israeli strike against an Iraqi nuclear 
facility of the same name — was that it could set back North Korea’s nuclear program by 
years, with little or no risk of U.S. casualties, while causing few North Korean casualties 
and little radiation contamination, if any. But the downside was that it was likely to invite 
North Korean retaliation, leading to war in the region.106 This led to the suspension of the 
military option in favor of the United States first pursuing a diplomatic alternative, 
including the threat of severe sanctions on North Korea unless it stopped its nuclear 
program. North Korea reacted strongly against the move, threatening to turn Seoul into a 
sea of fire and declaring that it would consider the imposition of sanctions an act of 
war.107 
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 On June 14, 1994, William Perry, the American defense secretary, called a 
meeting of U.S. military leaders and reviewed contingency plans. This was followed by a 
meeting with President Bill Clinton on June 16, 1994 in which options for increasing 
U.S. military forces in South Korea were considered. But the administration faced a 
dilemma. The better prepared the United States was militarily, the more likely it would be 
able to defeat the North with fewer casualties should there be a war. But the larger the 
buildup of U.S. forces, the more likely it would be interpreted by North Korea as the 
prelude to an American attack.108  
 While these options were being weighed by Clinton, former President Jimmy 
Carter was visiting Pyongyang on his own initiative to defuse the crisis. He met North 
Korean leader Kim Il Sung, who promised to allow the IAEA inspectors and the agency’s 
surveillance equipment to remain at the Yongbyon complex, as well as to work to recover 
the remains of Americans killed during the Korean War and to hold a summit with then 
South Korean President Kim Young Sam.109 Based on this last-minute agreement, the 
United States and North Korea agreed on the conditions for resuming dialogue.110 
Kim Il Sung’s death, announced on July 9, 1994, delayed negotiations between 
the United States and North Korea that had begun a day earlier in Geneva and raised 
questions about the succession process and the stability of North Korea.111 But the 
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bilateral talks resumed and culminated in the Agreed Framework, signed on October 21, 
1994.  
 
3.3 The Agreed Framework 
 
 The Agreed Framework was a short document for such an ambitious accord. In 
less than 1,040 words, it stipulated the terms under which North Korea would end its 
indigenous nuclear program and laid out a roadmap for Washington and Pyongyang to 
improve their historically hostile ties that would eventually lead to establishing 
diplomatic relations.112 
The relatively short text of the Agreed Framework meant that there was room for 
interpretation. This was less so for the concrete portions of the agreement, such as North 
Korea’s obligations to shut down its graphite-moderated reactor and the U.S. 
commitment to provide the country with heavy fuel oil as compensation for any loss of 
energy. But specific actions for improving relations, for example, were left relatively 
vague. 
The Agreed Framework obligated the United States to carry out the following 
commitments in exchange for North Korea’s freezing and eventual dismantling of its 
graphite-moderated reactor; 
• Make arrangements for the provision to North Korea of two light water 
reactors with a total generating capacity of approximately 2,000 
megawatts by a target date of 2003, 
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• Make arrangements to offset the energy forgone due to the operational 
freeze on North Korea’s graphite-moderated reactor and related facilities, 
pending completion of the first light water reactor unit. 
Meanwhile, the two sides also agreed that they would improve bilateral relations 
by;  
• Reducing barriers to trade and investment within three months of the date 
of the document, 
• Opening a liaison office in each other’s capital, 
• Upgrading bilateral relations to Ambassadorial-level, as progress is made 
on issues of concerns to both sides. 
The two countries agreed that to improve the security situation on the Korean 
Peninsula; 
• The United States would provide formal assurances to North Korea 
against the threat or use of nuclear weapons, 
• North Korea would take steps to implement the 1992 North-South Joint 
Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, 
As for nuclear nonproliferation measures, North Korea promised to do the 
following; 
• Remain a party to the NPT and allow implementation of its safeguards 
agreement, 
• Allow ad hoc and routine IAEA inspections to resume with respect to the 
facilities not subject to the freeze, upon conclusion of the supply contract 
for the provision of the light water reactor project, 
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• Come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA 
when a significant portion of the light water reactor project was 
completed. 
• Engage in dialogue with South Korea. 113 
U.S. policymakers in the executive branch anticipated Congressional resistance to 
the agreement and did not seek to make it a treaty, which would have required a two-
thirds approval from the Senate.114 The administration also used emergency funds from 
the executive branch to implement the first stages of the agreement, obviating the need to 
seek a specific Congressional appropriation.115 
The U.S. domestic conditions for implementation worsened when the Republican 
Party, whose members were largely skeptical of the negotiation approach, won control of 
both houses of Congress at the midterm elections in November 1994. 
 
3.4 The Agreed Framework - What the Americans implemented 
 
Commitments by the Americans consisted of six main parts. The following is a 
summary of U.S actions taken to implement the cooperative measures promised in the 
agreement. 
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1) Make arrangements for the financing and construction of the two light 
water reactors. 
The United States worked to fulfill this part of the commitment through the 
Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), an international 
consortium established for that purpose. U.S. government officials raised the idea of 
setting up an international consortium during their negotiations with North Korea when 
they realized that the financing of the two light water reactors, estimated to be over $4.6 
billion, was too big for the United States to shoulder alone.116 KEDO was officially 
launched in March 1995 in New York by Japan, South Korea and the United States, as an 
international organization under U.S. law.117 South Korea agreed to cover about 70 
percent of the estimated $4.6 billion, while Japan agreed to pay 116.5 billion yen, or 
about $1 billion at the time.118 The question of how to obtain the remaining funds was 
never resolved. 
Construction work was delayed and never completed. The delays were due to 
both technical and political problems. North Korea’s poor infrastructure and inexperience 
with large-scale foreign projects posed technical challenges. Political obstacles were 
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mainly caused by the historical hostility between the main contributors to the project — 
Japan, South Korea, and the United States — and North Korea. For example, a supply 
agreement between KEDO and North Korea was concluded nine months after the date 
the parties had agreed to make “best efforts” to do so, partly due to North Korean 
resistance to a South Korean demand that the reactors be designated as South Korean.119 
For its part, North Korea shut down its graphite-moderated nuclear facilities and 
allowed IAEA monitoring, and cooperated with the removal and storage of spent nuclear 
fuel rods from its 5MW reactor. The Agreed Framework collapsed before the process 
reached the dismantlement stage of the facilities whose operations had been frozen. 
 
2) Make arrangements for the provision of heavy fuel oil to North Korea. 
The United States agreed to provide North Korea with 150,000 metric tons of 
heavy fuel oil by October 21, 1995, the one-year anniversary of the signing of the Agreed 
Framework, and to deliver a total of 500,000 metric tons for each of the twelve-month 
period after that.120 The deliveries were made through KEDO. The first shipment reached 
North Korea in January 1995, after experts from the United States and IAEA visited 
Pyongyang to discuss the treatment of spent fuel and the monitoring of North Korea’s 
freeze on its nuclear facilities.121 
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Clinton administration officials arranged for the initial oil shipments to be 
financed by executive branch funds that did not require Congressional approval.122 After 
encountering harsher criticism than expected,123 they also decided in a Deputies 
Committee meeting at the end of 1994 to cap U.S. funding for KEDO at $30 million, far 
below the estimated cost of the oil deliveries, which were expected to be $50 million a 
year. While the plan assumed that other countries would contribute to the effort, that did 
not occur as planned and KEDO went into debt.124 
The financing of the heavy fuel oil deliveries posed a constant headache for the 
Clinton administration. Deliveries were irregular and experienced frequent delays. What 
was initially envisioned as a twelve-month “heavy fuel oil year” from November to 
October changed from year to year because of the delays. In 1997, for example, it took 
KEDO 15 months to deliver the promised 500,000 metric tons of oil. (See Appendix 1 for 
details of the pace of oil deliveries to North Korea.) However, the promised quantity of 
heavy fuel oil eventually reached North Korea until the United States stopped the 
deliveries in 2002 over a dispute with North Korea regarding its procurement of materials 
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3) Reduce barriers to trade and investment. 
As part of the improvement in ties, the Agreed Framework stipulated that “Within 
three months of the date of this Document, both sides will reduce barriers to trade and 
investment, including restrictions on telecommunications services and financial 
transactions.”125 While the clause was meant to benefit North Korea, which was trying to 
unshackle itself from U.S. sanctions and improve its economy, Pyongyang took the 
symbolic step of lifting its sanctions against the United States first. It announced on 
January 9, 1995, well before the three-month deadline, that it was ending its prohibition 
on U.S. commodities imports and the entry of U.S ships into its ports.126 
The United States announced the easing of some sanctions against North Korea 
on January 20, 1995, a day before the deadline, but said the rest depended on progress on 
a range of issues not limited to Pyongyang’s nuclear program. The restrictions 
Washington lifted allowed travel by Americans to North Korea and some limited 
business transactions related to the implementation of the Agreed Framework.127 
The United States announced the lifting of more sanctions on September 17, 
1999, almost five years after the signing of the Agreed Framework. It said that it was 
allowing most North Korean goods into the United States as well as most personal and 
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commercial fund transfers between the two countries. In announcing the measure, 
Washington said that it was taking the step because of progress in bilateral missile talks 
that began in April 1996.128 
 U.S. actions regarding the lifting of sanctions is the first subcase for the Agreed 
Framework and will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 
 
4) Open a liaison office in Pyongyang. 
While the United States and North Korea took some preparatory steps to open 
liaison offices in each other’s capitals, they were never established. 
Officials from the two countries first met in Washington D.C. for talks on the 
topic in December 1994, a month and a half after the signing of the Agreed Framework. 
The meeting produced a draft agreement on consular issues.129 U.S. experts visited 
Pyongyang to survey sites for a future liaison office on January 29, 1995, followed by a 
visit to Washington by North Korean experts in early April 1995.130 
A key outstanding issue was how to move diplomatic pouches in and out of North 
Korea.131 According to U.S. negotiator Robert Gallucci, North Korea was reluctant to let 
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the United States open a liaison office in Pyongyang because of concerns that it would 
engage in espionage activities.132  
The February 1995 crash of a U.S. military helicopter that strayed into North 
Korea, which killed one U.S. military crewman and led to the detention of another, also 
prevented the liaison office from moving forward. 
 
5) Upgrade relations to the Ambassadorial level as progress is made on issues 
of concern to both sides. 
The implementation of the agreement never reached this stage, as steps that would 
have laid the groundwork for it, including the opening of the liaison office, were never 
realized. 
 
6) Provide North Korea with formal assurances that the United States would 
not threaten or attack it with nuclear weapons. 
The United States envisioned this as a negative security assurance it provides to 
non-nuclear members of the NPT, under which it does not use or threaten to use nuclear 
weapons against such members who are in compliance with non-proliferation 
commitments.133  
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Washington offered words of assurance in other political statements. The Agreed 
Framework said it upheld the Joint Declaration between the United States and North 
Korea issued in June 1993. The declaration included “assurances against the threat and 
use of force, including nuclear weapons” and promised “mutual respect for each other’s 
sovereignty and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs.”134 After a visit to the 
United States by North Korean Vice Marshal Jo Myong Rok — the first of its kind — the 
two countries also issued a Joint Communique which declared that “neither government 
would have hostile intent toward the other” and repeated the mutual respect for each 
other’s sovereignty as stated in the 1993 Joint Declaration and the 1994 Agreed 
Framework.135 
 
3.5 The second crisis 
 
 The implementation of the Agreed Framework began to unravel after President 
George W. Bush came into office in 2001. Shipments of heavy fuel oil promised to the 
North Koreans continued with delays, while work to prepare for the construction of the 
light water reactors continued, some in the Bush administration were adamantly opposed 
to the Agreed Framework. 
 What led to the collapse of the deal was a U.S. intelligence community analysis in 
2002 that North Korea had been pursuing a covert uranium enrichment program for the 
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past half-decade.136 The Bush administration treated North Korea’s procurement efforts 
for the uranium enrichment program as cheating on the Agreed Framework. This was 
because even though that agreement did not specify uranium enrichment as a prohibited 
activity, it was not allowed under the1992 denuclearization agreement between the two 
Koreas mentioned in the Agreed Framework and also violated the NPT safeguards 
agreement with the IAEA, which North Korea agreed to adhere to. 
 The United States confronted Pyongyang with information about its procurement 
efforts in a meeting in Pyongyang in October 2002 and later said that North Korea had 
admitted to the uranium enrichment program’s existence. North Korea denied having 
done so. Ultimately, Washington cut off the heavy fuel oil deliveries that had been 
promised to North Korea as alternative energy for shutting down its nuclear facilities. 
Soon afterward, Pyongyang restarted the facilities it had frozen under the agreement and 
asked the IAEA to remove seals and monitoring equipment from them.137 
 The U.S. decision to define North Korea’s procurement efforts for a uranium 
enrichment program as a violation of the Agreed Framework, as well as Washington’s 
decision to terminate heavy fuel oil deliveries are the focus of the second subcase 
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3.6 The Six Party Talks - President George W. Bush’s first term 
 
 The Six Party Talks process — involving China, Japan, the two Koreas, Russia 
and the United States — was established to defuse this new crisis. The negotiations 
evolved from a trilateral meeting among China, North Korea and the United States that 
was held in March 2003 at the request of the United States, which hoped that the 
inclusion of other parties would increase pressure on North Korea and make it more 
difficult for Pyongyang to break promises.138 
 The talks did not make progress for the first two years, as the United States 
refused to engage in bilateral negotiations with North Korea, believing that such talks 
rewarded North Korea’s bad behavior. During this time, Washington avoided anything 
that resembled the approach taken by Bush’s predecessor, Clinton. Thus, any contacts 
between U.S. diplomats with their North Korean counterparts that could be described as 
“negotiations” set off alarms in Washington, as did references to “freezing” the 
Yongbyon nuclear plant,139 which were reminiscent of the Agreed Framework, which 
traded positive inducements for reversible steps on the part of North Korea. 
 
3.7 The Six Party Talks – President George W. Bush’s second term 
 
 This approach changed after Bush’s reelection in 2004. Bush changed the national 
security team responsible for foreign policy partly due to U.S. failure to find weapons of 
mass destruction in Iraq after the invasion of that country. The personnel change was also 
intended to resolve the fractiousness of decision-making in the first term. That had pitted 
                                                 





a group of national security advisers who preferred coercion, such as Vice President Dick 
Cheney, against Secretary of State Colin Powell, who emphasized diplomacy.140 
 A part of this shake-up,  Condoleezza Rice was appointed secretary of state. 
When asked by Bush to become his top diplomat, Rice, who had been his national 
security adviser during the first term, convinced the president that his foreign policy 
approach should move away from one that was perceived as emphasizing preemption to 
one that included more diplomacy.141 
 This broad foreign policy change impacted the North Korea talks. This was a time 
when the Six Party Talks were facing yet another deadlock and concerns were mounting 
that North Korea was preparing to conduct a nuclear test. North Korea’s Foreign Ministry 
said in a statement in February 2005 that Pyongyang had produced nuclear weapons, 
followed by an announcement in March that the country was no longer bound by its 
moratorium on the flight-testing of longer-range missiles.142 
 Against this backdrop, the United States decided it would try to persuade North 
Korea to give up its nuclear weapons in a verifiable manner in exchange for formally 
ending the Korean War, one of Pyongyang’s stated demands.143 Rice appointed 
Christopher Hill, a negotiator of the Dayton Accords that ended the Bosnian War, as the 
new point man for North Korea. 
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 Hill pursued a strategy of establishing a set of agreed principles that would be the 
basis for practical steps for North Korea, as he had done during the Dayton peace talks.144 
The strategy — similar to the approach used by the Clinton administration as well as 
China’s vision of how negotiations should proceed145 — eventually bore fruit in the form 
of a breakthrough document on September 19, 2005. In that agreement, North Korea 
“committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and 
returning, at an early date, to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to 
IAEA safeguards.”146 The United States, meanwhile, “affirmed that it has no nuclear 
weapons on the Korean Peninsula and has no intention to attack or invade the DPRK with 
nuclear or conventional weapons,”147 referring to North Korea by its official name, the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and promised to work to formally end the state 
of war. 
 The new flexibility of the second term Bush administration was evident in the 
agreement’s reference to North Korea’s right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The 
agreement said that parties other than North Korea “expressed their respect and agreed to 
discuss, at an appropriate time, the subject of the provision of light water reactor” to 
Pyongyang.148 The reference to the light water reactor was a major concession for the 
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Bush administration, which had done everything it could up to that point to distance itself 
from the Clinton administration agreement with North Korea, which promised to replace 
the country’s indigenous graphite-moderated reactor with less proliferation-prone light 
water reactors. 
 As for the manner in which implementation would occur, the document stated that 
parties would follow the principle of “commitment to commitment, action to action.”149 
This was a promise that no one party would benefit from the agreement without 
corresponding steps taken by others. 
 The landmark agreement immediately faced problems. Opponents of the process 
in Washington reacted immediately, and Hill was instructed to read a unilateral statement 
that clarified the U.S. interpretation of the agreement. This statement was drafted in 
Washington by those who were displeased about the U.S. concessions. It said, for 
example, that North Korea would eliminate its nuclear weapons “completely, verifiably 
and irreversibly,”150 a phrase that the United States had stopped using at the request of 
not only North Korea but the other partners in the talks. It also imposed stringent 
conditions on when the United States would be willing to discuss the provision of a light 
water reactor. The statement said that such discussions would take place when North 
Korea verifiably eliminated all nuclear weapons, came into full compliance with the NPT 
and IAEA safeguards and showed a commitment to nonproliferation.151 In addition, it 
said that normalization of relations would be possible only after North Korea addressed 
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U.S. concerns about human rights, it biological and chemical weapons programs, its 
ballistic missile programs and proliferation, terrorism, and other illicit activities.152 
 North Korea reacted with anger at what it saw as U.S. negation of the just-reached 
agreement. The following day, North Korea’s Foreign Ministry said in a statement 
carried by the official Korean Central News Agency that Pyongyang would not dismantle 
its nuclear weapons program before the light water reactor was provided. “What is most 
essential is … for the U.S. to provide LWRs (light water reactors) to the DPRK as early 
as possible as evidence proving the former’s substantial recognition of the latter’s nuclear 
activity for a peaceful purpose,” the statement said.153 “The U.S. should not even dream 
of the issue of the DPRK’s dismantlement of its nuclear deterrent before providing 
LWRs, a physical guarantee for confidence-building.”154 
 A further blow to the agreement came on the same day the North Koreans made 
their statement. The U.S. government published a notice by the Treasury Department that 
it was designating the Macao-based Banco Delta Asia (BDA) bank as a primary money 
laundering concern.155 This amounted to imposing international financial sanctions 
against North Korea, which had assets in the bank. This was the culmination of efforts by 
U.S. law enforcement agencies to target North Korea’s many illegal activities. But the 
timing of the implementation was not coordinated with the diplomats working on the 
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nuclear issue.156 A dispute over some $25 million in North Korean funds that were frozen 
as a result of the U.S. sanctions bogged down the nuclear talks that reconvened in 
November 2005.  
 As diplomacy stalled, North Korea carried out tests of seven ballistic missiles, 
including the three-stageTaepodong-2 in early July 2006, and followed up with its first 
underground nuclear test on October 9. The nuclear test was viewed by the Bush 
administration as a failure of its approach to North Korea,157 which prompted another 
shift in U.S. policy. Washington decided that preventing its diplomats from holding 
bilateral meetings with North Korean officials, which had been the rule until then, was 
not working and that such meetings should be allowed. 
 This change was prompted partly by China’s deft maneuvering. While 
Washington’s initial instructions for Hill were to meet with the North Koreans only in the 
presence of the Chinese, he ended up holding bilateral negotiations with his North 
Korean counterparts as Chinese diplomats failed to arrive at one of the planned trilateral 
talks.158 This initially prompted criticism from Washington as well as complaints from 
Rice to her Chinese counterpart, but the dispute blew over as engagement with North 
Korea gained momentum.159 
 A major obstacle was removed from the Six Party Talks process when the United 
States and North Korea resolved their dispute over BDA in March 2007, reaching a 
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compromise that unfroze the $25 million in North Korean funds, even if this move was 
criticized by those in the United States against the engagement policy. 
 In 2007, the six countries agreed on more detailed steps to be taken during the 
first two phases of the implementation of the September 2005 agreement. Specific 
measures in the third phase were never determined, as the process collapsed before it 
reached that point. 
 Following are the actions stipulated in the initial two phases. 
 
❖ Initial phase 
 The initial phase, agreed to on February 13, 2007, described specific measures 
that were to be taken over a relatively short time period of two months. North Korea 
agreed to “shut down and seal for the purpose of the eventual abandonment” of its 
plutonium facility in Yongbyon and invite the IAEA back to the country for monitoring 
and verification of this step. The other parties agreed to provide North Korea with 50,000 
tons of heavy fuel oil and its equivalent as energy assistance.160  
 
❖ Second phase 
Following the completion of the initial phase, the parties agreed to second phase 
actions on October 3, 2007. In this phase, North Korea was to “disable” all existing 
nuclear facilities in a way that was “scientific, safe, verifiable, and consistent with 
                                                 




international standards.”161 “Disable” was intended to mean that North Korea would be 
unable to restart operations at these facilities for a significant amount of time. Three core 
facilities at the Yongbyon complex – the nuclear reactor, the reprocessing facility and 
nuclear fuel fabrication plant - were to be disabled by the end of 2007. 
In addition, North Korea was to provide a “complete and correct” declaration of 
all its nuclear programs by the end of that year. A joint statement announcing the second 
phase measures did not mention a timeframe for the verification of the declaration. 
The United States also promised to remove North Korea from its list of state 
sponsor of terrorism and terminate the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act in 
parallel with North Korean actions. In exchange with North Korea’s denuclearization 
activities, other countries were to complete the delivery of economic, energy and 
humanitarian assistance up to the equivalent of one million tons of heavy fuel oil 
promised to the country. 
The contentious issue of whether and when to provide light water reactors was not 
covered in these first two phases, as it was understood that would come in the later phase 
where North Korea would take more permanent measures for nuclear abandonment. 
 While some parts of the implementation moved smoothly, others did not.  
The heavy fuel oil delivery posed logistical as well as political problems. Japan 
refused to participate in the delivery of heavy fuel oil, citing its dispute with North Korea 
over Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea in the 1970s and 1980s to train 
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Pyongyang’s spies.162 Russia’s shipment of the heavy fuel oil, meanwhile, was delayed 
for months. 
Logistical problems delayed the disablement work at the Yongbyon nuclear 
complex. While negotiators agreed in October 2007 to complete the work at the three 
facilities by the end of that year, nuclear experts concluded in a meeting shortly afterward 
that could not be done in a safe manner.163 Discharging of the 8,000 nuclear fuel rods at 
the nuclear reactor had been expected to take 100 days.164  
In addition, North Korea slowed the pace of work at Yongbyon to signal its 
displeasure about actions by the other parties. In January 2008, North Korea , for 
example, reduced the pace of the discharging at the nuclear reactor, citing the delay in 
Russian heavy fuel oil delivery. 
One bright spot was progress made in the disablement measures at the two other 
facilities at the Yongbyon complex; the reprocessing facility and the nuclear fuel 
fabrication plant. Those procedures were completed by the end of 2007. 
 North Korea did not submit a “complete and correct” declaration covering all its 
nuclear programs by the initial December 31, 2007 deadline. The country said in a 
Foreign Ministry statement that it had submitted a document in November of that year, 
but the United States said that it was not complete.165   
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This was mainly because the report did not address the uranium enrichment 
program that the United States had suspected North Korea of developing. Based on 
materials and equipment that North Korea had sought or obtained, the Central 
Intelligence Agency concluded in 2002 that Pyongyang was making a major effort to 
shift from a small-scale experimental uranium enrichment program to an industrial-scale 
one.166 The CIA, however, also said in the assessment that it was unclear whether a plant 
was already in operation.167 North Korea had denied having an enrichment program, 
although its response to the allegation when confronted by a U.S. delegation in a meeting 
in Pyongyang in 2002 was interpreted by the United States as confirmation of its 
existence. 
 To deal with this contentious issue, Hill met with his North Korean counterpart 
Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Gwan in Geneva in March and in Singapore in April. 
They hammered out a compromise agreement, under which North Korea would account 
for the plutonium program in the declaration while acknowledging U.S. concerns about 
uranium enrichment and proliferation separately.168 
 Based on this agreement, North Korea submitted its declaration to China on June 
26, 2008. While its contents have not been made public, North Korea reportedly said in 
the 60-page report that it had separated a total of about 30 kilograms of plutonium, which 
was roughly in line with assessments by outside experts. The declaration also said that 
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Pyongyang used 2 kg of plutonium for its first nuclear test on October 9, 2006, which 
some analysts said was too small to be credible.169 
In response to the submission, Bush notified Congress of his intent to remove 
North Korea from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism after a 45-day waiting period 
as required by law,170 and rescinded the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act 
toward Pyongyang.171  The White House said it would “carefully assess” North Korean 
actions during the 45-day period, particularly regarding verification of its nuclear 
declaration.172 
On July 12, negotiators of the six countries met in Beijing and agreed on a broad 
outline for verifying North Korea’s nuclear declaration.173  In this agreement, the 
countries said that a verification mechanism would be created involving experts of the six 
parties, and that it would involve visits to facilities, review of documents, interviews as 
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well as other measures that the parties agree on.174  The agreement also said that IAEA 
consultation would be welcome when necessary.175  The specifics of the mechanism and 
implementation, however, were to be determined by a working group under the Six Party 
Talks.176 
Problems emerged after the United States presented its proposal for the specifics 
of the verification plan to North Korea around this time.  The U.S.-proposed verification 
protocol sought “full access to any site, facility or location” that may have been used for 
nuclear purposes as well as the use of various technical tools including sampling.177  In 
other words, the proposal would have given inspectors free rein to inspect for nuclear 
material outside of what North Korea had reported in its declaration submitted earlier to 
its Six-Party counterparts. 
As the dispute continued over which North Korean sites should be inspected using 
what methods, the 45-day deadline passed without the Bush administration removing 
North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism.  In response, North Korea 
suspended work to disable its Yongbyon facilities, which involved removing nuclear fuel 
rods from the reactor.  North Korea announced it had suspended work on August 14 in a 
statement issued through the official media on August 26.  In it, a North Korean Foreign 
Ministry spokesman complained that the agreement had promised to remove North Korea 
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from the list of state sponsors of terrorism after it submitted its declaration of nuclear 
programs, not after a deal was reached on a verification mechanism.178 
This announcement came about the same time as North Korean leader Kim Jong 
Il suffered a stroke, although this was not publicly known then.179 This event most likely 
impacted North Korean behavior, although how it did so remains unknown to outside 
observers.  
Resumption of disabling work at the Yongbyon plant came after Hill visited 
North Korea in early October and the two countries reached a compromise on the 
verification mechanism. U.S. officials said that under this agreement, North Korea would 
allow “sampling and other forensic measures” at three declared nuclear sites, as well as 
“access, based on mutual consent, to undeclared nuclear sites.”180  The measures were to 
serve as a baseline for a protocol to be approved by all six parties of the denuclearization 
talks.  No joint written agreement was released to the public. 
Following this bilateral agreement, the United States removed North Korea from 
the list of state sponsors of terrorism on October 11.  Tensions declined temporarily, but 
problems reappeared in November of that year, when North Korea released a statement 
denying that it had agreed to sampling.  It said that agreement on inspection activities was 
limited to “field visits, confirmation of documents, and interviews with technicians” as 
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stated in previous written agreements, and that demanding anything more would be “an 
act of infringing upon sovereignty little short of seeking a house-search.”181 Furthermore, 
in January 2009, North Korea issued a statement insisting that verification for nuclear 
disarmament should be carried out on both halves of the peninsula, stating, “free field 
access should be ensured to verify the introduction and deployment of U.S. nukes in 
South Korea and details about their withdrawal.”182 
Sampling was a sensitive issue for North Korea because it was one of the reasons 
that led to the confrontation with the IAEA in the 1990s.  Sampling by IAEA inspectors 
in 1992 revealed a discrepancy in North Korea’s claims about how much reprocessing it 
had conducted and how much plutonium it had extracted.   
 In December 2008, the United States said that heavy fuel oil shipments could not 
be continued without an agreement on verification. In the United States, President Barack 
Obama took office in early 2009, with a message that Washington would seek 
engagement with hostile countries. But in April 2009, North Korea launched a space 
vehicle that was believed to be a test of its Taepoding-2 ballistic missile. When the 
United Nations condemned the launch, North Korea indicated it would withdraw from 
the Six Party Talks. Later that month, it expelled IAEA personnel and U.S. officials from 
North Korea.183 
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 The third subcase for this dissertation, to be discussed in Chapter 6, concerns the 
dispute between the United States and North Korea over the verification of its nuclear 
facilities and the decision by Washington to refuse to take Pyongyang off its list of state 
sponsors of terrorism until an agreement could be reached on the issue. The fourth 
subcase, to be dealt with in Chapter 7, deals with the bilateral dispute over sampling, a 
verification method that the United States demanded in its verification protocol for North 




 The history of the Agreed Framework and the Six Party Talks shows that 
negotiations with North Korea have been a long and complex process. It also shows that 
the implementation of the agreements reached by the countries involved were as 
complicated as the negotiations. 
 Delays were common due to logistical as well as political reasons. At times, 
delays that resulted from technical matters, such as the shipment of heavy fuel oil under 
the Six Party Talks provided a reason for North Korea to slow the pace of work. 
 The next four chapters will discuss four specific episodes and analyze the impact 












Chapter 4  Lifting of Sanctions Under the Agreed Framework (1995) 
 
 This chapter discusses the first subcase which concerns the manner in which the 
United States lifted its sanctions against North Korea, a commitment made under the 
Agreed Framework. The question asked is: Why did the United States refrain from taking 
a more generous posture when it lifted sanctions in January 1995, when there were no 
apparent North Korean violations of the agreement? This chapter first gives an overview 
of the events surrounding the lifting of sanctions, and then explains why this has been 
chosen as a subcase. That is followed by descriptions of related events in U.S. domestic 
politics as well as the international arena to put U.S. actions regarding sanctions in 
perspective. It concludes with an explanation of the event, using the three models 
described in Chapter 1. 
 
4.1 The lifting of U.S. sanctions 
 
 The history of U.S. sanctions against North Korea goes back to the outbreak of 
the Korean War in 1950, when Washington imposed a total embargo on its exports to the 
country.184 Since then, Washington has issued numerous other legal restrictions against 
Pyongyang. For example, the United States suspended North Korea’s Most Favored 
Nation trade status in 1951 because it was a communist country. Washington also placed 
Pyongyang on its list of state sponsors of terrorism for blowing up a South Korean plane 
in 1987 with the intention of disrupting the 1988 Seoul Olympics.185 Essentially no trade 
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was allowed between the two countries at the time the Agreed Framework was signed, 
due to the many legal restrictions in place. 
 As mentioned in Chapter 3, the Agreed Framework had two main components. 
One concerned tangible steps that involved North Korea’s promises to shut down and 
eventually dismantle its indigenous nuclear facilities, in exchange for less proliferation-
prone light water reactors and the shipment of alternative energy to compensate for the 
operational freezing of the nuclear facilities. The other component concerned the 
improvement of relations between the historical enemies. 
 The lifting of sanctions belonged to the second category. The Agreed Framework 
signed on October 21, 1994 stated that “Within three months of the date of this 
Document, both sides will reduce barriers to trade and investment, including restrictions 
on telecommunications services and financial transactions.”186 The clause was largely 
meant to economically benefit North Korea by freeing it from the trade sanctions. 
But Pyongyang took the symbolic step of lifting its sanctions against the United 
States first. It announced on January 9, 1995, that it was ending its prohibition on the 
import of U.S. commodities and the entry of U.S. ships in its ports.187 
 A day before the January 21, 1995 deadline, Washington took the following 
measures, although they were notable for what they did not include as most of the U.S. 
prohibitions on direct trade, financial transactions and transportation remained intact. 
• The United States permitted most telecommunications, travel and news-gathering 
activities between the two countries. This allowed American news organizations, 
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for example, to carry out financial transactions necessary to open bureaus in 
North Korea and North Korean media to do the same. 
• The United States authorized North Koreans to use U.S. banking systems to clear 
dollar transactions with third countries as long as the funds did not involve the 
North Korean government. 
• The United States allowed financial transactions for diplomatic missions, so that 
the two countries could open liaison offices in each other’s capitals as agreed to 
under the Agreed Framework. 
• The United States allowed U.S. imports of North Korean magnesite, a mineral 
used by steelmakers. North Korea and China were the only known sources of the 
mineral and U.S. reliance on buying it from China had given the Chinese a 
monopoly position to demand higher prices. This measure allowed U.S. industries 
to obtain the material at more competitive prices. 
• The United States ceased active opposition to U.N. funding of development 
projects in North Korea, which paved the way for small-scale projects to proceed 
in the country. 
• The United States lifted the “extraterritorial” application of U.S. sanctions — 
known as secondary sanctions — to foreign companies controlled by American 
investors, such as joint ventures in which American companies were partners or 
foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies. The step particularly benefitted U.S. 
businesses in South Korea.188 
                                                 






In announcing the measures, U.S. government officials said that the further easing 
of sanctions would take place if progress was made not only on the nuclear issue but also 
on other matters of U.S. concern, such as North Korea’s missile program.189 
North Korea complained that the steps the United States announced on January 
20, 1995 were merely symbolic. Pyongyang made its objections clear to the United 
States, making “strong, repeated pitches” for the lifting of more sanctions in a September 
1995 meeting with U.S. officials190 and complaining through its official media that the 
United States is “persistently trying to get political concessions from” North Korea by 
holding up the lifting of sanctions.191 
Meanwhile, progress was being made in some other aspects of the agreement by 
January 1995. Inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) visited 
North Korea from November 23 to 28, 1994 and confirmed that North Korea had frozen 
the three operating nuclear facilities at Yongbyon and stopped construction work on the 
other two larger facilities.192 Nuclear experts from the United States and North Korea met 
in Beijing in late November to discuss the light water reactor project, and North Korean 
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officials visited Washington D.C. to discuss technical issues related to the proposed 
exchange of liaison offices.193 
The U.S. government’s own assessment of North Korean compliance was 
positive. On January 17, 1995, the United States said that North Korea was “in full 
compliance with provisions of the Agreed Framework” and that the only area where it 
fell short was in its commitment to engage in dialogue with South Korea.194 
But the United States eased more sanctions only after North Korea promised in 
bilateral talks in Berlin in September 1999 to refrain from testing long-range missiles. 
Washington then allowed most U.S. consumer goods to be exported to North Korea and 
the import of North Korean goods into the United States. Washington also permitted most 
personal and commercial fund transfers between the two countries which were necessary 
for any trade to take place and eased transportation restrictions, allowing commercial 
transportation by air and sea.195 Washington, however, kept in place prohibitions on the 
export of military and sensitive dual-use items and most types of U.S. foreign aid.196 
 
4.2 Why is this a subcase? 
 
This is a case in which U.S. actions cannot be easily explained given North 
Korea’s favorable behavior. North Korea took the symbolic step of lifting its sanctions 
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against the United States first, even if that was not of much benefit to Washington. It was 
also complying with its requirement to freeze its graphite-moderated facilities. If so, why 
did the United States take only minimal steps before the initial three-months deadline?  
 Unlike some of the other commitments which required multilateral funding and 
coordination, this episode concerned unilateral actions on the part of the United States,. 
This allows the analysis to minimize the impact of other countries and focus on the 
question of whether U.S. actions were prompted by North Korean actions or 
consideration for U.S. domestic politics. 
 
4.3 Domestic political context 
 
 Clinton administration officials recognized that domestic political support was 
crucial to the successful implementation of the Agreed Framework. They began briefings 
to the media as well as the Congressional members even before the signing took place in 
Geneva on October 21, 1994.197 
 The initial reaction by the U.S. media was less than enthusiastic, particularly 
about the fact that the United States was making concessions in exchange for North 
Korea’s actions. The headline for the New York Times article on the announcement of the 
deal read, “Clinton Approves a Plan to Give Aid to North Koreans”198 while that of the 
                                                 
197 Wit, Poneman and Gallucci, Going Critical, 332-335. 
 
198 David E. Sanger, “Clinton Approves a Plan to Give Aid to North Koreans,” New York Times, 




Washington Post was “North Korea Pact Contains U.S. Concessions; Agreement Would 
Allow Presence of Key Plutonium-Making Facilities for Years.”199  
 Congress also reacted negatively. Republicans were generally skeptical of the 
Clinton administration’s engagement approach to North Korea and immediately criticized 
the accord. Robert Dole, the Republican Senate majority leader from Kansas, said in a 
statement that “It is always possible to get an agreement if you give enough away.”200 
Democrats did not immediately support the deal, either.201 
 Congressional support deteriorated further when the Republicans took control of 
both chambers for the first time in 40 years in midterm elections held less than three 
weeks after the signing of the Agreed Framework. The Republican Party gained 54 seats 
in the House of Representatives in a landslide election and captured eight more seats in 
the Senate on a campaign that promised a “Contract with America,” which included 
balancing the budget and welfare reforms.202 
 There was much criticism in Congress about the Agreed Framework and it can be 
categorized into four main objections. 
 The first that the agreement did not do enough. In Congressional hearings held in 
December 1994 and January 1995, the accord was attacked for not dealing with issues 
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ranging from North Korea’s missile program to failing to address the fate of the 
thousands of Americans missing in action or held as prisoners of war during the 1950-
1953 Korean War.203 In a January 26 hearing, Republican Senator John McCain of 
Arizona questioned the decision to leave the issue of North Korea’s weapons delivery 
systems out of the Agreed Framework. Secretary of Defense Perry responded by saying 
that while the agreement only dealt with North Korea’s nuclear program, stopping it was 
a worthy goal in itself.204 Republican Senator Frank Murkowski of Alaska, meanwhile, 
questioned the judgment of leaving the problem of U.S. servicemen missing in action out 
of the agreement, a position seconded by Senator Bob Smith, a Republican from New 
Hampshire.205 
 The second complaint was that the Agreed Framework made too many 
concessions to the North Koreans. This issue figured prominently in U.S. negotiator 
Robert Gallucci’s private sessions with lawmakers in which Gallucci tried to win their 
support for the accord. 
The most common critique I got of the Framework … was 
“What are you doing a deal with these guys for? We should 
tell them to stop.” And I would (say), depending on what 
the audience was, “Ah, tell them to stop, why didn’t I think 
of that?” I spent over a year negotiating. I should have just 
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told them to stop. Of course. So, buy my next car for me. 
You don’t have to use money, just tell them to give me the 
keys.206 
The aversion to the idea of giving positive inducements to North Korea in 
exchange for policy adjustments featured prominently in comments by lawmakers at the 
time.  McCain, for example, criticized the agreement saying it represented “a tendered 
bribe to North Korea in exchange for a limit on its nuclear weapons program.”207 
Murkowski said that that it “carried a scent of appeasement.”208 
 The notion that the agreement did not cover enough issues of U.S. concern and 
that it gave too much away led to repeated assertions that the United States should have 
made “a better deal.”209 
 The third type of complaint concerned the nature of the North Korean regime. 
U.S. lawmakers referred to North Korea’s past bad behavior and expressed strong 
skepticism that Kim Jong Il regime would honor its part of the bargain. In the January 26 
session, Murkowski painted a picture of a regime on the verge of collapse due to 
economic hardship and a power vacuum after founder Kim Il Sung’s death in the summer 
of 1994. He argued that the Agreed Framework will only serve to give North Korean 
regime a new life because of promised assistance.210 
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 While not explicitly stated in Congressional sessions, lawmakers were also 
unhappy that Clinton administration officials, anticipating Congressional resistance, 
sidestepped legislative approval for initial actions stipulated in the agreement. As 
mentioned above, the Agreed Framework was not defined as a treaty or an international 
agreement that required Senate ratification.211 This was because Clinton administration 
officials doubted that even with the Democrats in control of the Senate at the time of the 
signing of the document, it would have gotten a two-thirds vote in favor of it.212 
 The administration also avoided a Congressional vote by using emergency 
executive branch funds for the initial shipments of heavy fuel oil to North Korea. The 
shipments were made using $5 million from the Department of Defense’s emergency 
funds.213 The administration also used “a couple of hundred thousand dollars” from 
Department of Energy funds for initial actions to deal with North Korea’s spent fuel.214 A 
frustrated McCain told Gallucci at one point, “Why don’t you reprogram money for the 
rest of your life if that’s what you think you are going to get away with?”215 
 Executive branch officials such as Defense Secretary Perry and Gallucci defended 
the agreement, arguing the accord not only dealt with the urgent problem of North 
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Korea’s nuclear program, but also created an opening to address other issues of concern 
ranging from the country’s missile program to conventional forces and human rights.216 
 As debate on the Agreed Framework was taking place in the United States, the 
relationship between the United States and North Korea was being tested in other ways. 
On the morning of December 17, 1994, an unarmed helicopter carrying two U.S. Army 
warrant officers was shot down by North Korea after traveling into North Korean 
airspace by mistake. Chief Warrant Officer David Hileman was killed, while Chief 
Warrant Officer Bobby Hall was captured.217 
 North Korea insisted that the helicopter was on an espionage mission, while the 
United States maintained the helicopter had lost its way.218 
 Representative Bill Richardson, a Democrat from New Mexico who was on a 
separately scheduled visit to Pyongyang, brought back the remains of Hileman. Hall was 
released only after Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Hubbard visited North 
Korea and agreed to a statement of regret for the intrusion of North Korean airspace. 
 By early 1995, the executive branch’s efforts to win Congressional support for the 
Agreed Framework began to show results, even if criticism remained. Political moderates 
were in favor or were at least inclined to go along with the deal. Murkowski, once a 
fierce critic, toned down his opposition after visiting North Korea with Democratic 
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Senator Paul Simon from Illinois and meeting with General Gary Luck, the Commander 
of the U.S. Forces Korea, who expressed support for the deal.219 
 
4.4 International context 
 
 The United Nations Security Council endorsed the Agreed Framework on 
November 4, 1994, after diplomatic efforts by the United States to obtain support from 
key countries. France was initially skeptical about the agreement due to nonproliferation 
concerns, including the fact that North Korea would not be complying with IAEA 
safeguards immediately. Russia, meanwhile, was unhappy for several reasons including 
the fact that under the Agreed Framework, the United States would ensure North Korea 
that it would be given two light water reactors. Moscow had canceled a project providing 
Pyongyang with similar reactors in the 1980s due to American pressure. But China said it 
was happy to support a U.N. Security Council statement as long as North Korea did not 
object to its content.220 
 In South Korea, President Kim Young Sam supported the agreement, even if 
unenthusiastically. Kim, who had given an interview to the New York Times in October 
expressing unhappiness about the compromises that the United States had made with 
North Korea, nevertheless promised funding for the light water reactors.221 
 Public opinion in South Korea was negative. This was due to concerns that the 
United States had agreed to establish relations with North Korea. There was also as the 
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perception that Washington had proceeded with the agreement without adequately 
consulting Seoul.222 
 In Japan, the government welcomed the agreement but worried about the reaction 
of the country’s parliament, which was concern about the amount of money the country 
would contribute to the effort, particularly after Tokyo’s large financial contribution to 
the Gulf War campaign.223 
 
4.5 Explanation using the three models 
 
 When the United States eased sanctions against North Korea in January 1995, it 
took modest steps, leaving most of the consequential sanctions intact. Why did the United 
States lift some of the sanctions but not others? How did the country choose what 
sanctions to ease? This section analyzes these questions using the three analytical models. 
 
Model 1: The unitary rational actor model 
 In this model, a state’s actions may change due to another state’s conduct, but 
domestic factors are assumed to be stable. Under this assumption, the U.S. decision to 
keep most major sanctions intact can be interpreted as a strategy aimed at incentivizing 
North Korea to implement its part of the deal. In other words, the U.S. action was aimed 
at gaining advantage by withholding as many rewards from North Korea as possible 
without violating the deal so that the incentives could be used later, if necessary, to 
motivate Pyongyang to comply with the agreement. 
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This strategy, however, ran the risk of backfiring by discouraging North Korea 
from further cooperation. At this point, North Korea was fully implementing its 
commitments under the agreement by stopping the construction of two larger graphite-
moderated nuclear reactors, while holding technical discussions with the United States on 
the storage of spent fuel from the 5MW reactor in the Yongbyon complex. North Korea 
also lifted its legal restrictions against the United States, even if that was not a major 
benefit for Washington. There was no clear reason why the United States should have 
stepped back from a more generous cooperation posture. 
The explanation provided by this analytical model also does not fully explain the 
choice of the sanctions that were eased. The commitment under the agreement was to 
“reduce barriers to trade and investment, including telecommunication services and 
financial transactions.”224 Why did the United States choose to take measures that would 
enable news organizations from the United States to operate in Pyongyang, for example, 
but not others? 
 
Model 2: The institutional interest model 
 A fuller explanation as to why the United States chose to take modest steps 
becomes clear only when domestic politics are introduced into the analysis. This model 
looks at groups inside the U.S. government, using their interests, or utility-maximizing 
behavior, to explain government actions. 
In this case, the Clinton administration and Congress were the key actors. The 
Clinton administration’s utility-maximizing behavior was to implement the Agreed 
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Framework since the administration believed that by doing so it would have a positive 
outcome for national security and help win public approval so that the administration 
would be re-elected in 1996. For the Republican-controlled Congress, the Agreed 
Framework fell short of providing the United States with important national security 
gains. Thus, it believed that implementing the agreement did not improve the electoral 
chances of its members. Obviously, not everyone in the two groups agreed with these 
viewpoints. But these generalized views reflected the mainstream opinion of the groups 
at the time and as such the two groups will be used as the units of analysis. 
 As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the Clinton administration had anticipated 
domestic resistance to the agreement and had taken steps to avoid Congressional 
approval. But criticism against the deal was stronger than the administration had 
anticipated.225 It became even fiercer once the Republicans won control of both houses in 
midterm elections in November 1994. Members of Congress said the agreement achieved 
too little at too great a price for the United States. When a U.S. Army helicopter was shot 
down in North Korea, support for the Agreed Framework became even weaker. 
 Under these circumstances, the executive branch decided to ease sanctions in 
several stages.226 In the first phase, it chose to do the minimum possible while following 
the letter of the agreement. It also picked steps that were easily reversible and did not 
require Congressional approval to avoid an extra layer of complication.227 
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 The executive branch also shifted its explanation of why it was lifting sanctions 
against North Korea. In Congressional testimonies in December 1994 and January 1995, 
Clinton administration officials repeatedly emphasized that although the Agreed 
Framework only dealt with North Korea’s nuclear program, it would provide a political 
opening for the United States to address other concerns such as Pyongyang’s missile 
programs, conventional force structure, terrorist activities and human rights. Although 
Perry mentioned at one point said that North Korea would have to make improvements in 
non-nuclear areas to reap the full benefits of increased economic trade to restore its 
economy, the emphasis was on how other issues of U.S. concern would be dealt with 
later once the political process created by the agreement was established.228 
 But by March 1995, the administration’s explanations emphasized that the further 
easing of sanctions would only take place when solutions to other issues of U.S. concerns 
were obtained. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Winston 
Lord said in a Congressional testimony on March 19, 1995; 
 The timing and extent of further sanctions reduction 
measures will in large part depend on DPRK willingness to 
engage constructively on the issues we care about, 
including missile proliferation, the return of war remains, 
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the reduction of tensions and, most importantly, North-
South dialogue.229 
 A review of declassified government documents indicated that there may have 
been some differences in opinion within the government on how to proceed.  A note sent 
from the director of the State Department’s Office of Economic Sanctions Policy to the 
Treasury Department dated October 22, 1994, a day after the accord’s signing, describes 
a plan that is generally in line with the actual steps taken in January.230 This indicates that 
the Clinton administration had planned on a phased lifting of sanctions from the 
beginning, 
 However, there are strong suggestion that some executive branch members 
thought it would be a good idea for the United States to lift more sanctions than it did in 
the initial stage.231  Looking back at the decision made in late 1994 and early 1995, a 
declassified State Department background paper from January 1996 noted progress made 
in implementing the Agreed Framework and said; 
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We can … point to significant progress in implementing 
the Agreed Framework since the lifting of the first tranche. 
Moreover, the climate of U.S. public and congressional 
opinion is significantly more conducive to sanctions lifting 
than at the time of the first tranche, when reaction to the 
Bobby Hall helicopter incident led to a scaling back of the 
original package of sanctions-easing measures.232 
 The U.S. selection of what sanctions to lift are also become clearer when 
judgments within the domestic system are taken into account. The easing of legal 
restrictions on U.S. news organizations establishing offices in North Korea and the North 
Korean media doing the same in the United States was based on a January 1994 
government decision to promote measures for increased information exchanges to 
encourage openness in countries targeted by U.S. sanctions.233 According to the January 
1996 background paper, there were four U.S. goals for lifting the sanctions against North 
Korea; including bolstering societal openness and economic reform, helping U.S. 
businesses, helping North Koreans deal with the country’s food shortages and 
encouraging North Korea to maintain its compliance with the Agreed Framework and 
cooperate more in other fields.234 
 The analysis using Model 1 showed that the U.S. decision to lift sanctions in 
stages represented a strategy. But how many steps that should take and what would be 
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done in the initial phase was determined by what was possible in the domestic arena. The 
executive branch wanted the agreement it negotiated to succeed, and therefore had an 
incentive to cooperate with North Korea in a more generous manner.  Faced with a 
hostile Congress, however, it worked out a package that fulfilled the minimum 
requirement for the agreement and yet was acceptable domestically. 
 
Model 3: The individual mindset model 
Model 3 breaks down the unit of analysis further to individuals and looks at two 
main types of mindsets to understand U.S. actions. It provides an additional explanation 
about why the sanctions portion of the agreement may have been particularly susceptible 
to influence from domestic politics. 
 In this case, the key Cooperators — or those who preferred cooperative measures 
and were generally satisfied with the level of concessions from North Korea — were 
mainly in the executive branch. They were defending the agreement from the Hardliners, 
or those who favored coercive steps and wanted more concessions from North Korea, 
who were mainly were in the legislative branch.  
The key Cooperators were at the time dealing with the various problems related to 
the implementation of the tangible portion of the deal, such as arranging for the heavy 
fuel oil shipments and planning for the construction of two light water reactors. This 
portion of U.S. obligations involved domestic as well as international coordination. Its 
progress was visible and was subject to little room for interpretation. 
 The lifting of sanctions belonged to the “soft” part of the deal, whose terms were 
more ambiguous and subject to interpretation by both sides. In both the negotiation and 
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implementation phases of the agreement, this “soft” part of the agreement did not receive 
as much attention from the Congress, government officials or the media.  
For example, Gallucci, one of the key Cooperators, says he realized the 
importance of the “soft” half of the agreement, particularly when it came to the 
normalization of relations, only after leaving government in 1996. 
I don’t know that I understood how important 
normalization was when we were doing the 
negotiations. … (When) I left government in the spring of 
1996, I remember thinking, they thought they got a new 
political relationship with us, and they figured out they 
haven’t. So, I did eventually cotton to this, but I don’t know 
that when we were doing the negotiation that I understood 
as I did a few years later how important it was.235 
 Perry, another important Cooperator, also noted that the promised improvement of 
relations was not implemented satisfactorily. 
The president decided that the political price of (working 
toward a normal relationship with North Korea was) too 
high. … We did not try to build a relationship with North 
Korea. It’s certainly arguable whether we would have 
succeeded, that is, whether North Korea would have 
reciprocated. My judgment is they would have, because 
they thought those were the important parts of the 
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(agreement). When people talk about whether the treaty 
was being implemented, they tend to leave that point out.236 
 With their attention focused on the tangible portions of the Agreed Framework — 
and busy defending the deal from the Hardliners in Congress — the key Cooperators did 
not, and likely could not, pay close attention to the implementation of the “soft” portion 
of the agreement, including the lifting of sanctions. Thus, the “soft” portion of the 





A close look at how the United States reduced its sanctions against North Korea 
as required by the Agreed Framework shows that the country only took modest steps by 
the deadline, despite North Korea’s full compliance with the accord at that point. 
The interpretation provided by the unitary rational actor model, or Model 1, 
shows that this was a strategy to preserve some leverage over North Korea, which U.S. 
officials thought might not cooperate as smoothly in the future and might need to be 
prompted by more incentives. But that does not explain why the United States was 
willing to risk the U.S. position backfiring and causing North Korea to become 
uncooperative, or why the United States chose some sanctions and not others. 
 Introducing the interests of domestic groups using Model 2 provides a fuller 
explanation. The executive branch, which had an incentive to make the agreement work, 
decided on an initial sanctions-lifting package it thought would be acceptable to critics in 
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the legislative branch. In other words, the executive branch worked within what it 
perceived as limits dictated by domestic politics to form its strategy. Adding domestic 
politics also explains the choice of sanctions to be lifted, such as the relaxation of legal 
restraints on media bureaus which was part of an earlier plan to encourage openness in 
closed societies. 
 The analysis using Model 3, which introduces individual mindsets, provides an 
additional explanation as to why domestic politics may have influenced the lifting of 
sanctions rather than other parts of the deal. From the negotiation stage, the focus was on 
the tangible portions of the agreement, light water reactors for North Korea in exchange 
for the shutdown of North Korea’s plutonium production. The “soft” portion of the deal, 
including the lifting of sanctions, did not receive as much attention from the key 
Cooperators who wanted to defend the agreement. 
 Going back to the first question, “Why did the United States refrain from taking a 
more generous posture when it lifted sanctions against North Korea in 1995?” It was 
because the executive branch, which wanted the agreement to succeed, drew up a strategy 












Chapter 5 The Highly Enriched Uranium Problem (2002) 
 
 
What led to the end of the Agreed Framework was a  series of events stemming 
from an assessment by the U.S. intelligence community in the summer of 2002 that North 
Korea had been procuring equipment and material for a production-scale uranium 
enrichment program.237 The United States confronted North Korea with this information 
in a Pyongyang meeting in October 2002. When a senior North Korean official’s remarks 
on the topic were interpreted as an admission, Washington urged KEDO to suspend 
heavy fuel oil shipments to North Korea promised under the Agreed Framework. 
 This chapter looks in detail at the U.S. decisions at the time. The question it asks 
is: Why did the United States treat North Korea’s procurement of equipment for uranium 
enrichment as a violation of the Agreed Framework, and why did it respond by stopping 
the shipment of heavy fuel oil? 
The chapter begins with an overview of the developments related to the issue, 
followed by the reasons why this incident was chosen as a subcase for this research, with 
a particular focus on why North Korea’s uranium enriched procurement effort was being 
treated as a violation of the terms of the Agreed Framework. It then turns to the domestic 
political context of the events, followed by developments in the international arena that 
may have impacted the outcome. It concludes with an analysis of the developments using 
the three models. 
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5.1 The highly enriched uranium problem 
 
 There are two ways to produce nuclear materials that can be used for in atomic 
weapons, plutonium and highly enriched uranium. The production of plutonium requires 
bulky facilities such as a reactor and a reprocessing plant, which can be spotted by 
surveillance satellites. Uranium fuel is first put in a reactor to create a controlled nuclear 
chain reaction. The spent fuel rods are then taken to a reprocessing plant to chemically 
separate the plutonium.238  
 Uranium enrichment does not require such large facilities and thus is easier to 
conceal. The goal in this process is to produce a concentrated form of uranium 235, 
which only comprises 0.7 percent of natural uranium. Fissile material suitable for a 
nuclear weapon must have a uranium 235 content of more than 90 percent. There are 
several ways to conduct this process. One of the principal methods is to convert the 
uranium into a gaseous form, which is then fed into centrifuges that spin the gas at high 
speed. By doing so, the lighter isotope, uranium 235, separates from the heavier uranium 
238. The desired concentration can be achieved by repeating this process.239 Despite the 
relatively simple logic of the operation, developing a uranium enrichment program is 
challenging as it requires the acquisition of specialized material, such as metal alloys. It 
also requires the mastery of difficult technology, including engineering skills needed to 
balance the centrifuges while spinning them at several times the speed of sound.240 
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 The Agreed Framework stopped North Korea’s plutonium program by freezing 
the country’s graphite-moderated reactor and related facilities in Yongbyon, which had 
been operating since the 1980s and stopping the construction of two bigger reactors that 
could have produced more plutonium. 
 North Korean interest in uranium enrichment is believed to date back to the late 
1980s, when German intelligence first detected that the country obtaining some of the 
necessary equipment and technology.241 An inflection point in its pursuit of the program 
is likely to have come in the late 1990s, when its cooperation with Pakistan blossomed.242 
 Whether the agreement encompassed a highly enriched uranium program is a 
point of some contention. The document signed on October 21, 1994 does not 
specifically mention such a program.243 There are three factors, however, that support the 
argument that the agreement nonetheless applied to a highly enriched uranium program. 
First, the Agreed Framework commits the two countries to “work together for 
peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula,”244 which meant that any pathway 
to building a bomb was prohibited. Secondly, the agreement said that North Korea “will 
consistently take steps to implement the North-South Joint Declaration on the 
Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,”245 which committed the two Koreas to refrain 
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from possessing nuclear enrichment facilities. Finally, it would violate North Korea’s 
safeguards agreement with the IAEA. As North Korea promised to remain in the NPT 
and comply with IAEA safeguards in the Agreed Framework, it is argued that North 
Korea was naturally bound by the deal to refrain from developing a highly enriched 
uranium program. 
 In addition, Gallucci told the Congress in December 1994 that the United States 
would consider the development of a uranium enrichment program by North Korea a 
breach of the agreement because Pyongyang promised not to possess uranium enrichment 
facilities in the 1992 North-South Joint Declaration it signed with South Korea.246 
 The ambiguity regarding the treatment of a highly enriched uranium program in 
the Agreed Framework was not accidental. There appears to be two reasons why the 
agreement did not mention uranium enrichment by name. 
The first reason was that the U.S. negotiating team wanted the agreement’s focus 
to be on North Korea’s plutonium program. The threat that program posed for the United 
States was both visible and immediate, whereas that of a highly enriched uranium 
program was only what one former government official called “barely the wispiest cloud 
on the horizon”247 when the Agreed Framework was negotiated. Gallucci remembers a 
conversation with his colleagues about whether to mention uranium enrichment in the 
document when the team was negotiating with its North Korean counterpart in Geneva. A 
member of the team warned that going after the program might derail the entire deal, 
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adding that the program was covered in the agreement by reference to the 1992 joint 
declaration between the two Koreas in any case.248 
 The second reason is cited by Robert Carlin, a former North Korea analyst at both 
the Central Intelligence Agency and the State Department. He said that uranium 
enrichment was not mentioned because the United States wanted to avoid anything that 
could not be verified.249 While the United States suspected North Korea’s interest in 
uranium enrichment, it did not know the extent of that interest or any possible location of 
any facilities. The thinking behind this was that as verification was bound to become a 
crucial component of the agreement, it was wise to not complicate the issue by including 
items that could not be sufficiently verified. 
 The matter came to a head in the summer of 2002, when the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) produced a new assessment of North Korea’s uranium enrichment efforts, 
which concluded the country was working toward a production-scale program.250 An 
unclassified CIA report to Congress in December 2002 stated; 
The United States had been suspicious that North Korea 
has been working on uranium enrichment for several years. 
However, we did not obtain clear evidence indicating that 
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North Korea had begun acquiring material and equipment 
for a centrifuge facility until mid-2002. 
In 2001, North Korea began seeking centrifuge-related 
materials in large quantities. It also obtained equipment 
suitable for use in uranium feed and withdrawal systems. 
North Korea’s goal appeared to be a plant that could 
produce enough weapons-grade uranium for two or more 
nuclear weapons per year when fully operational.251 
 While there was consensus in the U.S. intelligence community on North Korea’s 
procurement efforts to develop a uranium enrichment program,252  there were also 
unanswered questions such as whether North Korea had been able to put together the 
components and if so, where the facility was.253 CIA Deputy Director John McLaughlin 
acknowledged that there was no smoking gun and that there were “questions which could 
not be answered with confidence.”254 
  The intelligence community’s conclusion came as the administration of George 
W. Bush, which took office in January 2001, was finishing up its second review of its 
North Korea policy.255 Dubbed the “Bold Approach,” the new policy promised incentives 
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from the United States if North Korea took substantial steps toward denuclearization. The 
United States had already proposed a July 10, 2002 visit to North Korea by Assistant 
Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs James Kelly to discuss this new 
approach. Learning of the new assessment by the intelligence community, the United 
States decided to postpone the trip. As a reason for the delay, Washington cited a clash 
between North Korean and South Korean vessels in late June in the Yellow Sea or West 
Sea as it is called by Koreans, which sank a South Korean patrol boat and killed several 
South Korean sailors.256 
 Kelly’s rescheduled visit took place in October 2002. He confronted North Korea 
with the new U.S. assessment, without providing any supporting evidence.257 On the 
second day of the meetings, First Vice Minister Kang Sok Ju acknowledged U.S. 
comments on North Korea’s uranium enrichment program to produce nuclear weapons 
and declared that his country was prepared to manufacture even more developed 
weapons. Although Kang did not use indisputable language admitting that the country 
had a highly enriched uranium program, the U.S. delegation concluded that his comments 
signaled such an admission.258 
 In response, the United States decided to stop the heavy fuel oil shipments being 
made to North Korea under the Agreed Framework. While the United States was 
financing the heavy fuel oil deliveries, KEDO was responsible for organizing the 
purchasing and shipping of the fuel. At U.S. urging, KEDO’s executive board issued a 
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statement on November 14, 2002 condemning North Korea’s pursuit of a nuclear 
weapons program and suspended the shipments.259 
 On December 12, 2002, Pak Gil Yon, ambassador at the North Korean permanent 
mission to the United Nations sent a letter to Charles “Jack” Pritchard, special envoy for 
negotiations with North Korea, saying that the United States had broken the Agreed 
Framework and that North Korea would lift the freeze on its nuclear facilities.260 North 
Korea removed all IAEA surveillance equipment on December 21, and on December 31 
expelled IAEA monitors, who had been in North Korea on rotation since 1994.261 In 
January, the country restarted its facilities at Yongbyon and announced plans to leave the 
NPT. This meant that North Korea was restarting the 90-day NPT withdrawal process, 
which it had suspended at the last minute in 1994 when it began talks with the United 
States that culminated in the Agreed Framework.262 
 
5.2 Why is this a subcase? 
 
 This episode is chosen as a subcase since both sides deviated from commitments 
contained in the agreement. Studying such a case increases the likelihood that factors 
other than U.S. domestic politics had an impact on the outcome. 
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 Despite the ambiguity in the language of the Agreed Framework, North Korea’s 
pursuit of the uranium enrichment program is treated as a violation of its terms in this 
study. This is because U.S. officials considered it to be the case. Since this research looks 
at how U.S. domestic politics impacted the implementation of the agreement, it accepts 
the U.S. definition of the North Korean activity, regardless of whether the North Koreans 
disputed it. The focus of the analysis is on how this official interpretation influenced 
American domestic politics as well as the country’s actions regarding the accord. 
 However, the analysis portion of this chapter also looks at how North Korea’s 
uranium enrichment program came to be defined as a violation of the Agreed Framework. 
 
5.3 Domestic political context 
 
 The Bush administration came into office in January 2001 with a deep antipathy 
toward North Korea’s Kim Jong Il, who the president viewed as a tyrant who inflicted 
suffering on his people while he enjoyed a luxurious lifestyle including expensive cars, 
cognac and foreign movies.263 Early in his presidency, Bush likened interactions with 
North Korea to dealing with children; 
I told my national security team that dealing with Kim Jong 
Il reminded me of raising children. When Barbara and 
Jenna were little and wanted attention, they would throw 
food on the floor. Laura and I would rush over and pick it 
up. The next time they wanted attention, they’d throw the 
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food again. “The United States is through picking up its 
food,” I said. 264 
 In addition, the Bush administration harbored a strong dislike of the preceding 
Clinton administration.265 The Bush administration’s broad policy approach in its early 
days was described as “anything but Clinton,” as it rejected policies solely because they 
had been conducted by its predecessor.266 
When Secretary of State Colin Powell made remarks to the press early in the Bush 
administration that it planned to pick up where Clinton left off and engage North Korea 
early in Bush’s presidency, it touched off a firestorm within the administration.267 Powell 
was instructed by National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice to correct that impression 
and he walked back his remarks when he spoke to the media again.268 
 Against this background, policymakers who dealt with North Korea were mainly 
divided into two groups; those for and against the Agreed Framework. Those for the 
agreement — which included Secretary of State Colin Powell and Kelly — saw value in 
engaging North Korea, even if they recognized flaws in the accord.269 
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 Those opposing the agreement included Vice President Dick Cheney, Defense 
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control John Bolton and 
Robert Joseph, who was on Bush’s transition team as a proliferation and defense expert 
and later joined the National Security Council.270 Their argument was that the character 
of the North Korean regime made it untrustworthy — it would cheat on any international 
commitment — and that the Agreed Framework did not give the United States what it 
needed in terms of verification.271 
 Above all, they had a profound dislike of making concessions to adversaries. 
Lawrence Wilkerson, who worked in the State Department’s Office of Policy Planning at 
the start of the administration and became Powell’s chief of staff in 2002, said; 
There is a certain element, and Cheney led that element, 
that does not believe that any enemy of the United States of 
consequence can ever be dealt with. They come out of that 
group that appreciates … Chamberlain’s appeasement of 
the Nazis as the primordial, indicative, seminal event of 
international relations in the 20th century and they refuse to 
repeat that. They use that template for every decision-
making process, in which some sort of accommodation or 
diplomacy with an enemy is contemplated. That is their 
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belief; Appeasing enemies is absolutely bad, there is no 
way you should do it.272 
 The Bush administration’s first policy review on North Korea, which began in 
February 2001, resulted in a June 6 announcement in which Bush said his government 
would pursue “serious negotiations,”273 while calling for “improved implementation”274 
of curbs on North Korea’s nuclear activities in compliance with the IAEA,275 “verifiable 
constraints”276 on North Korea’s missile programs, and “a less threatening conventional 
military posture.”277  
 The U.S. government’s North Korea policy was affected by larger events shortly 
after this. The September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the United States conducted by 
militants linked to the Islamic extremist group Al-Qaeda briefly united the world on the 
side of the United States. This was symbolized by such events as a phone call between 
Rice and Russian President Vladimir Putin in which the Russian leader asked what his 
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country could do to help278 and the French newspaper Le Monde’s editorial headline, 
“We are all Americans.”279 
Domestically, the attacks “lit a fire”280 under the camp opposed to engagement 
with North Korea, giving the group new hope that their view would prevail. The United 
States embarked on a path pursuing a “war against terrorism,” which was defined as a 
broad struggle against terrorist groups that threatened the way of life for Americans and 
their allies.281 The initial focus of the administration thus was on Afghanistan as part of a 
larger war on terror, which will evolve into the war on Iraq. 
 Amid an overall hardening of the mood in the United States, Bush gave his State 
of the Union address in January 2002 in which he called Iran, Iraq and North Korea the 
“Axis of Evil.”282 Asian experts at the State Department believed the phrase complicated 
U.S. efforts to engage North Korea and created problems even with allies, while those 
opposed to engagement thought that attitude signaled disloyalty to the president.283 
 After much debate, the administration notified Congress in March 2002 that North 
Korea was not in compliance with the terms of the Agreed Framework as it did not 
provide enough information about its nuclear activities, and did not allow inspections of 
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related facilities.284 While that would normally have ended the $95 million in foreign 
assistance needed to implement the agreement, Bush issued a waiver so that funding 
would not be affected.285 
 At the same time, the administration began a new policy review, which 
culminated in the new “Bold Approach” policy advocated by Powell. As noted earlier, it 
was when this policy approach was being prepared that the intelligence community 
reported its findings about North Korea’s uranium enrichment efforts.286 Some suspected 
that opponents of the Agreed Framework were encouraging the intelligence community 
to build a case on uranium enrichment to obstruct the process.287 
 Meanwhile, domestic battles between those who preferred cooperative measures 
and those who favor coercive means in foreign policy were over other issues. 
 Among them was the Bush administration’s determination to withdraw from the 
1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which imposed limits on the United States and Russia 
concerning missile defenses.288 The treaty was based on the premise that if either country 
increased defenses against long-range missiles, the other side would have to respond by 
developing more offensive capabilities, which could trigger a renewed arms race. 
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Proponents of withdrawal argued that this constraint on long-range missile defense 
systems no longer made sense because the Soviet Union was gone. They believed the 
United States needed to pull out unilaterally or make changes with Russia’s consent, in 
order to protect itself from missile attacks by what they considered unpredictable regimes 
such as North Korea or in case of accidental launches from China and Russia.289 Bush, 
Cheney, Rumsfeld, Rice and Bolton shared this opinion.290 The State Department led by 
Powell was not enthusiastic about the idea, worried about the diplomatic consequences of 
such a move.291  
Finally, the United States announced on December 13, 2001 that it would 
withdraw from the treaty within six months, and proceeded to do so on June 13, 2002. 
 There were other foreign policy issues that had a high priority among key 
administration members around this time, which made the North Korea issue of less 
concern for some. Chief among those problems was the question of how to compel Iraq’s 
Saddam Hussein to cooperate with U.N. inspectors over the country’s suspected weapons 
of mass destruction.292 President Bush decided in 2002 that U.S. forces should be used to 
overthrow Saddam, a decision not made public until early the following year. 
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5.4 International context 
 
 While the U.S. intelligence community was reaching its new assessment about 
North Korea’s uranium enrichment procurement effort, South Korean President Kim Dae 
Jung was pursuing his “sunshine policy” of engagement with North Korea. He worried 
that the U.S tougher stance against North Korea would undermine his effort.293 Kim and 
Bush had a disastrous meeting in Washington in March 2001 in Washington, six weeks 
after Bush’s inauguration, because the South Koreans perceived the American president 
to be insultingly informal and apparently dismissive of Kim’s deep experience in Korean 
Peninsula politics.294 
 The relationship between the two leaders fared better during Bush’s trip to South 
Korea in February 2002. Despite Bush’s remarks a month earlier about North Korea 
being part of the “Axis of Evil,” the trip included a joint visit by the two leaders to the 
demilitarized zone between the two Koreas. This gave symbolic support to Kim’s efforts 
to restore the rail connections with North Korea as part of his broader engagement 
plan.295 
 Japan, meanwhile, had been holding secret talks with North Korea to prepare for a 
summit meeting between Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and North Korean 
leader Kim Jong Il. The preparations had been taking place since September 2001.296 
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 The diplomatic effort was aimed at normalizing diplomatic relations between the 
two countries. But first they needed to solve a dispute over Japanese citizens who had 
been abducted by North Korea in the 1970s and 1980s, some of whom were used to train 
North Korean spies in Japanese language and culture.297 
 Breaking with tradition, Koizumi chose not to fully inform the United States 
about the preparatory talks his government was holding with North Korea.298 In fact, 
most of the Japanese government was kept in the dark about until about a month before 
Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang on September 17, 2002.299 
 The United States was informed of Koizumi’s planned visit to the North Korean 
capital to meet with Kim Jong Il only 72 hours before a public announcement was made 
by the Japanese government. The information was conveyed to U.S. Deputy Secretary of 
State Richard Armitage, who visited Tokyo in late August to give to alert Japan about the 
new U.S. intelligence community assessment on North Korea’s highly enriched uranium 
program, without providing details.300 U.S. concerns about the North Korea’s uranium 
enrichment program led to the Japanese beefing up a portion of the joint declaration 
issued by Japan and North Korea after Koizumi’s visit that emphasized that both sides 
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would comply with all related international agreements, although it did not specifically 
refer to the uranium enrichment issue.301 
 
5.5 Analysis using the three models 
 
Model 1: The unitary rational actor model 
 Using the unitary rational actor model, the U.S. action to halt the shipment of 
heavy fuel oil to North Korea can be interpreted as a straightforward reaction to the 
discovery of North Korea’s covert pursuit of a uranium enrichment program. According 
to this explanation, U.S. government officials learned of the program, confronted North 
Korea with the problem, and obtained what they interpreted as Pyongyang’s admission. 
The U.S. action of stopping heavy fuel oil shipments was a reaction to North Korea’s 
violation of the terms of the Agreed Framework. 
 Was this a rational act on the part of the United States? It was a reasonable action 
to take if the U.S. goal was to punish North Korea for violating the agreement by 
withholding benefits. The understanding between the two countries had been that while 
the Agreed Framework was not a legally binding treaty, if one side stopped short of fully 
implementing its clauses the other side could reduce the level of cooperation.302 In 
addition, U.S. officials had warned their North Korean counterparts during negotiations 
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that some types of activity by Pyongyang would lead to political problems in 
Washington, regardless of any ambiguity in the language of the document.303 
The move would be less logical if the U.S. objective was to stop North Korea’s 
nuclear program. It was reasonable to assume that North Korea would retaliate to the halt 
in heavy fuel oil shipments by restarting its frozen plutonium program that was frozen 
under the agreement. Once it did so, Pyongyang could not only use the covert highly 
enriched uranium program but also its declared plutonium program to make nuclear 
bomb material. 
 In other words, leaving an agreement without replacing it with another policy for 
containing nuclear material production would merely give more room to allow North 
Korea to pursue its nuclear program. This leaves the question: Why did the United States 
take that decision? 
 
Model 2: The institutional interest model 
 Reviewing the interests of the separate institutions within the U.S. government 
provides some additional insights. Unlike the first case study regarding the lifting of 
sanctions, however, in this case major divisions existed not only between the executive 
and the legislative branches of the government, but also within the administration. In this 
section of the analysis separate agencies within the government are treated as unitary 
rational actors whose views were represented by their leadership. 
 The State Department led by Powell had an interest in making the agreement 
work. This was partly a structural issue, given the department’s mandate to solve 
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international problems through diplomacy. As then National Security Advisor Rice 
pointed out, it was Powell’s job to talk to unsavory regimes in order to find solutions to 
problems. He could hardly have done that while being committed to the regimes’ 
demise.304 Meanwhile, the Vice President’s office and the Defense Department, led by 
Rumsfeld, were against the Agreed Framework and wanted the North Korean problem 
solved through tougher sanctions and isolation.305 
 The institutional interest model would interpret the U.S. decision as the State 
Department losing out to other parts of the government that were against the Agreed 
Framework since it was unable to defend the accord following the new U.S. intelligence 
assessment of North Korea’s uranium enrichment procurement efforts. The president 
sided against the State Department decided to halt the heavy fuel oil shipments. 
 While this explanation gives more context, it still does not answer why the United 
States chose to stop the heavy fuel oil shipments knowing full well that North Korea 
might restart its plutonium program in response. 
 
Model 3: The individual mindset model 
 A more detailed look into the individuals who played a part in the decision and 
their mindsets process gives a fuller explanation of what was taking place.  
 As mentioned above, the divisions in the government was not just among 
agencies. While Model 2’s paints a general description of the State Department pitted 
against the Vice President’s Office and the Defense Department, there was also a schism 
                                                 




within the State Department between those for the Agreed Framework and those against 
it. This was most evident in the appointment of Bolton as the undersecretary for arms 
control and international security, the department’s number three post. Bolton was 
Powell’s “neocon hire”306 in the department to respect Bush’s wish to have conservative 
views represented in the department. 
 Bolton was a Hardliner who believed that the Agreed Framework did not go far 
enough in extracting concessions from North Korea and that coercive measures rather 
than cooperative give-and-take should be the means in obtaining them. He called the 
officials in the State Department’s Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs 
“EAPeasers,”307 a combination of the bureau’s acronym EAP with the word “appeasers,” 
for defending the Agreed Framework. His views clashed with those of Powell, who saw 
merit in the Agreed Framework in dealing with North Korea. In the State Department, 
Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, the number two official in the department 
and Assistant Secretary Kelly led policy efforts aimed at a solution through diplomatic 
efforts. 
 Among the other agencies, officials in the Hardliner group included Cheney and 
his chief of staff Lewis “Scooter” Libby and Eric Edelman, Stephen Yates and Samantha 
Ravich, who were staffers in the Vice President’s office. In the Defense Department 
headed by Rumsfeld were his deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, and Undersecretary of Defense 
Douglas Feith, who opposed the deal. In the National Security Council, Joseph, the senior 
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director of counterproliferation, and John Rood, who also dealt with proliferation issues, 
also belonged to this group. 
 Bolton was what Morton Halperin, Priscilla Clapp and Arnold Kanter describe as 
an “in-and-outer” in the bureaucratic system, meaning someone who joined the 
government from the outside and whose views were shaped mostly by his association 
with the groups he came from.308 Bolton remained loyal to the group that shared his 
preference for coercive measures in foreign policy.309 
 The role of the national security advisor is normally to find a consensus among 
feuding groups. But Condoleezza Rice, who did not clearly attach herself to either of the 
Cooperators or Hardliners, was never able to take control and press effectively for a 
coherent policy.310 Both groups blamed Rice for a lack of consistency in North Korea 
policy.311 
 There were three decision points in the highly enriched uranium episode that 
deserves a closer look. One is how the United States judged that North Korea’s uranium 
enrichment procurement effort was a violation of the Agreed Framework. The second is 
the way in which the U.S. government decided to confront North Korea on the issue. The 
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third is how the government decided to respond to North Korea’s reaction during Kelly’s 
visit. 
 The Hardliners were convinced that North Korea clearly violated the Agreed 
Framework by procuring equipment and material for an industrial-scale uranium 
enrichment program, regardless of some ambiguities in the language of the agreement 
and gaps in the intelligence about the suspected program. 
 Their argument was that finding an actual facility was too high a bar for U.S. 
intelligence to detect because of Pyongyang’s secretive nature, and that it was safe to 
assume that it had already built one given the North Korean regime’s character.312 Some 
in the Hardliner camp, such as Wolfowitz, argued that what was known should be 
regarded as the tip of the iceberg. They preferred estimates of North Korea’s procurement 
efforts that were larger than those given by the intelligence community.313 
 Bolton describes his efforts to convince his State Department colleagues to accept 
his views of the development in a meeting on July 19, 2002. 
We met just after 3:30 p.m. in Powell’s conference room … 
Kelly started by trying to table a long agenda of items to 
discuss, which I thought would be a waste of time. I 
intervened, saying we had reached a turning point in 
history, and that the new information we had on North 
Korea’s uranium-enrichment activities could lead to only 
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one conclusion, namely that the Agreed Framework was 
dead. … Kelly responded that there was still disagreement 
about exactly when North Korea would have enough highly 
enriched uranium to make a warhead, which was true but 
irrelevant to the point that the DPRK314 was violating the 
Agreed Framework. He also said that the North might 
begin reprocessing plutonium if we announced the demise 
of the framework, and that South Korea and Japan would 
certainly be surprised. I answered that it was 
incontrovertible that procurement for an industrial-scope 
level of uranium enrichment was under way, and that any 
new information we obtained could only make us more 
concerned. … As for plutonium, I said it was a top matter 
for contingency planning, but not a reason to save the 
Agreed Framework.315 
 In his memoir, Bolton describes a network of likeminded people in the NSC and 
the Defense Department who told him that their respective agencies viewed the highly 
enriched uranium program as a fatal blow to the Agreed Framework, and that “the only 
issue was where State would come out, about which I made encouraging noises.”316 
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 Against this backdrop, many of the Cooperators who supported the Agreed 
Framework concluded that North Korea’s uranium enrichment procurement effort was a 
violation of the spirit, if not the word, of the accord,317 even if some questioned how far 
along North Korea was in actually constructing an enrichment facility, and whether the 
North Korea’s intention was to hedge its bets in case the agreement fell apart.318 
 The decision on how to respond to the discovery of North Korea’s uranium 
enrichment procurement effort was debated between the Hardliners and the Cooperators. 
While Hardliners called for an immediate end to the Agreed Framework, the Cooperators 
expressed concern that confronting North Korea with the information might convince it 
to hide what it already had. They advocated a comprehensive settlement that incorporated 
the uranium enrichment issue into the Bold Approach.319 The argument by the 
Cooperators — mainly in the State Department — was that the United States had 
previously dealt with difficult issues with North Korea through a cooperative approach, 
and it could do so again.320 An example of this was the 1998-1999 dispute over an 
underground site in Kumchang-ri that Washington suspected was a secret nuclear reactor 
and reprocessing facility. North Korea eventually granted U.S. inspectors, including 
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military personnel, access to the site which revealed that their suspicions were 
unfounded. 
The Hardliners initially opposed a visit by Kelly to Pyongyang, with only the 
Cooperators in the State Department supporting that plan. But Bush authorized the visit, 
at the urging of Rice. She thought that it would be useful for Kelly to deliver a tough 
message to North Korea, and that it would help U.S. allies Japan and South Korea.321 
 Once Bush decided that an envoy should be sent, no one raised major objections 
to confronting North Korea with the information.322 The only disagreement then was who 
should visit, with those against cooperation calling for either Joseph or Bolton to carry 
the message.323  
The dispute then moved to what should be the U.S. message to North Korea. The 
initial draft drawn up by the Cooperators in the State Department was rejected as being 
too soft. Hardliners in the NSC then drew up much tougher talking points urging North 
Korea to completely change its policy.324 Kelly was instructed to read the message 
verbatim and to refrain from any side conversations or socializing with the North 
Koreans during his visit.325 
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Once North Korea reacted to Kelly’s message with an apparent admission, the 
Hardliners pushed for a quick counter-response. They wanted to turn back a shipment of 
heavy fuel oil that was on its way to North Korea but were reminded that the United 
States alone could not make that decision because KEDO was executing the shipment.326 
The State Department informed the other principal members of KEDO — South Korea, 
Japan and the European Union — that the United States planned to stop payment for the 
deliveries.327 The November KEDO meeting then decided to stop heavy fuel shipments to 
North Korea. 
The struggle between the two factions involved leaks to the news media. The 
admission by the North Koreans of the uranium enrichment program was reported by the 
media before the U.S. government came up with a response. Rice believed that 
Hardliners leaked that information “to snuff out any hope of further negotiations.”328 
There was no substantive discussion about replacing the Agreed Framework with 
another arrangement to prevent the North Koreans from proceeding with the plutonium 
and highly enriched uranium programs to increase their stockpile of nuclear bomb 
material. Bolton believed a replacement mechanism was not necessary.  His logic was 
that determining that the agreement was broken was “the only intellectually honest 
conclusion.”329 
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Looking at these three decision points in detail shows two factors that likely 
contributed to the actions reached.  
 The first factor concerns the intense coordination among the Hardliners who 
believed that the Agreed Framework was bad policy and needed to be discarded. As seen 
in Bolton’s comments, they were in closely cooperated to realize their policy goals. In 
contrast, the key officials who saw merit in the Agreed Framework differed in their 
degree of support as they did not see it as a perfect arrangement. 
 Wilkerson, a critic of the decision-making process of the group led by Cheney, 
described the dynamic as follows: 
(Those against the agreement) had a strategy, furthermore 
they were ruthless in carrying it out. We had no strategy, 
we were not ruthless, they beat us, again and again and 
again.330 
 Related to this is the second element, which was that Powell, the highest-ranking 
defender of the Agreed Framework, was busy with other issues, including the withdrawal 
from the ABM Treaty. Powell mainly relied on Armitage and Kelly to deal with day-to-
day issues regarding the North Korea nuclear problem.331 
 There are indications that Powell carefully chose his battles with his opponents in 
the administration. After Bolton gave a speech in Seoul disparaging the North Korean 
leader in 2003, Pritchard was instructed by Powell to tell the North Koreans that the only 
officials who could authoritatively discuss U.S. policy toward the country were the 
                                                 





president and the secretary of state.332 When he learned of this message, Bolton was 
furious. Soon afterward, Jon Kyl, a Republican Senator from Arizona and a Bolton ally, 
urged Powell to take “corrective action” against Pritchard.333 According to Pritchard, 
Powell did not defend him, despite the fact that he was carrying out Powell’s instructions 
and they had a good working relationship; 
Colin Powell, four star (general), secretary of state, 
independent minded person, was not going to step into the 
line of fire to do something that made it look like he was 
defending North Korea within that mindset, attitude, of that 
administration.334 
 There are some who, looking back, wonder whether another approach could have 
been possible. Pritchard, who was a member of Kelly’s delegation on the October 2002 
visit, regrets not trying to set up an opportunity for diplomacy so that option would have 




 While the U.S. intelligence community concluded in the summer of 2002 that 
North Korea was procuring equipment for a production-scale uranium enrichment 
program, some questions remained as to how far along it was in the program. In addition, 
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the ambiguity of the language in the Agreed Framework left room for the United States to 
interpret this program as not being a clear violation of the accord if it wanted to. 
 But Washington concluded that North Korea violated the Agreed Framework, and 
elected to end the heavy fuel oil shipments, an act that predictably prompted North Korea 
to restart its plutonium program. 
 The unitary rational actor model shows that the suspension of energy shipments 
would have been the logical action should the U.S. objective have been to punish North 
Korea, but not if it was trying to prevent North Korea from developing more material for 
nuclear weapons. While the interests of different groups within the government provide 
some explanation, a fuller interpretation is only possible by looking at the mindsets of 
individuals in the administration. 
 Even before the uranium enrichment program became a focus of debate, the 
Hardliners believed that the Agreed Framework was unsatisfactory as it did not extract 
enough concessions from North Korea and rewarded the country for its bad behavior by 
giving the country positive inducements to change its ways. 
When the U.S. intelligence community reached its conclusion about North 
Korea’s uranium enrichment procurement activity, the Hardliners seized the opportunity 
to advance their view, working within the system to try to make that the official 
government position. The Cooperators, meanwhile, had varying levels of doubt about the 
accord’s likelihood of success and the price that the United States was paying. Faced with 
new information about North Korea’s uranium enrichment activities, the government 
chose to take the most stringent interpretation of Pyongyang’s conduct. 
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 While Bush agreed to send Kelly to Pyongyang, the talking points were scripted 
by the Hardliners, giving Kelly little leeway. Once North Korea’s comments in the 
meeting were taken as an admission of the highly enriched uranium program, a halt to 
heavy fuel oil shipments was immediately recommended and later became policy. 
 The Hardliners coordinated across agencies and worked with great intensity, 
while the attention of the highest-ranking officials in favor of the agreement was 
consumed with other policy issues. As the tolerance for concessions toward North Korea 
deteriorated sharply, the United States moved toward coercive steps that it knew could 




















Chapter 6 The Verification Problem (2008) 
 
 
 The Six Party Talks — involving China, Japan, the two Koreas, Russia and the 
United States — were established to defuse the second North Korean nuclear crisis after 
Pyongyang restarted its nuclear facilities it had frozen under the Agreed Framework. 
While the talks did not make progress in the first term of the George W. Bush 
administration, that changed with the administration’s new approach to North Korea in 
the second term. 
 The six countries adopted a document on September 19, 2005 in which North 
Korea committed to abandoning all its nuclear weapons and programs.336 While the talks 
were halted for two years due to another dispute — this time over U.S. sanctions on a 
Macao bank accused of laundering North Korean funds — they were put back on track 
after the issue was solved. In 2007, participants of the process agreed on more detailed 
steps to be taken during the first two phases of the implementation of the September 2005 
agreement. Specific measures in the third phase were never determined, as progress 
stopped before reaching that point. 
 This chapter deals with events that took place in the second phase of 
implementation. In this stage, North Korea was supposed to submit a complete list of its 
nuclear programs. While there was no agreement among the six parties that the 
verification of that list would take place during the second phase, the United States 
insisted that it be included as a requirement. 
The question to be analyzed in this chapter is: Why did the United States advance 
the timetable for establishing the verification protocol for North Korea’s nuclear activity, 
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and why did it expand its scope, when there was no clear violation of the agreement on 
North Korea’s part? It first discusses the dispute between the United States and North 
Korea over the verification of its nuclear program in detail, before explaining why this is 
chosen as a subcase. It then moves to a discussion of the domestic political context 
followed by relevant international events. It concludes with an analysis using the three 
models. 
 
6.1 The verification problem 
 
 Under the second phase actions agreed to by the six countries on October 3, 2007, 
North Korea was obligated to “disable” its three nuclear facilities at the Yongbyon 
nuclear complex and submit a “complete and correct” declaration of all its nuclear 
programs by the year’s end.337  
 Neither step was completed by the December 31, 2007 deadline, although 
significant progress was made in the disablement of the Yongbyon complex. Disablement 
work — which meant carrying out measures that would require significant time for North 
Korea to restart the facilities338 — began in early November339 and were completed at the 
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spent-fuel reprocessing facility and the fuel fabrication plant by the end of 2007.340 This 
meant that eight of the 11 disablement tasks identified by the United States were 
completed.341 (Appendix 6 lists the 11 steps.) 
 Disablement steps remained incomplete at the nuclear reactor by the end of 2007 
due to technical problems. In an October 2007 meeting in Pyongyang, technical staff 
from both countries decided to follow a 100-day schedule to remove fuel rods from the 
reactor instead of focusing on the year-end deadline, after the North Koreans informed 
the United States that a pace faster than that would expose North Korean workers to 
unacceptable levels of radiation.342 Discharge of the 8,000 fuel rods — a key step in the 
disabling process as fuel cannot be reloaded into the reactor without great difficulty — 
began only in mid-December.343 
 North Korea also manipulated the pace of work to signal its displeasure at the 
other five countries. For example, Pyongyang reduced the number of fuel rods extracted 
from the reactor in January to 30 a day from 80 a day needed for the complete removal of 
8,000 fuel rods in 100 days, complaining that a batch of heavy fuel oil that it was 
supposed to receive from Russia in November had not arrived.344 
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 Meanwhile, developments outside of the nuclear talks signaled a general 
improvement in relations between the United States and North Korea. One was a visit to 
Pyongyang by the New York Philharmonic to perform a concert on February 26, 2008. It 
was the first gesture of its kind between the two countries and some observers drew 
parallels with cultural overtures during the Cold War.345 
 The second was the resumption of U.S. food aid to North Korea. The 
administration said in May 2008 that it would provide more than 500,000 tons of food to 
the country. The announcement followed an agreement on monitoring methods that 
included random inspections and allowing Korean-language speakers to participate in the 
monitoring teams. This was the largest amount of food assistance from the United States 
to North Korea in one year since 1999. While the administration denied any connection 
between the nuclear negotiations and food aid, outside analysts doubted that claim.346 
 Differences between the United States and North Korea over the declaration of 
Pyongyang’s nuclear program continued to pose a problem. North Korea claimed in a 
Foreign Ministry statement on January 5, 2008 that it submitted a report in November 
2007 to the United States that was supposed to have served as a declaration.347 The 
United States, however, did not recognize that report as such. It said that the declaration, 
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when completed, should be submitted to China, the chair of the Six Party Talks 
process.348 Washington also made it clear that wanted North Korea to make a credible 
effort in explaining what it had in terms of materials, facilities and programs.349 
 North Korea’s nuclear declaration was also a topic in a letter by Bush sent to the 
North Korean leader, which was handed to the North Korean Foreign Minister Pak Ui 
Chun by Hill on his visit to Pyongyang in December 2007.350 The letter was respectful in 
tone, a change from the U.S. president’s uncompromising position earlier in his 
administration as represented by his “Axis of Evil” comment. In it, Bush offered to 
normalize relations between the two countries in return for Pyongyang disclosing and 
abandoning its nuclear program.351 
 A major sticking point was the question of how to treat North Korea’s uranium 
enrichment procurement efforts. The U.S. insisted that North Korea address the issue for 
several reasons. The first was because Washington had evidence from 2002 that 
Pyongyang purchased equipment necessary for the program and that it had received 
assistance from Pakistan.352 Suspicions deepened further when items the North Koreans 
provided to the United States as evidence during discussions was found to be 
contaminated with traces of highly enriched uranium. The first time this happened was in 
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late 2007, after U.S. officials visited a North Korean factory to investigate Pyongyang’s 
claim that the specialized aluminum the country purchased was not for a uranium 
enrichment program but was for a shipboard gun system.353 Sung Kim, the State 
Department’s Korea Desk Director, was allowed to return to the United States with 
samples of the aluminum tube, which, when tested in the United States, showed traces of 
highly enriched uranium.354 The second time was in 2008, when traces of enriched 
uranium were found among the 18,000 pages of documents that North Korea turned over 
to the United States in May of that year.355 The documents contained information about 
past campaigns to reprocess plutonium at Yongbyon. They were given in seven boxes to 
a group led by Sung Kim to verify how much plutonium was made at the facility.356 
 Another issue that the United States wanted North Korea to clarify was its nuclear 
cooperation with other countries. Since 2007, the United States had intelligence that 
North Korea had helped build a nuclear plant in Syria.357  This became particularly 
salient after Israeli forces attacked and destroyed the plant in September 2007. While 
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neither the strike nor the North Korean link was publicly disclosed, the broad outlines of 
the attack leaked to the media within the week.358 
 Hill met with Kim Kye Gwan, North Korea’s lead nuclear negotiator, multiple 
times in various locations — Beijing, Geneva and Singapore — to try to bridge their 
differences over what should be included in the declaration. In their meeting in Singapore 
on April 7-9, 2008, the two sides reached a compromise. Under this arrangement, North 
Korea was to provide a declaration of its plutonium program. The United States was to 
give North Korea a bill of specifics what Washington suspected to be the country’s 
proliferation activities as well as procurement efforts regarding highly enriched uranium, 
and North Korea was to acknowledge the U.S. concerns.359 It was as a result of this 
meeting that Sung Kim was able to visit North Korea to obtain the documents on the 
history of plutonium production in the Yongbyon facility.360 
 In late June, both the United States and North Korea took coordinated steps to 
fulfill their commitments. On June 26, 2008, North Korea delivered its nuclear 
declaration to China, the chair of the Six Party Talks. In response, Bush rescinded the 
application of the Trading with the Enemy Act against North Korea.361 He also gave 
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Congress 45 days of notice of his intention to take the country off the U.S. list of state 
sponsors of terrorism.362 
 While the United States puts countries on the state sponsors of terrorism list for 
their involvement in terrorist activities, there is considerable room for interpretation on 
what constitutes such acts. North Korea was included on the list after a bomb planted by 
its agents exploded on a South Korean airliner on November 29, 1987, killing 115 people 
on board. The State Department, however, determined that North Korea had not 
committed a terrorist act since then.363 Once the administration decides to remove a 
country from the list, the president must notify Congress of his intention 45 days before 
the action is taken. If Congress wanted to prevent the administration from doing so, it 
must pass legislation which is subject to a presidential veto.  
 A day after Bush’s announcement, North Korea destroyed the cooling tower at the 
Yongbyon complex. U.S. officials including Sung Kim traveled to Yongbyon to observe 
the controlled explosion, which was reported by several international media outlets 
including CNN. Bush watched it from the Oval Office.364 The dramatic effect of a 
controlled explosion required additional spending by the U.S. government.365 
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 The contents of the 60-page declaration were not publicly disclosed, but news 
media and independent analysts would conclude that North Korea declared that it 
separated about 30 kilograms of plutonium and used 2 kg of plutonium for its first 
nuclear test on October 9, 2006.366 While the total of plutonium extracted was within 
outside estimates, experts believe that the North Korean claim about the amount used in 
its first nuclear test was too small to be credible since North Korea was not believed to 
have mastered a sophisticated weapons design that would require only 2 kg of 
plutonium.367 
 North Korea, meanwhile, stepped up the pace of disablement work at the nuclear 
reactor in Yongbyon. In early July, it increased the number of fuel rods discharged from 
the nuclear reactor to 30 fuel rods a day, up from the 15 rods a day in June. But this was 
still far below the 80 fuel rods a day that it could safely discharge. In late June, nearly 
half of the 8,000 fuel rods had been pulled from the reactor.368 
 With the submission of the North Korean declaration, the focus shifted to the 
verification of the country’s nuclear activity. China called for a six-party meeting on July 
10-12, 2008 in Beijing to discuss the issue. In that meeting, the six countries agreed on a 
broad outline for verifying North Korea’s nuclear programs. The agreement said that a 
verification mechanism would be created involving experts from the six countries, and 
that it would involve visits to facilities, review of documents, interviews and other 
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measures that the parties agreed on. It also said that IAEA consultation would be 
welcome when necessary. The specifics of the mechanism and implementation were to be 
decided by a working group under the Six-Party Talks.369 
 On July 23, the foreign ministers of the six countries involved in the process 
confirmed their commitment to the denuclearization process at an informal meeting in 
Singapore, where they were attending a meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum, a 
security dialogue to which all six countries were members. Rice had her first meeting 
there with her North Korean counterpart Pak Ui Chun. This was the highest level face-to-
face contact between the two countries since the Six Party Talks began.370 
 Problems re-emerged that month, this time over a verification protocol draft that 
the United States presented to North Korea. The four-page protocol reflected the thinking 
of the State Department’s Bureau of Verification, Compliance and Implementation that 
wanted an intrusive protocol to be put in place. The U.S. proposal mentioned each of the 
broad verification requirements agreed to in the Beijing meeting and clarified 
Washington’s interpretation of them. For example, the protocol sought “full access to any 
site, facility or location” that may have been used for nuclear purposes. It also required 
the use of various technical tools, including sampling. The proposal also stipulated that 
the measures would cover all elements of a nuclear program, including plutonium 
production, uranium enrichment, weapons production and testing as well as any 
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proliferation activities.371  In other words, the proposal expanded the scope of the 
verification process considerably, giving inspectors free rein to inspect for nuclear 
material outside of what North Korea had reported in its declaration submitted earlier to 
its Six-Party counterparts. 
 The Americans insisted that the verification protocol must be agreed on before the 
U.S. president could take North Korea off the list of state sponsors of terrorism.372 North 
Korea complained that was not the deal to which it had agreed. The 45-day notification 
period of notification required by Congress on the state sponsors of terrorism list missed 
its August 11, 2008 deadline, without the United States taking action. North Korea 
responded by suspending its disablement activity at the Yongbyon nuclear reactor and 
threatening to restore the facilities at the nuclear site to its original state.373 A statement 
by the North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman, carried by the official Korean Central 
News Agency said: 
No agreements reached among the six parties or between 
the DPRK and the U.S. contain an article which stipulates 
the verification of the nuclear declaration of the DPRK as 
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conditionality for delisting it as a “state sponsor of 
terrorism.” 
As far as the verification is concerned, it is a commitment 
to be fulfilled by the six parties at the final phase of the 
denuclearization of the whole Korean Peninsula according 
to the September 19 joint statement.374 
 A close look at the U.S. attitude toward the verification process shows that a shift 
took place in the spring of 2008, when the United States was negotiating with North 
Korea over the content of its declaration. The United States began publicly hinting that it 
would push the North Koreans harder on the verification of their declaration by moving 
the submission deadline to an earlier date. The verification of the disablement of the 
Yongbyon reactor in the second phase was not a major challenge given the presence of 
both U.S. experts and IAEA inspectors at the site. The verification of North Korea’s 
declaration had been understood until this time to be a task for the third stage, as it was 
not spelled out in the second phase action plan agreed to in October 2007. 
 In a speech at a Washington think tank on June 18, 2008, Rice admitted to 
moving up the requirement: 
As to phase two, which is to end with the declaration and 
disablement, the parties are in agreement that the 
declaration must address the North Korean programs and 
facilities and that it must provide the means to know 
whether that declaration is complete and accurate. 
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Obviously, we’re not going to take the word of North 
Koreans that what they say on the piece of paper is a full 
representation of what they have. We will make a judgment 
as to whether or not we think, in accordance with what we 
know, it is, but we have to go and we have to verify. Let 
me give you an example. 
In order to verify the amount of plutonium that they’ve 
actually made, you have to have records, many of which 
they’ve given us, but you also have to have access to the 
reactor itself and to the waste pool, and they’ve said they 
will give us that access. What we’ve done, in a sense, is 
move up from issues that were to be taken up in phase 
three, like the verification, like access to the reactor, into 
phase two.375 
 Rice indicates in her memoir that the reason for expanding the scope of the 
verification protocol and moving up the schedule for its establishment was because the 
United States found the North Korean declaration inadequate and sought to find out more 
about North Korea’s uranium enrichment program. 
We decided to go at the problem from another angle. The 
North Koreans would also have to agree to a verification 
protocol to govern the on-site inspection of all aspects of 
                                                 




their nuclear program. That protocol, if properly structured, 
would give us access to sites both declared and undeclared, 
meaning that we’d have the right to inspect a building or 
facility even if the North hadn’t put it on the declaration. 
We could then trigger inspections of sites that were 
suspected of being associated with uranium enrichment.376 
 
6.2 Why is this a subcase? 
 
 The literal reading of the October 3, 2007 document on the second phase of the 
implementation of North Korea’s eventual denuclearization shows that this phase was to 
end with North Korea’s disabling of the Yongbyon nuclear complex and submission of a 
declaration of its nuclear programs. Verification was not included. 
 But the United States chose to advance the schedule for establishing a verification 
protocol from phase three to phase two, as Rice mentioned in her speech in June 18, 
2008, deviating from that understanding. In line with this policy, Washington held back 
the inducement it promised earlier — delisting North Korea as a state sponsor of 
terrorism — without first reaching an agreement on a verification protocol. 
 In addition, the United States expanded the scope of the verification protocol to 
include facilities that were outside those listed in North Korea’s declaration. The U.S.-
drafted protocol handed to North Korea in July proposed that the country allow 
verification activities anywhere, anytime. 
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 At the time, the United States did not cite any specific conduct by North Korea as 
a reason for its actions. North Korea had submitted its nuclear declaration as arranged. 
This is a case in which North Korean actions do not immediately explain why the United 
States pushed for more than was initially agreed, and thus domestic politics is likely to 
have played a major role. 
 
6.3 Domestic political context 
 
 Several domestic political changes in Bush’s second term from January 2005 had 
a significant impact on North Korea policy. 
 One was the ascent of Rice as the president’s most important foreign affairs 
advisor. Bush appointed Rice as secretary of state replacing Powell in his cabinet shake-
up following the 2004 presidential election. This freed her from the coordinator role she 
had played as national security adviser with limited success. Rice had a close relationship 
with the president, frequently working out at the gym with him, having meals with him 
and his wife Laura, and spending weekends with the couple.377 
 The second was Cheney’s general loss of influence. Cheney had enormous impact 
on policy decisions during Bush’s first term in office. Both hands-on and dynamic, 
Cheney put supporters in important positions throughout the administration, and made 
sure he obtained information from all key agencies.378 By 2007, that had changed. 
Cheney came under criticism for the administration’s handling of intelligence on 
weapons of mass destruction that led to the Iraq war. He also suffered politically when 
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his chief of staff I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby was convicted of lying and obstructing a leak 
investigation.379 Cheney pushed Bush to pardon Libby, but, while the president 
commuted the sentence, he never granted a pardon.380 Cheney was portrayed by the 
media as someone whose time had passed, and whose pursuit of ideological goals, love of 
secrecy and independent operations inside the White House did more harm than good.381 
Bush still listened to Cheney, but the vice president’s views had less impact on policy by 
this point. 
 In addition, some of the key members of Bush’s first term who shared Cheney’s 
ideology had left their most influential posts by then. John Bolton was appointed to be 
ambassador to the United Nations in August 2005382 and Donald Rumsfeld resigned in 
November 2006, after criticism over his management of the war in Iraq.383 The departure 
of Rumsfeld, as well as some of other neo-conservative officials, came after the 
Democratic Party won both houses of Congress in the November 2006 midterm elections, 
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giving the party complete control of the legislature for the first time since 1994 against a 
backdrop of increased public disapproval of the conflict in Iraq.384 
 There continued to be sharp differences in Washington between those who 
favored cooperative arrangements with North Korea to denuclearize and those who 
preferred coercive methods without concessions from the United States. 
 This time, Rice and Hill were on the more cooperative end of the policy spectrum. 
Rice thought that U.S. options available for North Korea were limited. Believing that 
there was no perfect solution to the problem, she argued that diplomacy was the only way 
for the United States to stop the North Koreans from expanding their nuclear capability 
unchecked and unmonitored.385 This approach was given a boost as the Rice-Hill team 
achieved some visible results in negotiations, particularly the September 2005 agreement 
and the two follow-up implementation accords. 
 On the more coercive end of the spectrum was Cheney’s office and his dwindling 
number of influential allies. Cheney believed that the United States needed to negotiate 
from a position of strength. He argued that there was nothing the United States could 
offer to the North Koreans in terms of concessions that was worth as much as to them as 
their nuclear weapons.386 Thus, he argued, the only way for diplomacy to work was if all 
parties understood that the United States was willing to back its actions with force. He 
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said in a 2004 meeting, “We don’t negotiate with evil. We defeat it.”387 Cheney criticized 
Rice’s State Department in its dealings with North Korea, saying it had come to regard 
“getting the north Koreans to agree to something, indeed anything as the ultimate 
objective” and that such attitudes encourage North Korean duplicity.388 Cheney was also 
strongly against bilateral negotiations with North Korea, saying that for any talks with 
Pyongyang to work, other parties in the Six-Party Talks must be involved.389 
 The two sides competed for the president’s ear. The Rice-Hill team mainly won 
the internal struggle, although Cheney says in his memoir that he thought he was about to 
gain the upper hand at the time Hill was holding bilateral negotiations with his North 
Korean counterpart — a format of talks he opposed — in Geneva over how Pyongyang 
should declare its nuclear programs. 
There was a period in the spring when it looked as though 
we might be able to get off the path that Rice and Hill put 
us on. Hill was in Geneva negotiating what would be in the 
North Korean declaration, and (National Security Adviser) 
Steve (Hadley) brought a draft of the proposed language 
into the Oval Office during our morning meeting on March 
14, 2008. The president said he didn’t want to see it. “I’m 
not going to sign anything until the vice president has 
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signed off on it,” he said. “You go over it with Dick. When 
he’s happy with it, I’m happy with it.”390 
 However, Rice ultimately prevailed in persuading Bush to sign off on the 
arrangement regarding the declaration. 
 As was the case in 2002 near the end of the Agreed Framework, the competition 
between the two groups involved leaks to the media. When U.S. intelligence officials 
held a classified briefing for members of Congress on April 24, 2008 about the 
September 2007 Israeli attack on the Syrian nuclear reactor that had been built with North 
Korean assistance, the contents were reported shortly before the briefing.391 Those 
working for a negotiated settlement strongly suspected that their opponents were trying to 
derail the diplomatic process, especially as Sung Kim was heading a visit to Pyongyang 
by an interagency delegation at the time, to follow up on the compromise agreement 
regarding North Korea’s nuclear declaration that Hill had reached with Kim Kye Gwan in 
Singapore.392 
 The briefing took place after Capitol Hill applied pressure on the administration 
that it be more forthcoming about the Israeli attack. Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 
of Florida, the ranking Republican on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and 
Representative Peter Hoesktra from Michigan, the ranking Republican member of the 
House Permanent Select Committee, criticized the Bush administration for its “veil of 
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secrecy” regarding the attack and urged it to brief all Congressional members, and not 
just the senior officials, on the incident.393 Rice then met with Ros-Lehtinen in a meeting 
which was described as tense.394 
 The disclosure that North Korea had helped construct the Syrian reactor 
unleashed a fresh round of criticism from Congress of the administration’s more 
diplomatic approach to North Korea, targeting Christopher Hill in particular. To indicate 
his disapproval, Republican Senator from Kansas Sam Brownback placed a hold on the 
nomination to U.S. ambassador to South Korea of Kathleen Stephens, a former deputy to 
Hill.395 A Washington Post report quoted Brownback’s aide as saying that people were 
very angry with the prospect of the United States agreeing with “a regime that has 
repeatedly demonstrated that its word is indistinguishable from a lie.”396 
 Meanwhile, Hill became a controversial figure within the administration. An 
experienced diplomat who negotiated the Dayton Accords ending the Bosnian War in 
1995 under Richard Holbrooke, Hill pushed for latitude against those trying to constrain 
the engagement policy. He made enemies within the system by sidelining people when he 
thought it was necessary.397 Robert Joseph, Undersecretary for Arms Control and 
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International Security who was against engagement with North Korea, resigned in 
January 2007, protesting Hill’s negotiations.398 
 
6.4 International context 
 
 Relations between the two Koreas deteriorated around this time. In February 
2008, conservative politicians Lee Myung Bak became South Korean president. Most of 
Lee’s supporters believed that his two predecessors – Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun 
– had given away too much to the North Koreans. While Lee was not ideologically 
opposed to diplomacy, he steered his policy away from inducements to seeking a position 
of strength with respect to North Korea.399 
 Ties worsened further when a South Korean tourist at the Mount Kumgang 
(Diamond) resort just north of the demilitarized zone was shot and killed by a North 
Korean soldier on July 11, 2008 while taking a walk in an area that has been declared off-
limits.400 The South Korean public reacted angrily to the death of the 53-year-old Seoul 
housewife, bringing a halt to tours by South Koreans to the area, which had begun in 
1998.401  
 Japan, meanwhile, was trying to settle its dispute with North Korea over the 
abduction of its citizens in the 1970s and 1980s, a major obstacle to normalizing 
diplomatic relations between the two countries. Japan refused to join in supplying heavy 
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fuel oil to North Korea, an inducement in the Six Party Talks process, until this issue was 
solved. Japanese and North Korean officials met three times that year, but failed to bridge 
their differences. 
 Japan objected to the U.S. plan to remove North Korea from its list of state 
sponsor of terrorism without a solution to Pyongyang’s kidnapping of Japanese citizens. 
Tokyo also argued that North Korea should remain on the list for harboring Japanese Red 
Army terrorists, who had hijacked an aircraft in Japan in 1970 and diverted it to North 
Korea.402 The Bush administration took the position that it had no legal obligation to link 
the abduction issue with the state sponsors of terrorism list.403 China and South Korea 
also apparently supported North Korea’s delisting.404 
 Japan had an ally in the vice president’s office, which championed its cause. 
Cheney, for example, forwarded a message from the U.S. Ambassador to Japan Thomas 
Schieffer about Japan’s complaints to the president in the run-up to the delisting 
decision.405 
 Some Congressional members had also earlier insisted that the Japanese 
abduction issue — along with other illicit activities — be settled before the 
administration took North Korea off the state sponsors of terrorism list. Republican 
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Senators Sam Brownback from Kansas, Chuck Grassley from Iowa and John Kyl from 
Arizona, along with Senator Joe Lieberman from Connecticut, an independent, submitted 
a resolution to that effect on December 10, 2007.406 
 
6.5 Analysis using the three models 
 
Model 1: The unitary rational actor model 
 Why did the United States advance the timetable requiring a verification protocol, 
and why did it expand its scope? The unitary rational actor model shows that Washington 
judged that the North Korean declaration on its nuclear activity to be incomplete and tried 
to obtain a satisfactory explanation through these methods, even if it deviated from the 
original understanding of when a verification protocol would be established. In other 
words, the United States shifted toward a coercive tactic, in response to North Korea’s 
inadequate declaration, so that answers it wanted could be obtained. 
 Rice’s public comments about advancing the schedule of verification came a 
week before North Korea submitted its declaration. A likely explanation is that the 
United States had suspicions from preparatory talks that North Korea would provide what 
the United States considered to be an insufficient declaration. Consequently, Washington 
adopted a more coercive posture. 
 The interpretation of events given by the unitary rational actor model leaves some 
unanswered questions. If the United States judged North Korea to have submitted an 
incomplete declaration, why did it not declare this to be a violation of the agreement at 
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the time? Why did it not stop implementing its own commitments, in response to that 
alleged violation? 
 
Model 2: The institutional interest model 
 The domestic institutional model helps answer some of these remaining questions. 
The State Department headed by Rice, with Hill taking the lead on the North Korean 
issue, had an interest in making the agreement work. They succeeded in obtaining the 
main agreement on September 19, 2005, and the two implementation deals that were 
reached in February and October 2007. They continued to have the president’s backing 
on the engagement process.  
Meanwhile, the parts of the government that were against the Six Party Talks had 
lost their influence with the president. Cheney no longer had the clout he had in the first 
term due to criticism over the handling of intelligence prior to the war in Iraq and the 
scandal involving his chief of staff. Bolton moved away from the center of power in 
Washington to become the U.N. ambassador, and Rumsfeld departed as defense secretary 
after the criticism about his conduct of the war in Iraq, among other issues, led to the 
Democratic Party taking control of both houses of Congress in the midterm elections in 
2006. In addition, Hill sidelined those who were against the Six Party Talks from the 
internal process as much as possible to ensure that the engagement policy would not be 
scuttled. 
 It is important to note that the people Hill alienated included those within his own 
agency, the State Department. Therefore, the institutional-level interest explanation does 
not necessarily divide those involved into neat groups. The bureau in charge of arms 
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control and verification at the State Department in particular was unhappy with the 
concessions the United States gave to North Korea and Hill’s treatment of the 
department. Robert Joseph, the head of the bureau since 2005 when he succeeded Bolton, 
resigned in protest. 
 But in general, the interpretation this model provides is that the State Department 
tried to settle the uranium enrichment question without destroying the framework of the 
deal it had worked arduously to obtain, by advancing the schedule for the verification 
protocol and expanding its application. 
 
Model 3: The individual mindset model 
 A look into the mindsets of individuals provides a further explanation of how the 
American strategy took shape. While the division at the time was roughly between those 
who preferred cooperative measures and those who favored coercive ones, there were 
some differences among the key individuals. 
Key officials were divided into three groups when it came to whether cooperation 
can achieve results. On one end were those who believed cooperation with North Korea 
was not possible or preferable, and favored coercive measures. This group of Hardliners 
included Cheney, who believed that there was no concession that could convince 
Pyongyang to give up its nuclear weapons, and that the only way to deal with Pyongyang 
was from a position of strength.407  
 Bush fell into the second group, which this study will call the Uncommitted 
Cooperators. This group did not necessarily deny the utility of cooperative measures, but 
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it was less committed to them than the Cooperators. The fact that he was open to 
cooperation made it possible for Rice to convince Bush, who genuinely abhorred the 
North Korean regime, that the United States should test Kim Jong Il to see if he would 
give up nuclear weapons if he thought Washington would let him survive.408 Bush’s 
change in position in early 2005 is described by Hill as a desire to move beyond the 
experiences of his first term. Bush did not want to be remembered as a warmonger, who 
always resorted to force.409 
 Rice likely fell into the Uncommitted Cooperator group. Neither Bush nor Rice 
believed that diplomacy with North Korea would necessarily lead to the regime’s 
survival. Rice said in her memoir that she predicted that opening up North Korea through 
diplomacy would have led to its collapse. She says of Bush’s decision to allow her to 
pursue diplomacy: 
It was not a softening of policy toward the North; the 
President was not abandoning regime change in favor of 
the State Department’s well-known desire to negotiate with 
rogue regimes. Rather, it was a kind of strategic gamble — 
a safe one from the United States’ perspective because the 
north would get no real benefit until it demonstrated its 
willingness to give up its nuclear arsenal.410 
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 This indicates that for Rice — who was senior to Hill and ultimately had the ear 
of the president — cooperation with North Korea was a tactic. In her eyes, the goal of the 
policy was to end or at least tame North Korea’s nuclear program, but with the possible 
added bonus of ending the regime altogether. Hoping that engagement would eventually 
undermine the North Korean regime means that Rice was willing to cooperate with North 
Korea, as she was not striving to reduce the gains available to the country under the 
agreement.411  But it also likely means that she was not fully committed to a cooperative 
arrangement with North Korea, and thus was more open to adopting coercive tactics. 
Such shifts in position can be explained as “tactical learning,” which Philip 
Tetlock describes as what happens when policymakers change tactics but do not question 
the fundamental premises of policy. Learning of this kind is intended to cope with events 
without changing the fundamental assumptions of a policy.412 Rice appears to have 
maintained that the root of the problem was the nature of the regime and that a truly 
cooperative arrangement was not possible. 
Hill can be viewed as belonging to the third group, the Cooperators. Hill thought 
that negotiations were necessary to establish patterns of cooperation in the region and 
enhance U.S. security. He thought that the criticism of the diplomatic approach had little 
relevance to reality since it was “a kind of mirror image of the North Korean one, to the 
effect that security, according to North Koreans and hardline conservatives, must be 100 
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percent homegrown and can never rely on the efforts or attitudes of others.”413 Hill also 
saw himself as a professional negotiator — a good one at that — rather than as someone 
who was committed to an ideological goal of any kind. 
Opinion on how far along North Korea was with a uranium enrichment program 
and how much that mattered was divided, roughly along the positions mentioned above. 
As was the case during the Agreed Framework, the Hardliners believed that the 
procurement of equipment was enough to conclude that North Korea had an active 
uranium enrichment program. Rice maintained that the outside world did not know the 
scale of North Korea’s program or what it had yielded in terms of nuclear material.414 
Hill appears to have had a similar view as Rice.415 
 The issue of what constituted sufficiently stringent verification was a major area 
in which the Hardliners and Cooperators fought to obtain the president’s approval. In his 
memoir, Hill gives an example of such a scene at a breakfast with the president, vice 
president and secretary of state in October 2007. 
The president turned to the vice president and said, 
“Dick, do you have any questions for Condi and Chris?”  
 Cheney looked up from his breakfast and 
responded, “Well, I’m not as enthusiastic about this as 
some people.” 
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 Condi didn’t seem to want to take that one on, so I 
did. “Mr. Vice President, I’m not enthusiastic, either. I’m 
doing the job I have been asked to do and trying to get 
home at night.” 
 The president seemed to sense the tension in my 
voice. “It’s okay, Chris,” he said. “The vice president was 
simply expressing some concern about what the 
verification regime will look like.” 
 Condi gestured to me that she would take it from 
there. She explained, very presciently (because the lack of 
an adequate verification regime ultimately was the issue 
that ended the process), that if we are unable to arrive at a 
satisfactory verification regime, we would obviously not 
continue. Cheney grunted and returned to his breakfast.416 
 Rice also persuaded the president to opt for cooperative measures by telling him 
that her efforts would ultimately produce a desirable outcome. One example of her 
persuasive techniques is captured in Cheney’s description of a National Security Council 
meeting on January 4, 2008, when Rice reassured Bush that they were on their way to 
achieving the first stage in denuclearization. 
Directing his questions at Chris Hill, who was seated 
against the wall behind Secretary Rice, the president asked, 
“What is the status of the talks? Will they lead to the North 
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Koreans giving up their weapons?” Rice said, “I got this,” 
and stepped in to respond. She emphasized the importance 
of getting the North Koreans to dismantle the reactor at 
Pyongyang (sic) and of doing whatever we could to make 
that happen. It was a first step she said, only a first step.417 
 Those promises, made by someone Bush trusted, may have been welcome to a 
president who was nearing the end of his term in office and was very likely to be 
concerned about his historical legacy.  
 Cheney, meanwhile, pressed both Bush and Rice to make an explicit commitment 
to obtain favorable results from the negotiations. Cheney says in his memoir that in the 
same meeting, he urged the president to maintain sanctions under the Trading with the 
Enemy Act and keep North Korea on the list of state sponsors of terrorism until 
Pyongyang provided a complete nuclear declaration list. Both the president and Rice 
agreed that was the plan. The vice president also asked Bush to confirm his position that 
North Korea’s failure to admit to nuclear cooperation with Syria would end the Six Party 
Talks deal. Bush agreed, and Rice concurred reluctantly, according to Cheney.418 
 The interaction among key players with different mindsets shows that the 
Cooperators faced domestic political pressure to produce clear results from the 
negotiations, particularly to find out about North Korea’s highly enriched uranium 
program and its nuclear cooperation with Syria.  
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 The North Koreans did not help the Cooperators’ position when they submitted a 
declaration which turned out to be far from satisfactory for the Americans. The 
declaration, which did not refer to North Korea’s uranium enrichment program, was 
characterized by one U.S. government official as more of a snapshot of what they had 
done.419 
 According to Hill, the omission by North Korea in the declaration of the uranium 
enrichment program in its declaration convinced him that there was no other way but to 
push for a stringent verification protocol. 
If they had put (the highly enriched uranium program) in 
the declaration, we could have looked at the and decided 
that verification could come later but … we had no, 
nothing, zero, from the North Koreans on a very important 
subject … to many people in Washington and in the 
delegation because we knew they had made some 
purchases consistent with a highly enriched uranium 
program. So, when they gave us absolutely zero on that … 
we had to essentially get something in the verification 
protocol, that is, move that up.420 
Hill also indicated that the significance of North Korea’s uranium enrichment 
program to U.S. domestic politics meant that he could not make the argument that the 
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value of maintaining a halt on North Korea’s plutonium program justified putting off 
discussions on the uranium enrichment program. 
We could have slipped it, but I think the unanswered 
question of verification would have been too strong, would 
have drowned out any other issue. I must say, we wanted to 
get control of the plutonium situation. That was very 
important. That argued for maybe putting the HEU (highly 
enriched uranium) situation later, but when they gave us 
nothing, and refused even to discuss it, refused to say there 
was going to be something, it kind of made it impossible 
for us to proceed. 
If the North Koreans had said, “We’ll take that up 
in phase three,” that’s something to work with. But they 
essentially claimed that there was nothing in highly 
enriched uranium. You know, we were prepared to think 
that they had not exploited it, we were prepared to think 
maybe they were not focused on it, but we could not ignore 
the purchases of equipment that was consistent with it … 
So, we could not just ignore that or push it off to later, 
when we had no reason to believe later would be better 
than earlier.421 




 After the North Koreans submitted the nuclear declaration, the United States 
presented them with a tough verification protocol proposal, incorporating the views of 
experts from the State Department’s Bureau of Verification, Compliance and 
Implementation who Hill had earlier sidelined because of their opposition to cooperative 
measures with North Korea. Hill was reportedly unenthusiastic about presenting the 
stringent U.S. proposal, but was overruled by superiors.422 
 The U.S.-proposed verification protocol included elements of a plan drafted 
initially in 2003 by Paula DeSutter, the assistant secretary for verification, compliance 
and implementation and a former John Bolton aide. DeSutter drafted the plan in the fall 
of 2003 for North Korea, after the first round of Six Party Talks was held during the first 
term of the Bush administration. She worked with officials in the intelligence community, 
the vice president’s office and the nonproliferation office at the National Security Council 
to draft a document that spelled out an intrusive verification regime. According to this 
approach, verification activities would ignore the IAEA and put the United States in 
charge, with the right to investigate anywhere, anytime on demand.423 
 This model shows that the Cooperators shifted their position toward a more 
coercive stance, after facing domestic pressure to produce results through negotiation and 
North Korea’s refusal to discuss its uranium enrichment efforts. There are several 
possible explanations for this shift. First, it could have been a tactical move to maintain 
support within the domestic system. Secondly, the Cooperators shifted toward the 
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Hardliners’ view by internalizing some of their arguments. The third possibility is that it 
was a mixture of both. 
 The Cooperators were, however, not ready to give up on diplomacy at this 
point.424 So the framework of cooperation was maintained, while coercive elements were 




 The unitary actor model shows that the United States advanced the schedule for 
the verification protocol from phase three to phase two, even though that was indicated in 
the written agreement in October 2007, because North Korea was not forthcoming about 
its uranium enrichment procurement activities. But this leaves the question of why the 
United States did not simply declare North Korea in violation of the agreement and stop 
implementing its commitments altogether. 
 The institutional interests model provides a further explanation. The State 
Department, which invested its time and effort to maintain the Six Party process, wanted 
to avoid its collapse. That, however, does not explain how the decision came about. 
 An analysis using the mindsets of individuals reveals that domestic political 
pressure played a role. The Cooperators faced pressure from opponents to produce results 
to justify diplomacy, particularly to convince the president, who was uncommitted to 
cooperation. When North Korea refused to explain its uranium enrichment procurement 
efforts, they incorporated some of the coercive tactics that were being promoted by their 
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Chapter 7 The Controversy over Sampling (2008) 
 
 While the United States and North Korea appeared to have reached a compromise 
in October 2008 over when and how to verify North Korea’s nuclear program under the 
Six Party Talks, the agreement unraveled later that year. The remaining sticking point 
was sampling, which the United States determined was necessary for a reliable 
verification protocol, but which North Korea adamantly refused to allow. 
This chapter examines this dispute and asks why the United States decided to end 
economic benefits to North Korea due to the disagreement over sampling. It first 
describes how the United States and North Korea appeared to reach a compromise over 
the issue, only to have the North Koreans say that they never agreed to it, and the U.S. 
reaction to that development. It then moves to a discussion on why this was chosen as a 
subcase. This is followed by an overview of the relevant U.S. domestic and international 
developments, and an analysis using the three models. 
 
7.1 The sampling problem 
 
 In August 2008, the United States and North Korea continued to disagree over 
when and how a verification protocol should be established for North Korea’s nuclear 
activities. The United States argued that North Korea should comply with what it termed 
were international standards for verification. Pyongyang complained that the U.S. 
demand to allow inspectors access to any facility at any time and take samples was the 
equivalent to the special inspections the IAEA had requested in the 1990s.425 
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 Special inspections are one of three main types of IAEA’s on-site inspection 
activity — in addition to ad hoc and routine inspections — that it can request to verify 
that a country is upholding its commitment not to use its nuclear program for weapons 
purposes.426 Special inspections are considered to be the agency’s method of last resort to 
obtain access to suspected nuclear sites. 
 The IAEA requested such inspections in 1993, after its inspectors found a 
discrepancy between North Korea’s claims and substances the IAEA found at the site. 
The waste samples showed a composition of plutonium that did not match the plutonium 
product that North Korea produced for verification. This meant that there had to be 
different nuclear waste pools that produced the verified plutonium product and the IAEA 
samples. The sophistication of the IAEA’s nuclear forensics surprised the North Koreans, 
who refused to comply with the IAEA’s request for special inspections. The IAEA 
negotiated some inspections with North Korea in 1993, but Pyongyang then relinquished 
its IAEA membership and announced its withdrawal from the NPT in 1994, leading to 
the first nuclear crisis.427 
 Tensions rose over sampling in 2008 after North Korea took steps to reverse the 
disablement work that had been undertaken at the Yongbyon nuclear complex in order to 
protest the U.S. decision to keep the country on its list of state sponsors of terrorism until 
a verification agreement could be reached. In early September, North Korea began 
moving equipment back into the nuclear complex in a clear effort to restore the 
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facilities.428 On September 24, 2008, the IAEA said in a press release that it had removed 
the seals and monitoring equipment from the reprocessing plant at the Yongbyon 
complex as requested by North Korea.429 
 Around the same time, North Korea’s leader Kim Jong Il suffered a stroke. This is 
believed to have happened on or shortly before August 14.430 Speculation about his health 
had circulated outside of North Korea in the summer, when Kim was not mentioned in 
the country’s official media. Rumors about his health increased further when he did not 
appear for a military parade to mark the 60th anniversary of the country’s founding on 
September 9.431 A French doctor who treated him confirmed later in 2008 that the North 
Korean leader had in fact suffered a stroke but had recovered.432 
 While the impact that Kim Jong Il’s stroke had on the Six Party Talks process 
cannot be precisely assessed, it was no doubt considerable, given the enormous power he 
had over the country’s decision-making process. One analyst points out that if Kim Jong 
Il had taken the decision to stop the disablement work at the Yongbyon nuclear complex 
before suffering his stroke, it would have been impossible for his subordinates to reverse 
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that decision until he recovered and decided to do so himself.433 At the very least, major 
decisions would not have been taken. Given that Kim did not appear to have a clear 
successor at the time, North Korean domestic politics could be said to have been in a 
state of suspension, even if the stroke did not prove fatal. 
 As North Korea began to reverse the denuclearization steps at the Yongbyon 
nuclear complex, Hill visited North Korea from October 1-3 to try to solve the dispute 
over the verification protocol. The two countries reached an agreement during the visit, 
and the United States removed North Korea from its list of state sponsors of terrorism on 
October 11, 2008.434 North Korea resumed denuclearization activities at the Yongbyon 
complex two days later and immediately allowed IAEA personnel access to the site, after 
barring them several days earlier.435 
 The United States said that the bilateral agreement on the verification protocol 
comprised a written portion and an oral understanding. U.S. officials did not release the 
written portion of the agreement, only providing a factsheet. The factsheet showed that 
the deal satisfied the main points that the United States had demanded earlier, with only 
minor modifications. It said the two sides reached: 
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• agreement that experts will have access to all declared facilities and, based on 
mutual consent, to undeclared sites; 
• agreement on the use of scientific procedures, including sampling and forensic 
activities and; 
• agreement that all measures contained in the verification protocol would apply to 
the plutonium-based program and any uranium enrichment and proliferation 
activities.436 
U.S. officials explained that the next step was to formalize the verification 
protocol among all six countries involved in the process, based on the U.S.-North Korea 
agreement.437 
 One of the few compromises evident in the October agreement was that there 
needed to be “mutual consent” for inspectors to enter undeclared sites. This was 
explained at a press briefing as not posing practical problems as inspections would 
require access permission by the host government in any case.438 
 According to independent analyst David Albright, the agreement on sampling 
included a promise by North Korea to take samples from the graphite in the core of the 
nuclear reactor in Yongbyon, which would allow analysts to figure out how much 
plutonium the facility had produced in its lifetime.439 
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But problems emerged again a month later, when North Korea said on November 
13, 2008 that sampling was not part of the written agreement from the October meeting. 
The Foreign Ministry spokesman comment, carried by the official KCNA, also said that 
the written agreement from that meeting limited the scope of verification to the 
Yongbyon nuclear complex, and that verification would take place only after economic 
compensation to the country by the other five parties was concluded.440 
 In the same statement, the spokesman said that North Korea was reducing by half 
the pace of disablement work at the Yongbyon complex, due to delays in the economic 
compensation it was receiving. This meant that it was pulling 15 fuel rods a day from the 
nuclear reactor and putting them into an adjacent pond, down from about 30 rods a day 
that it had generally maintained since early 2008 and far less than the 80 rods a day that it 
had initially agreed could be done safely. 
 The United States, however, maintained that there was an oral understanding 
between the two countries that sampling was part of the verification protocol. Hill, who 
met with Kim Kye Gwan in Singapore in early December before attending the Six Party 
Talks in Beijing, said before the start of the multilateral meeting; 
Our view is that if one is willing to say something and give 
one’s word on something, then one should be willing to 
write it down as well. Our objective is to try to have this all 
written down so that when we get to this very crucial phase 
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of disablement and verification, there won’t be any 
misunderstandings.441  
 The meeting turned out to be the last in the Six Party Talks process and it ended 
without an agreement on a verification protocol. China, the host of the negotiations, tried 
to break the deadlock by using such phrases as “scientific verification procedures” and 
“international standards” in referring to sampling, but North Korea did not agree to the 
wording.442 
On December 12, 2008, a day after the meeting ended, a U.S. State Department 
spokesman said shipments of heavy fuel oil to North Korea would stop until the 
verification protocol issue was solved.443 The announcement had limited practical impact 
in terms of ending economic benefits to North Korea, as the United States had already 
finished shipping its portion in December. However, the comment served a political 
purpose by clarifying the U.S. position that all benefits to North Korea would stop until 
the verification issue was settled.444 South Korea said it was reconsidering the shipment 
of 3,000 steel plates it was preparing to send to substitute for North Korea as heavy fuel 
oil shipments. But China and Russia chose to continue to provide economic assistance. 
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As a result, North Korea did not end its disablement work at the Yongbyon reactor until 
the spring of 2009.445  
 Rice confirmed that the problem involved was the issue of sampling in an 
interview with NBC on December 21, 2008; 
We have about 80 percent of the verification protocol 
agreed with the North — things like interviews with 
scientists, the right to go and ask questions and probe 
concerning various facilities, the right to look at operations 
records, to look at production records. We have 18,000 
documents in our possession. What the North wouldn’t do 
is go the last 20 percent, which is to clarify some of the 
elements of scientific procedures that might be used to 
sample the soil.446 
 As the Six Party Talks stalled, North Korea announced on February 24, 2009 that 
it planned to launch a rocket to put an experimental communications satellite into 
space.447 On April 4, it launched a three-stage rocket, which used ballistic missile 
technology. When the United Nations Security Council condemned the launch on April 
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13 in a statement and demanded that North Korea refrain from further launches,448 North 
Korea reacted strongly. It declared that the Six Party Talks process had lost its meaning 
and that the country was not bound any longer by the agreements the talks had produced, 
adding that Pyongyang would bolster its nuclear deterrent.449 Several days later, it 
expelled four IAEA officials and five U.S. experts who were in North Korea to help with 
the disablement process. The IAEA experts left the Yongbyon nuclear complex after 
taking off all the IAEA seals and switching off surveillance equipment.450  
 On April 25, North Korea said that the country has started reprocessing its spent 
fuel rods, and that “this will contribute to bolstering the nuclear deterrence for self-
defense in every way to cope with the increasing military threats from the hostile 
forces.”451 A month later, the country conducted its second nuclear test.452 
 
7.2. Why is this a subcase? 
 
 While the United States and North Korea appeared to have reached an 
understanding on a verification protocol during Hill’s visit to Pyongyang in early 
October, North Korea denied that sampling, a key verification measure, was included. 
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From the U.S. point of view, this was a deviation on the part of the North Koreans, as 
Hill had an oral agreement that sampling would be part of the protocol. 
 After a session of the Six Party Talks in Beijing in December failed to codify the 
agreement, the United States determined that economic benefits to North Korea should 
cease, even if practically this had a limited impact as the United States had delivered its 
portion of the heavy fuel oil and China and Russia decided to continue implementing 
their economic commitments. 
 This research treats this as a case in which North Korea’s deviation as perceived 
by the United States may have led to Washington’s decision to announce an end to its 
commitments. This means that North Korean actions, rather than any U.S. domestic 
political calculations adequately explains the decision process. 
 
7.3 Domestic political context 
 
 In the spring of 2008, pressure continued to mount on the administration to 
produce results from negotiations with North Korea. National Security Adviser Stephen 
Hadley scheduled interagency meetings to allow Hill to explain his diplomatic efforts to 
other key members of the government. According to Rice, Hill often treated the sessions 
as a constraint on his freedom of action that she had won for him from the president, and 
he answered questions “somewhat petulantly.” This bolstered the concerns of the Defense 
Department, Vice President Cheney’s office and the National Security Council staff 
about Hill’s approach.453 
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 Rice also notes that the media often treated every diplomatic breakthrough with 
North Korea as a result of Hill’s negotiating skills, and his freelancing behavior did not 
help win support in Washington. Hill agreed with Rice that he would stop talking with 
the media for a while and allow some of the with North Korea to be conducted by his 
deputy Sung Kim and Paul Haenle, who represented the National Security Council in the 
Six Party Talks.454 As a result, some of the press briefings, including the one announcing 
the agreement that was reached in Pyongyang in October 2008, were conducted by Sung 
Kim. 
 Opponents continued to criticize the process, including those who had left the 
government. Bolton delivered a blistering Wall Street Journal op-ed published a day after 
Bush’s decision to remove North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, 
calling it “a classic case of prizing the negotiation process over substance, where the 
benefits of ‘diplomatic progress’ can be trumpeted in the media while the specifics of the 
actual agreement, and their manifest inadequacies, fade into the shadows.”455 
 In its last months in office, the Bush administration was becoming increasingly 
unpopular with the public. While his approval rating had reached 86% shortly after the 
September 11, 2001 attacks and were given a boost when the United States deposed 
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Saddam Hussein in Iraq, his support subsequently declined due to such factors as the 
prolonged war in Iraq, reaching 24% in December 2008.456 
 In November 2008, Democrat Barack Obama was elected president.  
 
7.4 International context 
 
 Relations between the two Koreas continued to be less than cordial in the 
aftermath of the North Korean shooting of a South Korean tourist at the Mt. Kumgang 
resort. North Korea returned the body of the victim but declined a joint investigation.457 
The conservatives in the government were against reopening the resort, as they did not 
want North Korea to benefit financially from it.458 The North Koreans proposed military 
working level talks at the demilitarized zone, but when they met, North Korean officials 
only complained about South Korean civic groups sending leaflets into North Korea 
criticizing the Pyongyang leadership.459  
 On South Korea’s relations with the United States, South Korean President Lee 
Myung Bak had promised to strengthen the alliance, which had become a contested issue 
in South Korea. But he suffered a setback after he decided to open the domestic beef 
market to U.S. imports. This sparked large-scale protests in Seoul. The protests, which 
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began in May 2008, linked U.S. beef imports to the mad cow disease. By June protestors 
were targeting Lee’s leadership.460 
 Meanwhile, Japan reached a breakthrough agreement with North Korea in 
Shenyang, China, on August 13, 2008 to settle their dispute over the North Korean 
abduction of Japanese nationals. Japan and North Korea had been holding talks in one of 
the five working groups established by the Six Party Talks process.461 In the August 
agreement, Pyongyang said it will reinvestigate the abduction cases as quickly as possible 
and possibly complete it by autumn. Japan agreed to lift travel restrictions between the 
two countries and allow chartered flights once the investigation began. The two countries 
left some major issues unresolved — the fate of the Japanese hijackers from 1970 still 
residing in North Korea, for example — but the deal was the most concrete result from 
talks between officials of the two countries held that year.462 
 The agreement, if implemented, would have had a major impact on Japan’s 
contribution to the Six Party Talks, as Tokyo had refused to provide economic 
inducements to North Korea unless the dispute over the abduction of Japanese nationals 
was solved. But larger political factors in Japan prevented the Japan-North Korea 
agreement from being carried out. The unexpected resignation of Japanese Prime 
Minister Yasuo Fukuda in early September for domestic political reasons prevented 
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progress on the agreement’s implementation.463 As noted earlier, Kim Jong Il’s stroke 
also paralyzed the North Korean decision-making process, further hindering the plan. 
 
7.5 Analysis using the three models 
 
Model 1: The unitary rational actor model 
 Why did the United States end its diplomatic efforts as a result of the dispute over 
sampling? The unitary rational model would say that it was because North Korea refused 
to agree in writing that this important verification method would be included in the 
protocol. For the United States, a verification protocol without sampling was inadequate 
since it would be deprived of a tool necessary not only to verify the precise amount of 
plutonium produced by the nuclear reactor in Yongbyon, but also its ability to obtain 
clues about the extent of North Korea’s uranium enrichment program. 
 The dispute between the two countries also reflected a clash in their perceptions 
about the verification process in general and sampling in particular.464 For the United 
States, sampling was a technical necessity and an objective process. Therefore, North 
Korean resistance strongly indicated that it had been cheating or was going to cheat. For 
North Korea, verification was a political process that could be used against it.465 It was 
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particularly opposed to sampling due to its 1993 experience with the IAEA, which 
revealed the effectiveness of nuclear forensics. 
 The explanation provided by the unitary rational actor model explains the main 
thrust of the events, but some questions remain unanswered. Why did the United States 
decide that the issue of sampling was worth the risk of letting the Six Party Talks collapse 
and thus allowing North Korea to continue increasing its plutonium stockpile 
unhindered? 
 
Model 2: The institutional interest model 
 If the analysis includes the institutional interest model, this leads to the conclusion 
that the State Department, which had spearheaded the cooperative effort with North 
Korea, realized that it could not justify this approach to the president or the other parts of 
the government without North Korea’s written agreement on sampling. 
 Sampling is substantively important for any verification process. The IAEA 
routinely analyzes samples taken from facilities under its safeguards to compare the 
declared amounts with the isotopic composition of nuclear materials to ensure there are 
no significant differences between the two.466 
 Sampling was also politically important for the State Department in its 
bureaucratic battle with opponents of the agreement. It could not have been able to 
protect the agreement without including sampling due to the opposition it faced from the 
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Vice President’s office as well as some members of the Congress. A government official 
involved in the process said that an agreement without sampling would not have passed 
the muster adding; 
(Those aligned with the Vice President’s office) were 
trying to their best to undermine the negotiations, and in all 
honesty, if we were to attempt to tell the president that he 
should agree to a verification protocol that did not include 
sampling or access to undeclared sites, he would not have 
been able to go for it. I don’t think he would have wanted 
to. Even if he did I don’t think it would have been 
supportable.467 
Time was running out for the Bush administration. The last round of the Six Party 
Talks was held roughly five weeks before the inauguration of President Barack Obama, 
which put constraints on decisions by the outgoing Bush administration. 
 
Model 3: The individual mindset model 
 Introducing individual-level model provides a further explanation of how a 
preference for a stronger verification increased over time among those who supporting 
cooperative measures. As discussed in the case of Chapter 6, this was carried out by 
incorporating the views of those who sought more concessions from North Korea through 
coercive measures.  
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 As mentioned in Chapter 6, this approach was adopted in the State Department by 
Rice and Hill, who were the leading Cooperators. Paula DeSutter, the assistant secretary 
for verification, compliance and implementation who had drafted a tough verification 
plan for North Korea in 2003, was a Hardliner who opposed any compromise to freedom 
of activity by inspectors in North Korea. 
 Because of her position, DeSutter was cut out of the negotiating process 
throughout the spring of 2008. But she was among the three key officials who briefed the 
media after Hill and Kim Kye Gwan reached a compromise in October, which suggested 
she was no longer marginalized in the State Department. 
 It is unclear how Rice and Hill planned to use sampling to find out about North 
Korea’s uranium enrichment program if access to undeclared sites had remained 
restricted, although environmental sampling could have been one method. Since the early 
1990s, the IAEA has used an analysis of materials collected from buildings and the 
surrounding environment to detect the presence of undeclared nuclear activity.468 Rice 
indicated in a television interview on December 21, 2008 that that possibility may have 
been under consideration when she said that one of the differences with North Korea was 
“to clarify some of the elements of scientific procedures that might be used to sample the 
soil.”469 
                                                 
468 Aabha Dixit, Swipe Check: Collecting and Analysing Environmental Samples for Nuclear 




469 Condoleezza Rice, “Interview on NBC.” 
 
 179 
 Hill strongly hinted that sampling was important both substantively and politically 
to determining the extent of the uranium enrichment program. 
We had so much information on the (Yongbyon) reactor 
that with respect to plutonium, I thought we were OK. But 
how could we go forward when they gave us zero on the 





 The unitary actor model would explain that the reason why the United States 
decided to end economic benefits to North Korea under the Six Party Talks was because 
North Korea refused to put in writing what it had agreed to orally in a meeting in 
Pyongyang between Hill and Kim Kye Gwan in early October, namely that sampling 
would be allowed for verification of North Korea’s nuclear programs. Given that the 
United States would be deprived of an important tool for verification, Washington 
decided that this issue was worth the risk of the deal collapsing. 
 The institutional interest model shows that the State Department, which had led 
the cooperative effort with North Korea, decided it could not justify this approach to 
other parts of the government without the country’s written agreement on sampling. 
 An analysis that includes individual mindsets reveals another aspect. Faced with 
North Korean intransigence and domestic pressure, the Cooperators incorporated 
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measures preferred by the Hardliners. This could have been because they wanted to 
expand their support base in the domestic system by incorporating the views of those who 
preferred more coercive measures or a combination of the two. 
 While North Korea’s actions were an important factor in determining U.S. actions 
in this case, domestic calculations also played a part in the decision to move away from 
the commitments made in the Six Party Talks. Both factors pushed Washington to shift 



























Chapter 8 Conclusions 
 
 This dissertation examined four episodes in which the United States stepped away 
from full cooperation with North Korea under the terms of the Agreed Framework and 
the Six Party Talks agreements to determine whether U.S. domestic politics played a role. 
It also explored when, why and how that took place. Two of the episodes took place 
when the U.S. refrained from full cooperation despite the absence of clear violations on 
the part of North Korea. The other two cases were when both sides retreated from their 
commitments. 
 This chapter first summarizes the four subcases studied and key findings from the 
cases, followed by implications for theory and policy. 
 
8.1 Summary of subcases 
 
Chapter 4 
 This chapter explored why the United States refrained from a more generous 
posture when it lifted its sanctions against North Korea in January 1995 as promised 
under the Agreed Framework. The United States took only modest steps in easing the 
sanctions, leaving most of the consequential measures intact, even though North Korea 
was in full compliance with the accord at the time. 
 Institutional interests provided the strongest explanation in this case. Congress 
harshly criticized the Agreed Framework after it was concluded in October 1994. 
Opposition in the legislative branch grew stronger after the Republican party, which was 
generally skeptical of engagement with North Korea, took control of both houses of 
Congress in midterm elections in November 1994. Meanwhile, the executive branch 
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wanted the agreement it negotiated to work. It therefore had an incentive to cooperate 
with North Korea in a more generous manner from the outset to encourage Pyongyang’s 
cooperation. Faced with a hostile Congress, however, the Clinton administration worked 
out a package that fulfilled the minimum requirements of the agreement so that it would 
be acceptable domestically. 
 
Chapter 5 
 This chapter discussed an episode in which both sides retreated from full 
cooperation in implementing the Agreed Framework. In the summer of 2002, the U.S. 
intelligence community concluded that North Korea had been procuring equipment and 
material for an industrial-level uranium enrichment program. The question asked was: 
Why did the United States treat North Korea’s uranium enrichment procurement effort as 
a violation of the agreement, and why did Washington respond by stopping the shipment 
of heavy fuel oil? 
An explanation of the U.S. response using the unitary rational actor model 
showed that stopping heavy fuel oil shipments was a rational response only if the 
objective was to punish North Korea instead of preventing Pyongyang from making more 
nuclear weapons materials. 
 An analysis of mindsets provides a more useful explanation. The Hardliners 
strongly made the case that the program destroyed the basis for the Agreed Framework, 
while Cooperators had varying degrees of doubt about the likelihood of the deal’s 
success, even though they wanted to preserve it. The U.S. government chose to take the 
most stringent interpretation of Pyongyang’s actions as Hardliners, including John Bolton 
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in the State Department, promoted that view. Once the United States confronted North 
Korea and interpreted comments from a senior North Korean official as an admission of 
the program’s existence, a halt to heavy fuel oil shipments became policy since no key 
actor in the Cooperator camp was able to defend the Agreed Framework. 
 
Chapter 6 
 This chapter examined an episode during the Six Party Talks process in which the 
United States advanced the timing of a required step for North Korea without citing any 
specific violation by Pyongyang to justify Washington’s action. 
North Korea submitted a declaration of its nuclear activities in June 2008 as 
promised under the second implementation phase of the Six Party Talks process. The 
United States wanted North Korea to address its uranium enrichment program as well as 
proliferation activities in the declaration, which North Korea did not want to do. 
Around this time, the United States began saying that verification of North 
Korea’s nuclear activities would need to take place in the second phase of 
implementation and not the third phase as it had been understood until then. The United 
States denied North Korea a key incentive — the country’s removal from the U.S. list of 
state sponsors of terrorism — until a verification protocol could be agreed with North 
Korea. 
An analysis of individual mindsets shows that domestic political pressure played a 
role. The Cooperators faced pressure from the Hardliners to produce results to justify 
diplomacy, particularly in convincing the president, who was not as committed to the 
cooperative process as others. When North Korea refused to explain its uranium 
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enrichment procurement efforts and proliferation activities in their declaration, the 
Cooperators raised the scale of demands on North Korea by advancing the requirement 
for the verification from the third phase to the second phase. They also denied a key 




 This chapter looked into an episode during the Six Party Talks in which both sides 
retreated from their commitments. The question was: Why did the United States decide to 
end economic benefits to North Korea due to a disagreement over the sampling of North 
Korea’s nuclear facilities? 
While the two countries were at odds over where and how verification activities 
should take place, a compromise was reached in October 2008 between U.S. negotiator 
Christopher Hill and his North Korean counterpart Kim Kye Gwan that consisted of a 
written agreement and an oral agreement. According to the United States, North Korea 
agreed orally to the use of scientific procedures, including sampling and forensic 
activities.471 But North Korea said in November that such access and measures were not 
part of the agreement. North Korean negotiators refused to put those terms into writing in 
a meeting of the six countries held in Beijing in December. Shortly thereafter, the United 
States announced that it would stop economic benefits. 
 While the unitary rational actor model shows that the U.S. decision was in 
reaction to North Korea’s refusal to agree on sampling, an analysis of mindsets shows a 
                                                 
471 Department of State, “U.S.-N. Korea Understandings on Verification,” October 11, 2008. 
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fuller picture of why sampling was important. Faced with North Korean intransigence 
and domestic pressure to show that diplomacy was working, the Cooperators in the State 
Department incorporated some of the Hardliners’ demands on the verification protocol. 
While sampling was substantively important for verification, it was also politically 
important at home. 
 
8.2 Key findings 
 
• The United States reduced the level of its cooperation with North Korea not 
just because of North Korean actions, but also due to domestic political 
considerations. The broader implication of this is that domestic politics 
matters for the implementation of international security cooperation 
generally, particularly when the countries involved are adversaries. 
U.S. domestic political considerations played a role in all four subcases. In one 
case, North Korea’s actions were not the cause at all for reducing the level of 
cooperation. This was the episode in Chapter 4 when the executive branch in January 
1995 lifted sanctions only modestly under the Agreed Framework. The decision was not a 
reaction to North Korea’s noncompliance, but rather due to strong Congressional 
opposition to the Agreed Framework. While it was the administration’s strategy to delay 
the lifting of more consequential sanctions to later phases of implementation, this 
judgement was made within the limits of possibilities imposed by domestic politics. 
  But even in the other three subcases where North Korea’s actions were a reason 
for reducing U.S. cooperation levels, the realist model alone could not explain U.S. 
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actions. Fuller explanations of U.S. conduct could only be given when domestic political 
considerations are added to the analysis. 
 While this research focused on the United States, this is hardly a uniquely 
American phenomenon. Japan, for example, refused to provide funding for heavy fuel oil 
for North Korea in the Six Party Talks process, saying that it would not do so until a 
settlement was reached on the issue of kidnapped Japanese. This strategy was strongly 
linked to strong domestic demands for a solution to that problem. 
 There are also indications that North Korean actions were at times dictated by 
domestic politics. Pyongyang’s denial of an earlier oral promise to allow sampling in 
2008, described in Chapter 7, cannot adequately be explained by international events. It 
could have been motivated by North Korea’s own domestic politics, perhaps linked to its 
leader Kim Jong Il’s stroke in the summer of 2008. We do not know, but that remains a 
possibility. 
 Thus, the central contention of this dissertation is that domestic politics matters 
not just in the negotiation of international security cooperation agreements but also in 
their implementation phase. In other words, domestic political factors continue to affect 
the implementation of agreements by influencing a country’s interests and strategy.472 
The impact of domestic politics is particularly stark in this research as the United States 
and North Korea are adversaries.  The competition between supporters and opponents of 
cooperation shaped Washington’s decisions on which portions of its agreements with 
                                                 
472 On domestic political factors impacting negotiations, see, for example, Andrew Moravcsik, 
“Introduction: Integrating International and Domestic Theories of International Bargaining,” in 
Double-Edged Diplomacy, ed. Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson and Robert D. Putnam 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 15. On such factors affecting international 
cooperation in general, see Milner, 493. 
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North Korea should be carried out and in what manner. Sometimes the differences 
between these two groups reflected institutional divisions and other times it stemmed 
from differing mindsets among individuals within the same branch of government or 
agency. Domestic political competition pulled the United States away from full 
cooperation with North Korea to different degrees in the four subcases. 
 
• The United States reduced the level of its cooperation with North Korea 
when tolerance for concessions to Pyongyang diminished in the U.S. domestic 
system. 
To understand when and how U.S. domestic politics impacted the implementation 
of the agreements, this research used two levels of analysis. When the policy split was 
mainly between the executive and legislative branches of the government, institutional-
level analysis focusing on interests was useful in understanding the dynamics. This was 
seen in the episode that Chapter 4 examined concerning the lifting of sanctions in 1995. 
But when polarization took place inside the executive branch of the government, 
it was helpful to analyze individual-level mindsets. Two types of mindsets were used as 
analytic tools. The “Cooperators” are differentiated from “Hardliners” not only by their 
preference for cooperation over coercive measures to achieve their goals, but also by the 
level of concessions they demand from the target country. Cooperators believe that 
coexistence is possible as long as the target country satisfies their core demands. 
Hardliners have a more ambitious goal, such as the target country’s capitulation or 
regime change. 
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 Using this method, this study showed that the United States reduced its 
cooperation with North Korea when tolerance for concessions toward North Korea 
diminished in the domestic system. 
 
• U.S. domestic politics constrained cooperation with North Korea, but the 
degree in which it did so differed depending on who was in charge. When the 
Cooperators were stronger, they tried to broaden the coalition of support by 
adopting some coercive measures. The broader lesson is that a support 
coalition continues to be important for agreements in the implementation 
phase. 
In the case of the U.S. implementation of nuclear agreements with North Korea, 
the ability to deal with domestic political constraints on international cooperation were 
dealt with differed depending on who had power in the domestic system. When those 
against the agreements with North Korea — Congress on the institutional level or 
Hardliners on the individual level — were in a relatively strong position, they were able 
to limit options for supporters of the agreement. 
 The narrowing of options was seen in the Chapter 4 case involving the U.S. lifting 
of sanctions in 1995, when the administration refrained from more generous cooperation. 
It was also apparent in the case described in Chapter 5, when the United States decided to 
respond to North Korean’s uranium enrichment program by stopping heavy fuel oil 
shipments in 2002. While some Cooperators suggested that stopping the shipments 
without an alternative to the Agreed Framework would allow North Korea to increase its 
nuclear arsenal by pursuing both the uranium enrichment and plutonium programs, this 
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argument was not seriously considered as an option. The Hardliners won by emphasizing 
North Korea’s untrustworthiness as they called for an end to the heavy fuel oil shipment. 
 When the Hardliners were in charge, pessimistic interpretations were adopted, 
further posing challenges to cooperation. An example of this was shown in Chapter 5, 
when policymakers made decisions on how to deal with North Korea’s uranium 
enrichment procurement efforts. While U.S. intelligence convinced many policymakers 
that North Korea had procured enough material and equipment for an industrial-scale 
uranium enrichment program, there were some questions as to the extent North Korea 
had reached in setting up an operational program. In addition, uranium enrichment was 
not specifically mentioned in the Agreed Framework as it was not a major concern at the 
time it was signed. There was room for the United States to interpret the uranium 
enrichment program in a manner that would not have been viewed as a clear violation of 
the accord if it wanted to deal with the problem in another way. But the strong opposition 
toward the Agreed Framework within the U.S. domestic system made that option 
virtually impossible. 
 When Cooperators were in the driver’s seat, the situation was different. They 
were less subject to pressure and had more freedom to form their own strategy. The 
flexibility the Cooperators had is similar to the larger “win-set” in two-level games 
theory. In the two-level games theory, the win-set poses a fundamental constraint on 
policymakers by limiting the potential deals that might be approved by domestic 
constituencies in international bargaining.473 The wider the win-set, the more options 
statesmen can pursue. 
                                                 
473 Moravcsik, “Introduction: Integrating International and Domestic Theories of International 
Bargaining,” 23-24. 
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 For example, in Chapter 6, Cooperators thought North Korea’s declaration of its 
nuclear programs fell short of Pyongyang’s commitment, but they had the freedom to 
avoid declaring it a violation of the Six Party Talks agreement. The United States 
continued to fulfill its commitments in the Six Party Talks process, and dealt with the 
problem in a different manner.474 The Cooperators chose to quietly raise the level of 
demands on North Korea by advancing the schedule for verification of its nuclear 
activities and expanding the scope of verification activities. This action by the 
Cooperators was partly motivated by the necessity to learn about North Korea’s uranium 
enrichment program, which Pyongyang refused to address. U.S. officials thought that a 
stringent verification protocol would provide an opportunity to find out about the 
uranium enrichment program in spite of North Korea’s refusal to admit its existence. But 
there are strong indications that this choice was also due to political requirements at 
home. The Cooperators were under strong pressure from the Hardliners to prove that 
diplomacy was producing results. The Cooperators chose to incorporate some of the 
measures advocated by the Hardliners in a possible move to improve its support base at 
home. The Cooperators’ actions echo the manipulation of domestic win-sets in the two-
level games approach. In two-level games, statesmen adopt strategies such as side 
payments and mobilization of political groups to shape the final agreement in the 
negotiation stage.475 
                                                 
 
474 For example, U.S. negotiator Christopher Hill mentioned the varying opinions on the 
completeness of North Korea’s verification in remarks to the press, but declined to go into details. 
Christopher Hill, Evening Walk-Through at the Six Party Talks, State Department archive 
website, July 10, 2008, https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2008/07/106940.htm (accessed 
on April 10, 2018). 
475 Moravcsik, “Introduction: Integrating International and Domestic Theories of International 
Bargaining,” 25. 
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In short, administration officials dealt with constraints on international 
cooperation posed by domestic politics in different ways, depending on the influence of 
the various players. When the Hardliners had more political influence, the degree of 
cooperation was reduced in accordance with the limits defined by the Hardliners. When 
Cooperators were in control, there was an attempt to broaden the coalition of support at 
home to gain more freedom to keep the agreement alive. More broadly, this underscores 
that an alliance of support in the domestic political arena is important not only in the 
negotiation and ratification stages of an agreement, but also its implementation phase. 
 
• Implementation of the two denuclearization agreements was a dynamic, 
iterative process. 
Implementation of the Agreed Framework and the Six Party Talks was not simply 
putting written terms into action by working out technical details and making necessary 
logistical arrangements. It required U.S. government officials to assess what was possible 
domestically and to interpret the terms of the agreement so that they could be 
implemented in a way that fit domestic political constraints. 
The terms of the agreements that tended to be affected more easily by domestic 
politics were those that did not involve tangible cooperation or were written in a vague 
manner. Thus, it was easier for U.S. government officials to adjust the lifting of sanctions 
as seen in Chapter 4 according to domestic political needs than to change the tangible 
portions of the agreement. 
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• Less tangible portions of the agreement were more susceptible to the 
influence of domestic politics. 
While the tangible portions of agreements such as the shipment of heavy fuel oil 
and the construction of light water reactors were the focus of policymakers, less tangible 
areas affecting the improvement of relations did not receive as much political attention. 
The case of the sanctions lifting in Chapter 4 showed that such areas are more susceptible 




 A limitation of this research is its sources of information. It relies on open-source 
data, which may not tell the entire story. This is particularly true of the Six Party Talks, 
as many of the classified documents that describe U.S. decision making have yet to find 
their way into the public domain. The study also relies on interviews and memoirs for 
information, which only tell the story from individual perspectives that can be inaccurate 
for deliberate or inadvertent reasons. Some of the study’s findings may have to be 
revisited once more information becomes available. 
 While this dissertation used individual-level mindsets as an analytical tool, it does 
not cover all aspects of an individual’s motivations, such as personal rivalries. But 
personal convictions about policy — in the case of this study, a preference for 
cooperation or coercion and the level of concessions one demands from the target country 
— do matter for what actors consider to be effective policy instruments, and thus still 
have relevance. 
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 This dissertation also raises new questions for further study. One is whether 
similar dynamics between domestic politics and international security cooperation exist 
when it comes to coercive measures. Whether coercive measures experience the same 
level of interference from domestic politics as cooperative ones is an area that merits 
separate research. 
 
8.4 Implications for Theory 
 
 This study was motivated by a desire to answer empirical questions raised by the 
history of the U.S. implementation of its nuclear agreements with North Korea, but it 
offers implications for theory. While any general propositions from a two-part case study 
of two adversaries are offered with some humility, it shows that the interaction between 
the international and domestic levels as described by the two-level games model 
continues in the implementation phase of international cooperation agreements. In other 
words, the study contributes to the literature by extending the application of the concept 
from the negotiation phase to the implementation phase. 
 This dissertation also shows that individual-level mindsets, or fundamental 
assumptions, can be useful units for analysis. It adds to the literature on the impact of 
conceptual frameworks and ideology on international cooperation. 
 
8.5 Implications for Policy 
 
• Assessment of North Korea’s willingness to cooperate. 
This dissertation showed that the United States retreated from full cooperation 
with North Korea as specified in the Agreed Framework and the Six Party Talks 
 194 
agreements not just in response to North Korean actions, but also for domestic political 
reasons. What was acceptable domestically played heavily in the calculations of the 
policymakers. 
This means that it is incorrect to assume that past engagement efforts did not work 
solely due to North Korean actions. Any assessment of engagement policy with North 
Korea should include the possibility that cooperative arrangements failed because of the 
way inducements were extended.  Some of the questions to be asked are: Were positive 
inducements extended fully in a timely manner? Did the United States use coercive 
tactics that backfired? 
Because the four sub-cases were chosen to identify why the United States did not 
fully implement some of its commitments, they do not shed light on whether North Korea 
would have responded more positively had the United States fully carried out the terms of 
the Agreed Framework and the Six Party Talks agreements. 
But it is true that North Korea kept the 5-megawatt graphite-moderated reactor at 
the Yongbyon nuclear complex frozen from 1994 to 2002 when the Agreed Framework 
was in place, and never resumed construction of the two larger reactors. Pyongyang also 
complied with its commitment to “disable” the complex under the Six Party Talks as long 
as it perceived the other parties to be fulfilling their commitments. North Korea only 
slowed or stopped disablement work when it wanted to signal its displeasure about delays 
in energy assistance or retaliate against the U.S. refusal to extend a key incentive, which 
was the removal from the U.S. state sponsors of terrorism list. 
It is possible that North Korea never intended to give up its nuclear weapons or 
decided not to during the process due to international security considerations or its own 
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domestic politics. The most benign interpretation of North Korea’s covert uranium 
enrichment procurement effort was that Pyongyang was hedging its bets so that it would 
have another path to a nuclear bomb should the 1994 Agreed Framework fail to produce 
the outcome it desired, namely increased economic development and improved relations 
with the United States. A less charitable interpretation would be that North Korea was 
willing to give up its plutonium program under the Agreed Framework while making sure 
it retained its uranium enrichment program. 
 However, it is also true that the outside world does not know what North Korea 
intended to do. As this dissertation showed, the test of its intentions through cooperation 
has not been as consistently applied as widely assumed because the United States stepped 
away from its own commitments for reasons other than clear-cut North Korean violations 
of its obligations. 
 
• American credibility 
This study has implications for American credibility as well. The North Koreans 
have accused the United States of throwing “all the agreements reached with us into a 
garbage can like waste paper under the absurd assumption that the DPRK would 
‘collapse.’”476 Such statements through the official North Korean media are obviously 
calculated for propaganda effects and strategic value. But it is also true that if North 
Korea sees the United States as not keeping its word, this could negatively impact any 
engagement efforts by Washington in the future since Pyongyang will have less reason to 
                                                 
476 Korean Central News Agency, “DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman Snipes at U.S. Report on 
‘National Security Strategy,’” December 22, 2017. 
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believe what the United States promises the country. It makes cooperation with North 
Korea even more difficult. 
The credibility problem could extend beyond the North Korean case. If the United 
States is viewed as not fulfilling its promises, it could create problems in negotiations 
with other countries, particularly with countries with which Washington does not have 
friendly ties. 
 
• Sidelining domestic opponents in the negotiation phase may complicate 
implementation. 
This study showed that both the Cooperators and Hardliners tried to cut each 
other out of the decision process in order to win presidential approval and make their 
preferred policy the country’s position in the implementation phase of the two 
agreements. The Hardliners mainly succeeded when it came to the Agreed Framework by 
influencing the president’s decisions, while the Cooperators were more influential for the 
same reason during the Six Party Talks process. But even when the Cooperators were in 
the driver’s seat, they needed to take the domestic opposition into consideration. They 
adopted some of the view of Hardliners as part of their implementation tactics, possibly 
to broaden the coalition for support at home. 
The Cooperators also tried to avoid Congressional votes, anticipating hostility 
toward engagement with North Korea in the legislative branch. But one of the reasons 
why Congressional members held up funding for U.S. commitments in the Agreed 
Framework was because they resented being bypassed in the process.  
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This shows an important tradeoff. Avoiding domestic opponents in the 
negotiation stage to facilitate the signing of an agreement may complicate its 
implementation later because they could then have a say in what happens to it. Coalition 
building needs to take place at some point in the process. 
 
It is impossible to take domestic politics out of the process of the implementation 
of international security cooperation agreements. As former Deputy Secretary of State 
Richard Armitage said, “Everyone has politics.”477 But efforts can be made to better the 
chances of their successful implementation. While the focus tends to be on the 
negotiation phase of international cooperation, reaching an agreement is not the end of 
the effort. Sustained political attention on the implementation phase as well as coalition 



















                                                 





Agreed Framework Text 
 
Source: Department of State Archive Website https://2001-
2009.state.gov/t/ac/rls/or/2004/31009.htm 
 
Agreed Framework Between the United States of America and the Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea 
Bureau of Arms Control 
Washington, DC 
 
October 21, 1994 
  
Delegations of the Governments of the United States of America (U.S.) and the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (D.P.R.K.) held talks in Geneva from September 
23 to October 17, 1994, to negotiate an overall resolution of the nuclear issue on the 
Korean Peninsula. 
 
Both sides reaffirmed the importance of attaining the objectives contained in the August 
12, 1994 Agreed Statement between the U.S. and the D.P.R.K. and upholding the 
principles of the June 11, 1993 Joint Statement of the U.S. and the D.P.R.K. to achieve 
peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula. The U.S. and the D.P.R.K. 
decided to take the following actions for the resolution of the nuclear issue:  
I. Both sides will cooperate to replace the D.P.R.K.'s graphite-moderated reactors and 
related facilities with light-water reactor (LWR) power plants.  
1) In accordance with the October 20, 1994 letter of assurance from the U.S. President, 
the U.S. will undertake to make arrangements for the provision to the D.P.R.K. of a LWR 
project with a total generating capacity of approximately 2,000 MW(e) by a target date of 
2003.  
-- The U.S. will organize under its leadership an international consortium to finance and 
supply the LWR project to be provided to the D.P.R.K.. The U.S., representing the 
international consortium, will serve as the principal point of contact with the D.P.R.K. for 
the LWR project.  
-- The U.S., representing the consortium, will make best efforts to secure the conclusion 
of a supply contract with the D.P.R.K. within six months of the date of this Document for 
the provision of the LWR project. Contract talks will begin as soon as possible after the 
date of this Document. 
 
-- As necessary, the U.S. and the D.P.R.K. will conclude a bilateral agreement for 
cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 
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2) In accordance with the October 20, 1994 letter of assurance from the U.S. President, 
the U.S., representing the consortium, will make arrangements to offset the energy 
foregone due to the freeze of the D.P.R.K.'s graphite-moderated reactors and related 
facilities, pending completion of the first LWR unit. 
 
-- Alternative energy will be provided in the form of heavy oil for heating and electricity 
production. 
 
-- Deliveries of heavy oil will begin within three months of the date of this Document and 
will reach a rate of 500,000 tons annually, in accordance with an agreed schedule of 
deliveries. 
 
3) Upon receipt of U.S. assurances for the provision of LWR's and for arrangements for 
interim energy alternatives, the D.P.R.K. will freeze its graphite-moderated reactors and 
related facilities and will eventually dismantle these reactors and related facilities. 
 
-- The freeze on the D.P.R.K.'s graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities will be 
fully implemented within one month of the date of this Document. During this one-month 
period, and throughout the freeze, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will 
be allowed to monitor this freeze, and the D.P.R.K. will provide full cooperation to the 
IAEA for this purpose. 
 
-- Dismantlement of the D.P.R.K.'s graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities will 
be completed when the LWR project is completed. 
 
-- The U.S. and D.P.R.K. will cooperated in finding a method to store safely the spent 
fuel from the 5 MW(e) experimental reactor during the construction of the LWR project, 
and to dispose of the fuel in a safe manner that does not involve reprocessing in the 
D.P.R.K.. 
 
4) As soon as possible after the date of this document. U.S. and D.P.R.K. experts will 
hold two sets of experts talks. 
 
-- At one set of talks, experts will discuss issues related to alternative energy and the 
replacement of the graphite-moderated reactor program with the LWR project. 
 
-- At the other set of talks, experts will discuss specific arrangements for spent fuel 
storage and ultimate disposition. 
 
II. The two sides will move toward full normalization of political and economic relations. 
 
1) Within three months of the date of this Document, both sides will reduce barriers to 
trade and investment, including restrictions on telecommunications services and financial 
transactions. 
 
2) Each side will open a liaison office in the other's capital following resolution of 
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consular and other technical issues through expert level discussions. 
 
3) As progress is made on issues of concern to each side, the U.S. and D.P.R.K. will 
upgrade bilateral relations to the Ambassadorial level. 
 
III. Both sides will work together for peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean 
peninsula. 
 
1) The U.S. will provide formal assurances to the D.P.R.K., against the threat or use of 
nuclear weapons by the U.S. 
 
2) The D.P.R.K. will consistently take steps to implement the North-South Joint 
Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. 
 
3) The D.P.R.K. will engage in North-South dialogue, as this Agreed Framework will 
help create an atmosphere that promotes such dialogue. 
 
IV. Both sides will work together to strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation 
regime. 
 
1) The D.P.R.K. will remain a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (NPT) and will allow implementation of its safeguards agreement under the 
Treaty. 
 
2) Upon conclusion of the supply contract for the provision of the LWR project, ad hoc 
and routine inspections will resume under the D.P.R.K.'s safeguards agreement with the 
IAEA with respect to the facilities not subject to the freeze. Pending conclusion of the 
supply contract, inspections required by the IAEA for the continuity of safeguards will 
continue at the facilities not subject to the freeze. 
 
3) When a significant portion of the LWR project is completed, but before delivery of 
key nuclear components, the D.P.R.K. will come into full compliance with its safeguards 
agreement with the IAEA (INFCIRC/403), including taking all steps that may be deemed 
necessary by the IAEA, following consultations with the Agency with regard to verifying 
the accuracy and completeness of the D.P.R.K.'s initial report on all nuclear material in 
the D.P.R.K.. 
 
Kang Sok Ju- Head of the Delegation for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 
First Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
 
Robert L. Gallucci- Head of the Delegation of United States of America, Ambassador at 






Text of Joint Statement of the Six Party Talks Issued on September 19, 2005 
Source: Department of State website https://www.state.gov/p/eap/regional/c15455.htm 
Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks 
Beijing 19 September 2005 
The Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks was held in Beijing, China among the People's 
Republic of China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Japan, the Republic of 
Korea, the Russian Federation, and the United States of America from July 26th to 
August 7th, and from September 13th to 19th, 2005. 
Mr. Wu Dawei, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, Mr. Kim Gye Gwan, Vice 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the D.P.R.K.; Mr. Kenichiro Sasae, Director-General for 
Asian and Oceanian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan; Mr. Song Min-soon, 
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the R.O.K.; Mr. Alexandr Alekseyev, 
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation; and Mr. Christopher Hill, 
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the United States 
attended the talks as heads of their respective delegations. 
Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei chaired the talks. 
For the cause of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia at 
large, the Six Parties held, in the spirit of mutual respect and equality, serious and 
practical talks concerning the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula on the basis of 
the common understanding of the previous three rounds of talks, and agreed, in this 
context, to the following: 
1. The Six Parties unanimously reaffirmed that the goal of the Six-Party Talks is the 
verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner. 
The D.P.R.K. committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear 
programs and returning, at an early date, to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons and to IAEA safeguards. 
The United States affirmed that it has no nuclear weapons on the Korean 
Peninsula and has no intention to attack or invade the D.P.R.K. with nuclear or 
conventional weapons. 
The R.O.K. reaffirmed its commitment not to receive or deploy nuclear weapons 
in accordance with the 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the 
Korean Peninsula, while affirming that there exist no nuclear weapons within its 
territory. 
The 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula 
should be observed and implemented. 
The D.P.R.K. stated that it has the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The 
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other parties expressed their respect and agreed to discuss, at an appropriate time, 
the subject of the provision of light water reactor to the D.P.R.K. 
2. The Six Parties undertook, in their relations, to abide by the purposes and 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations and recognized norms of 
international relations. 
The D.P.R.K. and the United States undertook to respect each other's sovereignty, 
exist peacefully together, and take steps to normalize their relations subject to 
their respective bilateral policies. 
The D.P.R.K. and Japan undertook to take steps to normalize their relations in 
accordance with the Pyongyang Declaration, on the basis of the settlement of 
unfortunate past and the outstanding issues of concern. 
3. The Six Parties undertook to promote economic cooperation in the fields of 
energy, trade and investment, bilaterally and/or multilaterally. 
China, Japan, R.O.K., Russia and the U.S. stated their willingness to provide 
energy assistance to the D.P.R.K. 
The ROK reaffirmed its proposal of July 12th 2005 concerning the provision of 2 
million kilowatts of electric power to the D.P.R.K. 
4. The Six Parties committed to joint efforts for lasting peace and stability in 
Northeast Asia. 
The directly related parties will negotiate a permanent peace regime on the 
Korean Peninsula at an appropriate separate forum. 
The Six Parties agreed to explore ways and means for promoting security 
cooperation in Northeast Asia. 
5. The Six Parties agreed to take coordinated steps to implement the aforementioned 
consensus in a phased manner in line with the principle of "commitment for 
commitment, action for action". 
6. The Six Parties agreed to hold the Fifth Round of the Six-Party Talks in Beijing in 













Text of Initial Phase Action Plan Under the Six Party Talks 
Source: Department of State Archive Website https://2001-
2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/february/80479.htm 
Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement 
13 February 2007 
The Third Session of the Fifth Round of the Six-Party Talks was held in Beijing among 
the People's Republic of China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Japan, the 
Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the United States of America from 8 to 13 
February 2007. 
Mr. Wu Dawei, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, Mr. Kim Gye Gwan, Vice 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK; Mr. Kenichiro Sasae, Director-General for 
Asian and Oceanian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan; Mr. Chun Yung-woo, 
Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs of the ROK 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade; Mr. Alexander Losyukov, Deputy Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation; and Mr. Christopher Hill, Assistant Secretary 
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Department of State of the United States 
attended the talks as heads of their respective delegations. 
Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei chaired the talks. 
I. The Parties held serious and productive discussions on the actions each party will take 
in the initial phase for the implementation of the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005. 
The Parties reaffirmed their common goal and will to achieve early denuclearization of 
the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner and reiterated that they would earnestly fulfill 
their commitments in the Joint Statement. The Parties agreed to take coordinated steps to 
implement the Joint Statement in a phased manner in line with the principle of "action for 
action". 
II. The Parties agreed to take the following actions in parallel in the initial phase: 
1. The DPRK will shut down and seal for the purpose of eventual abandonment the 
Yongbyon nuclear facility, including the reprocessing facility and invite back 
IAEA personnel to conduct all necessary monitoring and verifications as agreed 
between IAEA and the DPRK.  
2. The DPRK will discuss with other parties a list of all its nuclear programs as 
described in the Joint Statement, including plutonium extracted from used fuel 
rods, that would be abandoned pursuant to the Joint Statement.  
3. The DPRK and the US will start bilateral talks aimed at resolving pending 
bilateral issues and moving toward full diplomatic relations. The US will begin 
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the process of removing the designation of the DPRK as a state-sponsor of 
terrorism and advance the process of terminating the application of the Trading 
with the Enemy Act with respect to the DPRK.  
4. The DPRK and Japan will start bilateral talks aimed at taking steps to normalize 
their relations in accordance with the Pyongyang Declaration, on the basis of the 
settlement of unfortunate past and the outstanding issues of concern.  
5. Recalling Section 1 and 3 of the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005, the 
Parties agreed to cooperate in economic, energy and humanitarian assistance to 
the DPRK. In this regard, the Parties agreed to the provision of emergency energy 
assistance to the DPRK in the initial phase. The initial shipment of emergency 
energy assistance equivalent to 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil (HFO) will 
commence within next 60 days.  
The Parties agreed that the above-mentioned initial actions will be implemented within 
next 60 days and that they will take coordinated steps toward this goal. 
III. The Parties agreed on the establishment of the following Working Groups (WG) in 
order to carry out the initial actions and for the purpose of full implementation of the 
Joint Statement: 
1. Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula  
2. Normalization of DPRK-US relations  
3. Normalization of DPRK-Japan relations  
4. Economy and Energy Cooperation  
5. Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism  
The WGs will discuss and formulate specific plans for the implementation of the Joint 
Statement in their respective areas. The WGs shall report to the Six-Party Heads of 
Delegation Meeting on the progress of their work. In principle, progress in one WG shall 
not affect progress in other WGs. Plans made by the five WGs will be implemented as a 
whole in a coordinated manner. 
The Parties agreed that all WGs will meet within next 30 days. 
IV. During the period of the Initial Actions phase and the next phase - which includes 
provision by the DPRK of a complete declaration of all nuclear programs and 
disablement of all existing nuclear facilities, including graphite-moderated reactors and 
reprocessing plant - economic, energy and humanitarian assistance up to the equivalent of 
1 million tons of heavy fuel oil (HFO), including the initial shipment equivalent to 50,000 
tons of HFO, will be provided to the DPRK. 
The detailed modalities of the said assistance will be determined through consultations 
and appropriate assessments in the Working Group on Economic and Energy 
Cooperation. 
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V. Once the initial actions are implemented, the Six Parties will promptly hold a 
ministerial meeting to confirm implementation of the Joint Statement and explore ways 
and means for promoting security cooperation in Northeast Asia. 
VI. The Parties reaffirmed that they will take positive steps to increase mutual trust, and 
will make joint efforts for lasting peace and stability in Northeast Asia. The directly 
related parties will negotiate a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula at an 
appropriate separate forum. 
VII. The Parties agreed to hold the Sixth Round of the Six-Party Talks on 19 March 2007 























Second Phase Actions under the Six Party Talks 
 




Full text of joint document of the second session of the sixth round six-party 
talks 
    BEIJING, Oct. 3 (Xinhua) -- A joint document, named the Second-Phase Actions 
for the Implementation of the Joint Statement, was released here Wednesday after a 
two-day recess of the second session of the sixth round of the six-party talks. The full 
text is as follows:  
    The Second Session of the Sixth Round of the Six-Party Talks was held in Beijing 
among the People's Republic of China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 
Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the United States of 
America from 27 to 30 September 2007.  
    Mr. Wu Dawei, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, Mr. Kim Gye Gwan, 
Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK, Mr. Kenichiro Sasae, Director-
General for Asian and Oceanian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Mr. 
Chun Yung-woo, Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Peace and Security 
Affairs of the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Mr. Alexander Losyukov, 
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, and Mr. Christopher 
Hill, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Department of State 
of the United States, attended the talks as heads of their respective delegations.  
    Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei chaired the talks.  
    The Parties listened to and endorsed the reports of the five Working Groups, 
confirmed the implementation of the initial actions provided for in the February 13 
agreement, agreed to push forward the Six-Party Talks process in accordance with 
the consensus reached at the meetings of the Working Groups and reached agreement 
on second-phase actions for the implementation of the Joint Statement of 19 
September 2005, the goal of which is the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean 
Peninsula in a peaceful manner.  
    I. On Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula  
    1. The DPRK agreed to disable all existing nuclear facilities subject to 
abandonment under the September 2005 Joint Statement and the February 13 
agreement.  
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    The disablement of the 5 megawatt Experimental Reactor at Yongbyon, the 
Reprocessing Plant (Radiochemical Laboratory) at Yongbyon and the Nuclear Fuel 
Rod Fabrication Facility at Yongbyon will be completed by 31 December 2007. 
Specific measures recommended by the expert group will be adopted by heads of 
delegation in line with the principles of being acceptable to all Parties, scientific, safe, 
verifiable, and consistent with international standards. At the request of the other 
Parties, the United States will lead disablement activities and provide the initial 
funding for those activities. As a first step, the US side will lead the expert group to 
the DPRK within the next two weeks to prepare for disablement.  
    2. The DPRK agreed to provide a complete and correct declaration of all its nuclear 
programs in accordance with the February 13 agreement by 31 December 2007.  
    3. The DPRK reaffirmed its commitment not to transfer nuclear materials, 
technology, or know-how.  
    II. On Normalization of Relations between Relevant Countries  
    1. The DPRK and the United States remain committed to improving their bilateral 
relations and moving towards a full diplomatic relationship. The two sides will 
increase bilateral exchanges and enhance mutual trust. Recalling the commitments to 
begin the process of removing the designation of the DPRK as a state sponsor of 
terrorism and advance the process of terminating the application of the Trading with 
the Enemy Act with respect to the DPRK, the United States will fulfill its 
commitments to the DPRK in parallel with the DPRK's actions based on consensus 
reached at the meetings of the Working Group on Normalization of DPRK-U.S. 
Relations.  
    2. The DPRK and Japan will make sincere efforts to normalize their relations 
expeditiously in accordance with the Pyongyang Declaration, on the basis of the 
settlement of the unfortunate past and the outstanding issues of concern. The DPRK 
and Japan committed themselves to taking specific actions toward this end through 
intensive consultations between them.  
    III. On Economic and Energy Assistance to the DPRK  
    In accordance with the February 13 agreement, economic, energy and humanitarian 
assistance up to the equivalent of one million tons of HFO (inclusive of the 100,000 
tons of HFO already delivered) will be provided to the DPRK. Specific modalities 
will be finalized through discussion by the Working Group on Economy and Energy 
Cooperation.  
    IV. On the Six-Party Ministerial Meeting  
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    The Parties reiterated that the Six-Party Ministerial Meeting will be held in Beijing 
at an appropriate time.  
    The Parties agreed to hold a heads of delegation meeting prior to the Ministerial 











































U.S. Heavy Fuel Oil Shipments Under the Agreed Framework 
 
 
Note: The HFO year differed from the calendar year. The United States and North Korea 
agreed that 150,000 metric tons would be provided in the year ending on October 21, 
1995, or one year after the signing of the Agreed Framework. A total of 500,000 metric 
tons were to be delivered in each of the twelve-month period after that.  Because of the 
delays, however, the twelve-month period shifted from year to year. The months shown 
in red and italics were the delayed deliveries 
 
Source: KEDO Annual Reports for 2001 and 2002 on its website 
http://www.kedo.org/annual_reports.asp, United States General Accounting Office report 
“Nuclear Nonproliferation: Status of Heavy Fuel Oil Delivered to North Korea Under the 
Agreed Framework” published on September 1999, as well as additional annual KEDO 





Months of delivery Amount delivered in metric tons 




























Month of delivery Amount delivered in metric tons 
November 1996 0 
December  0 

























































Month of delivery Amount delivered in metric tons 






































































Eleven Disablement Actions Identified by the United States 
 
Source:  
Siegfried Hecker, Report of Visit to the Demorcatic People’s Republic of North Korea 
(DPRK). Pyongyang and the Nuclear Center at Yonbgyon, Feb. 12-16, 2008, Center for 




Fuel Fabrication Facility 
 
1) Remove and store all three uranium ore concentrate dissolver tanks. 
 
2) Remove and store all seven uranium conversion furnaces. Store the refractory bricks 
and mortar sand. 
 
3) Remove and store both the metal casting furnaces and vacuum system. Remove and 
store eight machining lathes. 
 




5) Cut and remove portions of the steel piping of the secondary cooling loop outside the 
reactor building. Remove the wood interior structure of the cooling tower. 
 
6) Discharge all 8,000 spent fuel rods. 
 





8) Cut cable and remove the drive mechanism for trolley that moves spent fuel caskets 
from the fuel receiving building into the reprocessing facility. 
 
9) Cut two of the four steam lines into the reprocessing facility. 
 
10) Remove the crane and door actuators that permit spent fuel rods to enter the 
reprocessing facility. 
 




Note: North Korea defined the tasks slightly differently, identifying 12 steps. At the 
reactor, it separated 5) into two actions. North Korea did not include 4) on its list, but 













































Timeline for Chapter 4 
 




1980s – North Korea begins construction of the Yongbyon nuclear complex. 
 
December 12, 1985 – North Korea signs the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty but does 
not complete a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. 
 
1986 – The five-megawatt reactor in Yongbyon nuclear complex becomes operational. 
 
September 30, 1990 – South Korea and the Soviet Union establish diplomatic relations. 
 
September 17, 1991 – North Korea joins the United States, simultaneously with South 
Korea. 
 
September 27, 1991 – U.S. President George H.W. Bush announces the unilateral 
withdrawal of naval and land-based tactical nuclear weapons deployed overseas. 
 
January 20, 1992 – South and North Korea sign the Joint Declaration of the 
Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. 
 
January 30, 1992 – North Korea concludes a comprehensive safeguards agreement with 
the IAEA. 
 
April 9, 1992 – North Korea ratifies its safeguards agreement with the IAEA. 
 
May 4, 1992 – North Korea submits inventory of nuclear material to the IAEA. 
 
May to September 1992 – IAEA holds ad hoc inspections, finds inconsistencies between 
North Korea’s declaration and findings. 
 
August 24, 1992 – South Korea and China establish diplomatic relations. 
 
February 9, 1993 – IAEA seeks special inspection of two sites suspected of storing 
nuclear waste. 
 
February 25, 1993 – IAEA board of Governors passes resolution calling on North Korea 
to accept special inspections. 
 
March 12, 1993 – North Korea announces it is withdrawing from the NPT. (The NPT 
requires a three-month withdrawal notification.) 
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June 11, 1993 – North Korea agrees to suspend its withdrawal from the NPT after high-
level U.S.-North Korea talks in New York. This was one day before the withdrawal was 
due to take effect. 
 
July 1993 – U.S.-North Korea talks held in Geneva. North Korea agrees to resume talks 
with South Korea and the IAEA. 
 
December 5, 1993 – IAEA Director General Hans Blix says he cannot give meaningful 
assurances about the continuity of safeguards in North Korea. 
 
December 29, 1993 – The United States and North Korea hold talks. North Korea agrees 
to accept IAEA inspections and to resume talks with South Korea, while the United 
States agrees to concur with South Korea’s announcement to suspend their joint Team 
Spirit 1994 exercises. 
 
March 3, 1994 – As arranged, IAEA inspections begin, North-South Korea talks begin, 
Team Spirit exercises held jointly with the United States and South Korea are suspended 
and a date for the third round of U.S.-North Korea talks are set. 
 
March 15, 1994 – IAEA inspectors leave after conducting inspections at all facilities 
except for the reprocessing plant. 
 
March 16, 1994 – IAEA Director General Blix says that the IAEA inspectors were 
unable to conclude whether nuclear material has been diverted from the Yongbyon 
nuclear complex, or whether reprocessing had taken place as a result of the inspections 
from the inspections earlier that month. 
 
May 19, 1994 – IAEA confirms North Korea began discharging nuclear fuel rods from 
Yongbyon reactor in a way that makes its inspectors unable to verify history of the core. 
 
June 10, 1994 – IAEA Board of Governors adopts resolution concluding that North 
Korea is widening its non-compliance. 
 
June 13, 1994 – North Korea withdraws from the IAEA. 
 
June 15-18, 1994 – Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter visits North Korea and extracts 
North Korean commitment to allow IAEA inspectors and equipment at Yongbyon, to 
deal with the issue of remains of Americans killed in the Korean War and to hold summit 
talks with South Korea. 
 
July 8, 1994 – The United States and North Korea begin talks in Geneva. 
 
July 9, 1994 - Kim Il Sung’s death is announced. The event postpones U.S.-North Korea 
talks as well as a summit of the two Koreas that were announced for July 25-27. The 
summit talks were never held. Kim Jong Il succeeds his father. 
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August 5-12, 1994 – U.S.-North Korea talks held in Geneva. 
 
September 23, 1994 – U.S.-North Korea talks held in Geneva. 
 
October 21, 1994 – Agreed Framework is signed in Geneva, Switzerland. 
 
November 23-28, 1994 – IAEA experts visit North Korea, confirm freeze of North 
Korea’s nuclear facilities. 
 
November 8, 1994 – Republicans win in U.S. midterm elections, control both houses for 
first time in 40 years. 
 
December 1, 1994 – Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s Subcommittee on East Asian 
and Pacific Affairs holds hearing on the Agreed Framework. 
 
December 19, 1994 – U.S. helicopter is shot down over North Korea, killing Chief 
Warrant Officer David Hileman. Chief Warrant Officer Bobby Hall survives but is held 
in North Korea. 
 
December 22, 1994 – Representative Bill Richardson, who was traveling in North Korea, 
brings back body of Hileman from North Korea but Hall is not released. 
 
December 30, 1994 – Tom Hubbard travels to North Korea to solve the helicopter 
incident. 
 
January 9, 1995 – North Korea announces lifting of sanctions against the United States. 
 
January 20, 1995 – The United States announces the easing of some sanctions against 
North Korea. 
 
January 22, 1995 – The deadline for easing of sanctions under the Agreed Framework. 
 
January 24-25, 1995 – Senate Foreign Relations Committee holds hearing on Agreed 
Framework. 
 
January 26, 1995 – Senate Armed Forces Committee holds hearing on Agreed 
Framework 
 
April 21-22, 1996 – First round of missile talks between the United States and North 
Korea take place in Berlin. 
 
June 11-13, 1997 – Second round of U.S.-North Korea missile talks held in New York. 
 
February 25, 1998 – Kim Dae Jung is elected president of South Korea, starting his 
“Sunshine Policy” toward North Korea. 
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August 31, 1998 – North Korea launches a Taepodong missile over Japan into the Pacific 
Ocean. 
 
October 1, 1998 – Third found of U.S.-North Korea missile talks are held in New York. 
 
March 29-31, 1999 – Fourth round of bilateral missile talks are held in Pyongyang. 
 
May 25-28, 1999 – William Perry visits Pyongyang as envoy for U.S. President Bill 
Clinton, delivers letter from Clinton to Kim Jong Il. 
 
September 7-12, 1999 – North Korea agrees to a moratorium on long-range missile 
testing for the duration of talks with the United States. The United States agrees to lift 
some of its economic sanctions in return. 
 
October 23, 2000 – Secretary of State Madeline Albright visits north Korea, becoming 
































Timeline for Chapter 5 
 
From the inauguration of U.S. President George W. Bush to the end of heavy fuel 
shipments under the Agreed Framework 
 
 
January 20, 2001 – George W. Bush is inaugurated president of the United States. 
 
March 6, 2001 – U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell says at a joint press briefing with 
the Swedish foreign minister that the Bush administration plans to engage with North 
Korea and pick up where the previous administration under Bill Clinton left off. Powell 
walks back his remarks a day later. 
 
March 7, 2001 – South Korean President Kim Dae-jung visits the United States for talks 
with Bush. 
 
May 3, 2001 – Swedish Prime Minister Goran Persson says that North Korean leader 
Kim Jong Il told him that Pyongyang will extend its moratorium on missile tests until at 
least 2003. 
 
June 6, 2001 – Bush announces the completion of his administration’s policy review, 
saying that serious discussions on a broad agenda should be carried out. 
 
August 4, 2001 – Kim Jong Il reaffirms his pledge to maintain a moratorium on ballistic 
missile tests until 2003 during a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in 
Moscow. 
 
January 29, 2002 – Bush calls North Korea, along with Iraq and Iran, “axis of evil” in 
the State of the Union speech. 
April 1, 2002 - Bush issues a memorandum stating that he will not certify North Korea's 
compliance with the Agreed Framework but waives applicable U.S. law prohibiting 
Washington from funding KEDO citing national security considerations and allowing the 
United States to continue financially supporting the Agreed Framework. 
June 29, 2002 – North and South Korea clash in the Yellow Sea, killing four South 
Korean sailors and sinking a North Korean vessel. 
July 2, 2002 - The United States cancels a planned delegation visit to North Korea, citing 
Pyongyang’s failure to respond to a proposed July 10 meeting date, as well as the June 29 
naval confrontation between North and South Korea. 
August 7, 2002: Charles “Jack” Pritchard, U.S. representative to KEDO and State 
Department special envoy for negotiations with North Korea, visits North Korea for a 
ceremony making the pouring of the concrete foundation for the first light water reactor 
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promised to North Korea under the Agreed Framework. Pritchard is the most senior 
official to visit North Korea since a visit to North Korea in 2000 by then Secretary of 
State Madeleine Albright. 
September 17, 2002 – Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visits North Korea for 
talks with North Korean leader Kim Jong Il. The two leaders sign the Pyongyang 
Declaration. 
 
October 3-5, 2002 – James Kelly, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific 
affairs, visits North Korea and confronts North Korea with U.S. assessment of its 
uranium enrichment procurement efforts. 
 
October 16, 2002 – Bush signs the Authorization for Use of Military Force against Iraq 
Resolution of 2002. The resolution gives him the authority to go to war to disarm Iraq. 
 
October 26, 2002 – Chinese President Hu Jintao visits the United States for talks. 
 
November 14, 2002 -  KEDO’s executive board announces that it is suspending heavy-
fuel oil deliveries to North Korea in response to Pyongyang’s admission to a U.S. visiting 
delegation in October that it has a uranium enrichment program.  
 
November 18, 2002 - The last shipment of heavy fuel oil reaches North Korea. 
 
November 29, 2002 – IAEA Board of Governors adopts a resolution urging North Korea 
to clarify its reported uranium enrichment program, but North Korea rejects the 
resolution. 
 
December 12, 2002 – North Korea sends a letter to IAEA announcing that it is lifting its 
freeze on nuclear facilities. 
 
December 21, 2002 – North Korea begins removing IAEA monitoring equipment and 
seals at its nuclear facilities. 
 
December 31, 2002 – North Korea expels IAEA inspectors. 
 
January 6, 2003 – IAEA board adopts a resolution in which it deplored North Korea’s 
decision to resume operation of its nuclear facilities in the strongest terms. 
 
January 10, 2003 – North Korea announces it is withdrawing from the NPT. North 
Korean view is that because it initially announced its withdrawal from the treaty a decade 
earlier but suspended it a day before the three-month notification requirement following 








Timeline for Chapters 6 & 7  
 
From North Korea’s first nuclear test to the last Six Party Talks 
 
 
October 9, 2006 – North Korea conducts its first nuclear test. 
 
November 6, 2006 – In midterm elections, Democrats regain control of both houses of 
the Congress. 
 
December 18-22, 2006 – Fifth round of Six Party Talks end without agreement. 
 
January 16, 2007 – U.S. and North Korean officials meet for first bilateral talks in 
Berlin. 
 
February 8-13, 2007 – Six parties meet in Beijing, agree on initial phase actions for the 
September 19, 2005 joint statement on North Korea’s denuclearization. 
 
March 5-6, 2007 – Christopher Hill and Kim Kye Gwan meet. 
 
March 7-8, 2007 – Japan and North Korea hold talks in Hanoi over normalization of 
diplomatic relations. 
 
March 19-22, 2007 – The sixth round of Six Party Talks begins, but are suspended after 
North Korean negotiators fly home after four days and refuse to participate until funds 
frozen at the Banco Delta Asia (BDA) in Macao are returned. 
 
March 25-31, 2007 – Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI), 
Foal Eagle joint exercises by the American and South Korean militaries take place. 
 
May 25, 2007 – North Korea fires an SRBM. 
 
June 7, 2007 – North Korea fires two SRBMs. 
 
June 18-20, 2007 – Sixth round of Six Party Talks resume in Beijing, concludes with a 
joint communique. 
 
June 21-22, 2007 – Christopher Hill visits Pyongyang, the first time a U.S. ambassador 
does so since October 2002. 
 
June 25, 2007 – A North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman confirms that BDA funds 
were transferred to Pyongyang and that North Korea would begin shutting down its 
Yongbyon nuclear facilities. IAEA’s Olli Heinonen visits Pyongyang to discuss 
verification procedures of the shutdown. 
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June 27, 2007 – North Korea fires three SRBMs. 
 
August 20-31, 2007 – Ulchi Focus Lens joint exercises by the American and South 
Korean militaries take place. 
 
September 5-6, 2007 – Japan and North Korea hold talks in Ulan Bator over 
normalization of diplomatic relations. 
 
September 6, 2007 – Israelis raid Syrian nuclear facility that was apparently being 
constructed with assistance from North Korea.  
 
September 11-14, 2007 – U.S., Russian and Chinese experts visit North Korea to 
examine facilities in the Yongbyon nuclear complex. 
 
September 27-October 3, 2007 – Six countries meet in Beijing and agree on second 
phase actions. In this phase, North Korea was to “disable” all existing nuclear facilities 
and provide a “complete and correct” declaration of its nuclear programs by the end of 
the year. 
 
November 1, 2007 – A team of U.S. nuclear experts travel to North Korea to begin 
disablement work. 
 
Early November 2007 – Disablement work begins at three facilities at Yongbyon, with 
American experts assisting. 
 
November 27, 2007 – Diplomats and nuclear experts from five countries visit North 
Korea for three days to monitor disablement activities. 
 
December 5, 2007 – Christopher Hill returns to Beijing from a three-day trip to North 
Korea, says differences remain with North Korea on its declaration of nuclear activity. 
 
December 6, 2007 – Christopher Hill tells reporters that uranium program needs to be in 
North Korea’s declaration. 
 
December 7, 2007 – Christopher Hill says U.S. President George W. Bush sent letters to 
North Korea and other parties in the Six Party process to promote the denuclearization 
process. 
 
Mid-December 2007 – North Korea begins removing fuel rods from the nuclear reactor 
in Yongbyon, a key element of the disablement activity there. The process is expected to 
take about 100 days. 
 
December 21, 2007 – Washington Post reports that traces of highly enriched uranium 
was found on aluminum tubes U.S. diplomat Sung Kim brought back from North Korea 
as a sample. 
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December 31, 2007 – Deadline for submission of declaration passes. “Disabling” of the 
reprocessing facility and the nuclear fuel fabrication plant is completed by this time, 
although work on the reactor itself remained. 
 
January 4, 2008 – North Korea says it is not to blame for the failed deadline, saying it 
has disabled the facilities at the quickest pace possible, and has notified the United States 
of the contents of a report on its nuclear programs complied in November. The United 
States says it does not regard the account as a final declaration. 
 
January 2008 – North Korea cuts the pace of the discharging at the nuclear reactor, 
citing the delay in Russian heavy fuel oil delivery. 
 
February 2, 2008 – Christopher Hill says after a three-day visit to Pyongyang that he did 
not receive North Korea’s declaration. Wang Jiarui, head of the Chinese Communist 
Party’s International department, also returns from a trip to Pyongyang on the same day. 
 
February 19, 2008 – Christopher Hill and Kim Kye Gwan meet in Beijing to try to 
resolve their dispute over declaration. 
 
February 26, 2008 – New York Philharmonic performs in Pyongyang. 
 
March 2-7, 2008 – Key Resolve, Foal Eagle joint exercises by the American and South 
Korean militaries take place. 
 
March 8, 2008 – Japan and North Korea end two days of talks in Hanoi on normalizing 
diplomatic ties without progress, 
 
March 13-14, 2008 – Christopher Hill and Kim Kye Gwan meet in Geneva over 
declaration. 
 
March 28, 2008 – North Korea indicates through official media that it will slow down or 
stop disablement activities if the United States sticks to what it called “unreasonable 
demands” over declaration. 
 
March 28, 2008 – North Korea fires three anti-ship cruise missiles. 
 
April 7-9, 2008 – Christopher Hill and Kim Kye Gwan meet in Singapore to resolve the 
declaration problem, reportedly reach provisional compromise. 
 
April 22-23, 2008 – U.S. intelligence community holds briefings for U.S. lawmakers 
regarding evidence that North Korea was assisting Syria with nuclear technology. 
 
April 22-24, 2008 – A U.S. interagency delegation, led by Sung Kim, director of the U.S. 
State Department’s Korean Affairs office, visited North Korea to follow up on the 
provisional agreement reached by Hill and Kim Kye Gwan in Singapore.  
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April 24, 2008 – In its first public statement since the Israeli bombing of a Syrian site in 
September 2007, the White House confirms that Syria has been clandestinely engaged in 
building a nuclear reactor with help from North Korea. 
 
May 9, 2008 – U.S. officials return from Pyongyang with 18,000 pages of documents 
regarding the Yongbyon nuclear complex. 
 
May 17, 2008 – The United States announces it is providing 500,000 tons of food aid to 
North Korea. 
 
May 30, 2008 – North Korea fires three anti-ship cruise missiles. 
 
June 11-12, 2008 – Japan and North Korea hold talks on normalization of diplomatic 
relations in Beijing. 
 
June 18, 2008 – Condoleezza Rice admits U.S. moved up verification requirement in a 
speech at the Heritage Foundation. 
 
June 26, 2008 – North Korea submits a declaration of its nuclear activities to China, the 
chair of the Six Party Talks. U.S. President George W. Bush announces the Trading with 
the Enemy Act no longer applies to North Korea, and notifies Congress of his intention to 
take the country off the list of state sponsors of terrorism. 
 
June 27, 2008 – North Korea blows up cooling tower (was not reported by North Korean 
media) 
 
June 30, 2008 – A shipment of U.S. food assistance arrives in North Korea, marking the 
resumption of food aid to the country after two and a half years. 
 
July 4, 2008 – North Korea says it is ready to cooperate with its counterparts on 
verification, but complains that the other five parties’ economic compensation has only 
reached 80 percent. It also restores the pace of disablement the same week, discharging 
up to 30 fuel rods a day from 15. 
 
July 10-12 2008 – Six countries meet, agree to on broad a mechanism to verify North 
Korea’s declaration of its nuclear program. 
 
July 11, 2008 – North Korea shoots a South Korean tourist at Mt. Kumgang resort, 
allegedly after the 53-year-old Seoul housewife strayed into an off-limits military zone. 
 
July 23, 2008 – Foreign ministers of the six countries meet in Singapore on the sidelines 
of a regional security meeting, confirm political will to move forward with 
denuclearization process. 
 
July 2008 – North Korea restores the pace of disablement activities at the Yongbyon 
nuclear reactor. By mid-July, it pulls 4,000 of the 8,000 fuel rods in the reactor. 
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August 11, 2008 – Forty-five notification period for the removal of North Korea from the 
state sponsors of terrorism list expires without decision from the United States. 
 
August 13, 2008 – Japan’s Akitaka Saiki and North Korea’s Song Il Ho meet in 
Shenyang, reach agreement in which North Korea will reinvestigate abduction cases of 
Japanese nationals. 
 
August 14, 2008 – North Korea suspends disablement steps to counter a U.S. decision to 
delay the country’s removal from its state sponsors of terrorism list. 
 
Around August 14, 2008 – Kim Jong Un suffers stroke. 
 
August 18, 2008 – Ulchi-Focus Lense joint exercises between the American and South 
Korean militaries take place. 
 
August 22, 2008 – Sung Kim meets with North Korean officials in New York to discuss 
verification. 
 
August 26, 2008 – North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman says in a statement that 
verification was supposed to take place in the third phase, not the second phase, and 
should not be a condition for the delisting as a state sponsor of terrorism. 
 
September 2008 – North Korea starts reassembling nuclear facility. 
 
September 6, 2008 – Japanese and North Korean officials meet in Ulan Bator to try to 
resolve North Korean abductions of Japanese nationals but fail to reach breakthrough. 
 
September 9, 2008 – Reports suggest North Korean leader Kim Jong Il suffered a stroke 
about a week earlier. 
 
September 24, 2008 – IAEA says it removed seals from the Yongbyon nuclear complex 
as requested by North Korea. 
 
October 1-3, 2008 – Christopher Hill visits North Korea for talks and reach compromise 
on verification. 
 
October 7, 2008 – North Korea fires two anti-ship cruise missiles. 
 
October 9, 2008 – IAEA says it is no longer granted access to the Yongbyon nuclear 
complex. 
 
October 11, 2008 – The United States takes North Korea off its terrorism list. 
 
October 13, 2008 – North Korea resumes disabling work at its nuclear reactor at 
Yongbyon. IAEA says it is granted access to facilities again. 
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November 4, 2008 – Barack Obama is elected U.S. president. 
 
Early November 2008 – North Korea slows the pace of removal of nuclear fuel rods to 
15 a day from 30 a day in August, complaining about delays in the delivery of promised 
energy assistance. 
 
November 13, 2008 – North Korea says it did not agree to sampling.  
 
December 3, 2008 – Christopher Hill and Kim Kye Gwan meet in Singapore to try to 
resolve the sampling issue, ahead of the meeting of six parties. 
 
December 8-11, 2008 – Six Parties meet in Beijing, but end in stalemate due to 
disagreement over verification. 
 
December 12, 2008 – United States says heavy fuel oil aid to North Korea will stop 
unless verification protocol is put in place. 
 
February 24, 2009 – North Korea announces it will launch an experimental 
communications satellite, which the international community believes is a missile test. 
 
March 2009 – North Korea slows the pace of removal of nuclear fuel rods further, from 
15 a day to 15 a week. 
 
March 9-20, 2009 – Key Resolve, Foal Eagle joint exercises between the American and 
South Korean militaries take place. 
 
March 17, 2009 – North Korea expels members of U.S. nongovernmental organizations 
in North Korea as part of a deal to provide 500,000 tons of food aid. 
 
March 17, 2009 – U.S. journalists Laura Ling and Euna Lee are detained in North Korea. 
 
March 24, 2009 – North Korea warns that it will leave the Six Party Talks and restart its 
nuclear program if the United States pushed for U.N. sanctions due to the missile test. 
 
April 5, 2009 – North Korea launches a rocket, which flies over Japan. 
 
April 13, 2009 – U.N. Security Council condemns rocket launch and announces it will 
broaden sanctions against North Korea. 
 
April 16, 2009 – IAEA inspectors leave North Korea after being expelled. 
 
April 18, 2009 – Last of the U.S. officials who were in North Korea for the disablement 
at the Yongbyon complex leaves the country. 
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April 25, 2009 – North Korea says it began reprocessing spent nuclear fuel rods to 
produce plutonium. When disablement work stopped at the Yongbyon nuclear complex 
on April 14, about 80 percent of the 8,000 nuclear fuel rods in its reactor had been 
removed. 
 
April 29, 2009 – North Korea says it will carry out another nuclear test and test-launch 
ballistic missiles if the U.N. Security Council does not apologize for condemning the 
country’s rocket launch. 
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